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iAbstract
The Impact of Quantitative Easing and Capital Requirements on Bank Lending: An
Econometric Analysis
Marco Spaltro
One of the key problems of the current nancial crisis is weak bank lending growth.
Shortages of capital, low liquidity bu¤ers and weak demand for bank lending have been
identied as possible contributors to bank lending weakness. Given that credit booms and
busts have important implications for both monetary and nancial stability, policymakers
acted swiftly to shore up bank lending growth by supporting demand for lending through
unconventional monetary policy and by establishing a macroprudential policy framework
to limit future imbalances within the nancial system. While the rationales for the use
of unconventional monetary policy and the establishment of a macroprudential policy
framework are di¤erent, they both target, directly or indirectly, bank lending growth to
achieve their objectives. The main contribution of this thesis is to estimate the impact
of quantitative easing and macroprudential policy on bank lending growth by using a
non-publicly available bank panel dataset of UK banks since the late 1980s. This dataset
was constructed by the Bank of England by merging Bank of England balance sheet and
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income statement data (including sectoral lending) with FSA regulatory returns data on
capital (including bank-specic capital requirements). Di¤erently from other research,
we are able to estimate our relationships using data spanning two business cycles and
to study the impact of these policies on various types of sectoral lending. We nd that
these new policies are non-neutral from a bank lending perspective, even though to a
di¤erent extent. In particular, we nd that quantitative easing in the UK has a positive
impact on bank lending even though not particularly large. There is evidence that these
e¤ects may have been more important for small rather than large banks. Moreover,
we also nd that the e¤ect of QE may have been smaller during the nancial crisis
because of lower capital ratios in the banking system. We show that changes in capital
requirements (a possible macroprudential tool) a¤ect bank capital decisions as banks try
to maintain a constant bu¤er above capital requirements. As banks change their capital
structure, bank lending growth is a¤ected. However, there is heterogeneity in the reaction
to changes in capital requirements, as large banks do not change their lending behaviour
following a regulatory shock. We also provide preliminary evidence that banks respond
to a regulatory shock by reducing their exposure to riskier assets in order to decrease
their risk weighted assets and boost their regulatory capital ratio by reducing lending
to private non-nancial corporations. These ndings have important policy implications.
First, quantitative easing in the UK is e¤ective in increasing bank lending growth but
our simulations suggest that the amount of gilts purchased by the Bank of England
may not be enough to provide a signicant stimulus to bank lending growth. Moreover,
these purchases may have been less e¤ective during the crisis period because of capital
constraints in the banking sector. These results suggest that larger asset purchases are
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needed to signicantly increase bank lending and that the e¤ect of asset purchases can be
magnied by further strengthening bankscapital positions. Second, capital requirements
may be an e¤ective macroprudential policy tool and could be used by newmacroprudential
regulators to reduce bank lending growth in boom times in order to contain systemic
risk. However, these e¤ects may be smaller than initially envisaged as large banks seem
insensitive to policy changes. There may be various reasons why these banks do not react
to changes in capital requirements. For example, large banksbetter access to capital
markets may allow these banks to operate with smaller capital bu¤ers. Moreover, if large
banks do not react to capital requirements because of their systemic importance (e.g.
because the threat of default is not credible), changes in the structure of the nancial
system may be necessary to enhance the impact of macroprudential policy.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
One the key problems of the current nancial crisis is weak bank lending growth.
Shortages of capital, low liquidity bu¤ers and weak demand for bank lending have been
identied as possible contributors to bank lending weakness. Given that credit booms and
busts have important implications for both monetary and nancial stability, policymakers
acted swiftly to shore up bank lending growth by supporting demand for lending through
unconventional monetary policy and by establishing a macroprudential policy framework
to limit future imbalances within the nancial system. While the rationale for the use
of unconventional monetary policy and the establishment of a macroprudential policy
framework is di¤erent, they both target, directly or indirectly, bank lending growth to
achieve their objectives.
The objective of uncoventional monetary policy is to ease monetary conditions beyond
the limit posed by policy interest rates at the zero lower bound in order stimulate economic
growth and reach the ination target (Blinder (2010)). Unconventional monetary policy
reaches its objectives by lowering market interest rates and by increasing the quantity
of central bank money in the economy which in turn boosts asset prices, consumption
and investments. At the same time, unconventional monetary policy may also support
bank lending by making bank balance sheets more liquid and therefore more willing to
extend new illiquid loans. Central bank asset purchases may also a¤ect bank lending by
2lowering bank funding costs which may lead to higher prots, faster capital accumulation
and stronger bank lending growth.
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to monitor and reduce systemic risk
which is the risk of developments that threaten the stability of the nancial system as
a whole and consequently the broader economy(Bernanke (2009)). The establishment
of macroprudential regulators was necessary as microprudential regulation is on its own
necessary but not su¢ cient to reduce systemic risk (De Nicoloet al. (2012)). For example,
UK banks were individually robust before the nancial crisis and there were rare failures
of nancial institutions, however their high leverage and interconnectedness meant that
for a given macroeconomic shock the loss to the nancial system was signicant (Bank of
England (2009)). Therefore, macroprudential policy may reach its objectives of reducing
systemic risk by cooling credit growth when large swings in credit pose risks to nancial
stability. For example during a credit boom, the macroprudential regulator may decide
to increase capital requirements to reduce credit growth.
Although we can identify objectives and possible transmission mechanisms, estimating
the e¤ects of these policies on bank lending is a challenging task. This is mainly because
these policies are unprecedented and there is no widely accepted empirical framework to
analyse their impact on bank lending. Moreover, given their rare occurrence, there is a
limited availability of data. For these reasons highlighted above, the empirical literature
is still developing.
Recent empirical literature on unconventional monetary policy focuses mainly on the
e¤ect of these policies on nancial markets and the broader economy (e.g. Joyce et al.
(2011), Gagnon et al. (2010)). This research nds that unconventional monetary policy
3is e¤ective in lowering nancial market yields, boosting economic growth and supporting
bank lending growth. But to our knowledge little has been done to estimate the impact
of unconventional monetary policy on bank lending using panel data (an exception is
Bowman et al. (2011)) and there is currently no research on the impact of quantitative
easing on UK banks.
The literature on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending generally nds
that changes in capital requirements a¤ect bank capital ratios, lower bank lending growth
and increase bank lending spreads (e.g. Francis and Osborne (2010), Osborne et al.
(2012), Aiyar et al. (2012)). These studies therefore provide some evidence that macro-
prudential policy may be e¤ective in containing excessive credit creation. However, this
research does not provide an insight on whether the impact of capital requirements varies
with bankscharacteristics and if banks respond by changing the composition of the loan
portfolio.
The main contribution of this thesis is to estimate the impact of quantitative easing
and macroprudential policy on bank lending growth by using a non-publicly available
bank panel dataset of UK banks since the late 1980s. This dataset was constructed by
the Bank of England by merging Bank of England balance sheet and income statement
data (including sectoral lending) with FSA regulatory returns data on capital (including
capital requirements). Di¤erently from other research, we are able to estimate the main
regressions using data spanning over two business cycles and study the impact of these
policies on various types of lending. We nd that these policies are non-neutral from a
bank lending perspective, even though to a di¤erent extent.
4In particular, we nd that quantitative easing in the UK has a positive impact on
bank lending even though not particularly large. There is evidence that these e¤ects may
have been more important for small rather than large banks. Moreover, we also nd that
the e¤ect of QE may have been smaller during the nancial crisis because of lower capital
ratios in the banking system.
We show that changes in capital requirements (a possible macroprudential tool) a¤ect
bank capital decisions as banks try to maintain a constant bu¤er above capital require-
ments. As banks change their capital structure, bank lending growth is a¤ected. However,
there is heterogeneity in the reaction to changes in capital requirements, as large banks
do not change their lending behaviour following a regulatory shock. We also provide pre-
liminary evidence that banks respond to a regulatory shock by reducing their exposure
to riskier assets in order to decrease their risk weighted assets and boost their regulatory
capital ratio by reducing lending to private non-nancial corporations.
These ndings have important policy implications. First, quantitative easing in the
UK is e¤ective in increasing bank lending growth but our simulations suggest that the
amount of gilts purchased by the Bank of England may not be enough to provide a
signicant stimulus to bank lending growth. Moreover, these purchases may have been
less e¤ective during the crisis period because of capital constraints in the banking sector.
These results suggest that larger asset purchases are needed to signicantly increase bank
lending and that the e¤ect of asset purchases can be magnied by further strengthening
bankscapital positions.
Second, capital requirements may be an e¤ective macroprudential policy tool and could
be used by new macroprudential regulators to reduce bank lending growth in boom times
5in order to contain systemic risk. However, these e¤ects may be smaller than initially
envisaged as large banks seem not to react to policy changes.
This thesis is structured as a consistent piece of research on the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policy and macroprudential policy. In Chapter 2 we review the literature
on the impact of (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy and capital require-
ments on bank lending. Chapter 3 sets the scene for the empirical papers by describing
the transmission mechanism of QE and capital requirements in the UK. In Chapter 4 we
present two simple theoretical models that derive priors on the e¤ects of Quantitative
Easing and capital requirements on bank lending. In Chapter 5 we estimate the e¤ect of
QE on bank lending and then simulate the e¤ect of QE using actual Bank of Englands
asset purchases. Chapter 6 estimates the impact of changes in capital requirements on
bank lending in the UK. Chapter 7 concludes.
In the following paragraphs we summarise the thesis in more detail. In Chapter 2 we
review the most relevant literature on the transmission mechanism of conventional and
unconventional monetary policy and capital requirements on bank lending. In the rst
section we look at the ndings of the bank lending channel literature which establishes
a role for banks in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (e.g. Kashyap and
Stein (1994), Kashyap and Stein (2000)). We then turn to the role of bank capital in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to show that monetary policy is more e¤ective
in a nancial system with more robust nancial institutions (e.g. Van den Heuvel (2002),
Jimenez et al. (2010)).
After analysing the literature on conventional monetary policy we look at current re-
search on unconventional monetary policy which focuses on the e¤ects of unconventional
6policy on nancial markets and the broader economy (e.g. Joyce et al. (2011), Gagnon
et al. (2010)). To our knowledge little has been done to estimate the impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policy on bank lending (Bowman et al. (2011) is an exception) and
there is currently no research on the impact of quantitative easing on UK banks.
In the second section we review the literature on the relationship between capital
and lending. While this research generally nds that capital matters for bank lending
(e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1997)) they do not answer the
question on whether capital requirements a¤ect bank capital and bank lending. This is
because changes in capital requirements are a rare event, for example the introduction of
Basel I accord in 1988, and it is di¢ cult to obtain robust estimates.
However, UK studies exploit the fact that the Bank of England and the FSA have
set time-varying individual capital requirements for more than three decades, so called
triggercapital ratios (capital requirements from now on). These additional requirements
were set by UK regulators starting in 1989 as the regulators felt that Basel I Accord did
not take into account a wide range of risks (e.g. interest rate risks, reputational and op-
erational risks) that may a¤ect rmsprobability of default (Richardson and Stephenson,
2000). Capital requirements are usually set above the minimum regulatory capital and
are mainly based on general market conditions, risk management practice and strength of
individual bankscontrols (FSA (2001), Francis and Osborne (2009)). If a bank breaches
this trigger level, regulatory action is taken. The capital requirements are set by the
FSA on a bank by bank basis and vary over time (they are usually reviewed every 18-36
months) which allows us to use it as a proxy for a macroprudential instrument.
7The literature using UK data on bank specic capital requirements, e.g. Ediz et
al. (1998), Alfon et al. (2005), Francis and Osborne (2009) nd that banks change
their capital ratios following a regulatory changes in capital requirements, i.e. capital
requirements are binding.
Moreover, Francis and Osborne (2010), Osborne et al. (2012) and Ayiar et al. (2012)
show that changes in capital requirements lead to a reduction in bank lending volume
and an increase in bank lending spreads. These ndings, along with the e¤ect of capital
requirements on capital ratios, suggest that capital requirements may be an e¤ective
macroprudential tool.
Chapter 3 sets the scene for the empirical analysis. We rst dene unconventional
monetary policy and macroprudential policy and suggest that these new policies were
necessary to restore nancial and monetary stability after the nancial crisis. We briey
describe the UK nancial system before and after the crisis, focussing in particular on
bank lending. We show that the boom in bank lending was funded mainly by an increase
in leverage which increased nancial fragility and then led to a sharp contraction in
credit. From the description of the fragilities of the UK nancial system we turn to the
transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy (Quantitative Easing, QE)
and macroprudential policy (focussing on capital requirements) on bank lending in the
UK.
QE can a¤ect bank lending indirectly, by boosting demand, and directly by changing
the composition of banksbalance sheets. QE a¤ects banksbalance sheets because the
Bank of England purchases assets from non-bank nancial institutions which leads to an
increase in banksdeposits and reserves held at the Bank of England. These additional
8reserves mean that banks holdings of liquid assets will have increased, making them
less reliant on seeking wholesale funding to manage their liquidity needs. Put another
way, the extra deposits that banks consequently held will have helped relieve any funding
constraints they may have faced. Since these constraints are more likely to bind in times
of nancial stress, it seems possible that this might have led to additional lending.
After looking at QE, we then analyse the transmission mechanism of macropruden-
tial policy by focusing on changes in capital requirements. When the macroprudential
regulator increases capital requirements during a credit boom banks have three options
to meet the new requirements: a) reduce bank lending, b) reduce the riskiness of their
exposures and c) issue fresh equity. However, issuing new equity can be costly because
of asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf (1984)), debt overhang problems (Myers
(1977)) and because of deductibility of debt interest payments. Therefore banks are likely
to respond to an increase in capital requirements by cutting lending and/or by reducing
asset side riskiness.
As discussed previously, the existence of the transmission mechanism of QE and capital
requirements hinges on the presence of imperfections in the debt and equity markets. In
Chapter 4 we therefore develop a theoretical framework based on Kashyap and Stein
(1994) adverse selection model to derive priors on the e¤ects of QE and changes in capital
requirements on bank lending.
Kashyap and Stein (1994) present a simple partial equilibrium model with a stylised
bank balance sheet and shocks to deposits that are driven by changes in monetary policy
stance (e.g. a change in interest rates). Following these shocks the bank may decide
to issue non-deposit liabilities if the stock of liquid assets is not enough to absorb the
9reduction in deposits. Loans cannot be liquidated so only securities can be drawn down
following shocks to deposits. The key feature of this model is that, because of adverse
selection, issuing non-deposit liabilities is costly so that a shock to deposits (e.g. because
of QE) leads to a change in bank lending, the so called bank lending channel. Moreover,
the standard model also predicts that there is a di¤erent reaction of large and small banks
as their costs of issuing non-deposit liabilities vary. After examining the e¤ects of QE on
bank lending using this stylised model, we develop a simple new model where we include
a shock to capital and capital requirements to derive the bank lending supply equation.
These simple models give us two testable predictions on the e¤ects of QE and capital
requirements on bank lending supply. First, the model predicts that an increase in deposits
following QE leads to an increase in lending. And the e¤ect of changes in deposits is
stronger for small banks than for large banks because small banks nd issuing non-deposit
liabilities more costly. Second, changes in capital requirements have an e¤ect on bank
lending. Therefore, increases in capital requirements may be a useful tool to contain
excessive credit creation. On the other hand, the model also suggests that these e¤ects
are heterogenous across banks. Large banks react less to changes in capital requirements
than small banks because of lower costs of issuing capital.
Chapter 5 tests for the existence of the bank lending channel and quanties the e¤ect
of the Bank of Englands QE policy during 2009-10 on bank lending using a new non-
publicly available panel dataset on UK banks. To our knowledge this is the rst paper
that attempts to estimate the e¤ect of the Bank of England programme of asset purchases
on bank lending.
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The use of this unique dataset allows us to model the relationship between bank
lending growth and its determinants over a twenty-year period pre-dating the nancial
crisis and to explore whether the relationship between deposits and bank lending changed
during the crisis. We nd that the bank lending channel exists and that Bank of Englands
QE programme had a positive, albeit economically small, e¤ect on bank lending.
Another important nding is that the estimated positive e¤ects of unconventional
monetary policy on bank lending may have been smaller during the crisis given sharp
reductions in capital ratios by major UK nancial institutions. Along with other studies
(e.g. Van den Heuvel (2002), Jimenez et al. (2010)) these ndings suggest that there is a
tight relationship between the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy and bank capital. We also
explore heterogeneities between large and small banks and nd that the e¤ect is mainly
driven by small banks. This is intuitive given that small banks may nd more costly to
issue non-deposit liabilities during the nancial crisis and therefore may be more credit
constrained than large banks.
Finally, using the historical relationships between bank lending growth and deposit
growth, macroeconomic indicators and individual controls, we simulate the e¤ects of the
actual asset purchases on the banking sector. The simulations suggest that the economic
impact is small and that more asset purchases would be necessary to generate a signicant
increase in bank lending.
In Chapter 6 we estimate a dynamic model of bank lending growth to quantify both
short and long-run e¤ects of changes in capital requirements on bank lending growth.
We also estimate a capital equation to understand how changes in capital requirements
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are transmitted to bankscapital ratios. To do so we employ a newly constructed and
non-publicly available dataset with data since 1989 encompassing two full business cycles.
The e¤ect of the increase in capital requirements is transmitted through increases
of actual holdings of capital. Capital requirements are therefore binding, a necessary
conditions for the transmission mechanism to work.
As capital requirements a¤ect the composition of banksliability side, we would ex-
pect to have an e¤ect on bank lending too. Our results suggest that the e¤ect of capital
requirements on lending is quite large and highly statistically signicant. But the e¤ect
is not homogenous and large and small banks react di¤erently to an increase in capital
requirements. In particular, large banks seem insensitive to a change in regulatory pol-
icy, while small banks react to it quite strongly. This could have potentially important
implications as few large banks constitute a conspicuous slice of the lending market. We
also nd that banks not only reduce the volume of lending but de-risk their balance sheet
in the short term by cutting lending to private non-nancial corporations in an e¤ort to
reduce their risk weighted assets.
From a policy perspective, the macroprudential authority should therefore take into
account that changes in capital requirements are likely to a¤ect bank capital ratios, the
volume and composition of lending. But the e¤ects on total lending may be lower than
initially estimated as large banks may not be a¤ected by changes in capital requirements.
If large banks do not react to capital requirements because of their systemic importance,
changes in the structure of the nancial system may be necessary to enhance the impact
of macroprudential policy.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature review
2.1. Introduction
In this non exhaustive literature review we consider relevant research that will provide
a useful background for the following theoretical and empirical chapters. In the rst
section we review the main papers on the relationship between monetary policy (both
conventional and unconventional) and bank lending from a partial equilibrium perspective.
The theoretical and empirical backing for the existence of this channel is the so called
bank lending viewaccording to which monetary policy a¤ects bank lending not only by
changing the demand for lending, but also by a¤ecting the supply of bank lending. This
theory hinges on economic frictions in debt markets and the imperfect substitutability of
bank lending and bonds by corporates. Overall, existing evidence seems to suggest that
conventional and unconventional monetary policy have an e¤ect on bank lending supply
even though the analysis, especially for unconventional monetary policy, is still largely
unexplored.
In the second section we consider the literature on the e¤ects of capital and capital
requirements on bank lending. Similarly to the bank lending view, changes in capital
and capital requirements have the potential to a¤ect bank lending because of frictions in
the market for equity. While empirical evidence on the relationship between capital and
bank lending is particularly developed, literature on the impact of capital requirements
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on bank lending is more limited. This is because changes in capital requirements are rare
and often a¤ected several banks at the same time making the estimation process di¢ cult
for empirical economists. However, the UK provides a useful natural experiment because
regulators have been setting bank by bank capital requirements for over two decades, the
so called trigger capital requirements. Several papers use this natural experiment to
estimate the e¤ect of capital requirements on bankscapital and lending decisions and
generally nd that changes in capital requirements a¤ect banksbehaviour.
2.2. Evidence on the e¤ects of conventional and unconventional monetary
policy on bank lending
The literature on the impact of recent unconventionalmonetary policy (e.g. QE,
Troubled Asset Relief Programme and Securities Markets Programme (SMP)) on bank
lending is still developing. However, the e¤ects of standard monetary policy, where the
main tool is a changes in interest rates or reserves, on bank lending have been widely
examined in the theoretical and empirical literature. For example, the bank lending view
suggests that because of the existence of frictions in debt markets and non perfect substi-
tutability of bonds and bank lending, changes in monetary policy a¤ect bank lending and
the real economy over and above its e¤ect on demand. In other words, the bank lending
view gives banks an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The existence of this channel has been debated for many years, but the development of
panel econometric techniques and the use of bank and rm level data produced more
evidence in favour of the bank lending channel.
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If standard monetary policy is likely to a¤ect bank lending, unconventional monetary
policy may a¤ect bank behaviour too. For example, Quantitative Easing (QE) in the
UK impact banks balance sheet by increasing banksdeposit base and reserves and by
lowering their funding costs. While evidence on this particular channel is limited at the
moment, initial empirical evidence in other countries seems to conrm that this channel
may exist.
In the sections below we start by reviewing existing research on the bank lending view
and we then review recent empirical papers on the impact of unconventional monetary
policy on the broader economy and bank lending.
2.2.1. E¤ects of standard monetary policy on bank lending
In the classic money view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, banks cannot
a¤ect the real economy as they do not do anything specialcompared to other agents
(e.g. households): they hold only two assets, money and bonds. In this stylised world,
changes in monetary policy a¤ect the real economy only because of frictions in the price
adjustment process (Kashyap and Stein (1993)). A monetary policy tightening reduces
banksdeposits and this reduction leads to a contraction in bonds held by banks. The
household sector will therefore hold less money and more bonds on the asset side of their
balance sheet. With a sticky adjustment in prices, the reduction in household money
balances reduces real money holdings and leads to higher real interest rates which lowers
investments and real economic growth. In this simplied framework, banks do not have
a separate role in accentuating the decline in economic activity and changes to banks
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liabilities do not a¤ect banksprotability and lending. In other words, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem holds in this world.
For example, Romer and Romer (1990) argue that, following a monetary tightening
and a subsequent decline in deposits, banks can always frictionlessly issue non-deposit
liabilities to make up the shortfall in deposits. In this case, the change in monetary policy
a¤ects the real economy only through a decline in loan demand (i.e. an inward shift of
the loan demand curve) and will have no independent impact on bankslending, i.e. an
inward shift of the loan supply curve.
In contrast to the money view of the transmission of monetary policy, the bank lending
view establishes a specic role for banks (Bernanke and Blinder (1989)). In this theoretical
framework, banks not only hold money and bonds, but can also extend loans. If the change
in reserves has an independent impact on bank lending and if some rms are dependent
on bank loans because they cannot access the bond market, changes in monetary policy
will have an impact on economic activity through an inward shift of the lending supply
curve which will not be captured only by increases in real interest rates.
Kashyap and Stein (1993) adopt the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) denition of the
bank lending channel and investigate whether the various conditions for which the bank
lending channel exists are empirically satised. According to this research, there are three
necessary conditions for the lending channel of monetary policy transmission to exist: a)
bonds and bank loans must not be perfect substitutes for rms on the liability side of their
balance sheet, b) the central bank, by changing the amount of reserves in the banking
system must be able to a¤ect the supply of loans and c) there exists some sort of imperfect
adjustment that prevents any monetary tightening from being neutral. After reviewing
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the existing empirical literature, Kashyap and Stein conclude that the evidence on the
existence of the bank lending channel is quite strong, even though more evidence would
be needed to quantify the impact of the bank lending channel on the real economy.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) is probably the rst comprehensive study to provide
empirical evidence on the existence of the bank lending channel. The authors use time
series data to rst show that a monetary tightening reduces bank deposits and also banks
holdings of securities, while the change in monetary policy a¤ects bank lending only with
a lag. However, these conclusions can also be interpreted as supporting the money view
because monetary policy tightening may a¤ect lending via a reduction in loan demand.
Kashyap et al. (1993) try to solve this identication problem by examining demand
for corporate external nancing during periods of monetary tightening. They nd that
following increases in interest rates, commercial paper issuance increased even when bank
lending declines markedly and they interpret this result as evidence of a shift in the bank
lending supply curve while demand for nancing remained strong.
However, other authors (e.g. Oliner and Rudebush (1993)) argue that these results are
also consistent with the fact that monetary policy a¤ect small rms more than large rms
rather than a genuine shift in loan supply. In this case, bank lending declines because
small rmsdemand contracts, while large rms that are less a¤ected by tighter monetary
policy will continue to issue corporate paper.
In an attempt to understand better these sectoral di¤erences and the implications for
the bank lending channel, Kashyap and Stein (1994) develop a simple adverse selection
theoretical model to formulate predictions consistent with the bank lending view and then
use disaggregated data on US banks to test their models predictions. They nd that small
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and large banks react di¤erently to a change in monetary policy, with small banks being
more a¤ected than large banks because the former are more a¤ected by capital markets
frictions. The authors argue that these results are consistent with the bank lending view
even though the limited length of the time series does not allow them to obtain conclusive
results. In line with Kashyap and Stein conclusions, Kishan and Opiela (2000) nd that
small banks are signicantly impacted by changes in monetary policy.
Ashcraft (2006) conclusions are in line with the existence of the bank lending channel
as he shows that large banks react less to a monetary policy shock because these banks
can issue more easily non-deposit liabilities to o¤set the policy induced decline in deposits.
However, the author uses then a structural VAR to conclude that the e¤ect of the bank
lending channel on the real economy is limited. Khwaja and Mian (2008) use a loan
level bank panel dataset and unexpected nuclear experiment in Pakistan, accompanied
by government prohibition to US dollar payments, to analyse the e¤ects of liquidity shocks
on bank lending. The authors nd evidence of a sizeable bank lending channel and nd
that large and politically connected borrowing rms are more able to substitute away the
credit crunch.
Kashyap and Stein (2000) provide strong empirical evidence on the existence of the
bank lending channel using a large panel dataset of US banks by showing that within
the small banks category those with a smaller liquid asset bu¤er react to a tightening
in monetary policy more sharply than those with a larger bu¤er. This is because small
banks with a small bu¤er of liquid assets will not be able to insulate their loan book from
the shrinkage of their balance sheet following tighter monetary policy. Moreover, Kashyap
and Stein use a two step estimation approach to allow for a di¤erent macroeconomic shock
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in each period for each geographical region which will reduce the possibility that changes
in loan demand explain part of the estimated e¤ects.
2.2.2. Standard monetary policy, bank capital and bank lending
The original formulation of the bank lending view, links monetary policy to bank lending
through the e¤ect of interest rates on bank deposits and the existence of frictions in the
market of non-deposit liabilities. However, Kashyap and Stein (1993) also consider the
e¤ects of capital requirements on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a
simple theoretical model and conclude that when capital requirements bind, for example
after experiencing a capital loss, the e¤ect of an expansionary monetary policy on bank
lending are likely to be limited. This happens because capital requirements restrict the
ability of banks to expand their balance sheet even though banks liquidity increases
following a monetary expansion. Even though this paper does not investigate empirically
the role of capital requirements in the bank lending view, it introduces the notion that
capital in the presence of regulatory capital requirements may a¤ect the way in which
monetary policy interacts with the banking system.
Van den Heuvel (2002) develops a theoretical model that explicitly takes into account
the role of bank capital in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Given that
the proportion of non-reservable liabilities in banksbalance sheets has increased, Van
den Heuvel argues that the standard bank lending channel is weaker and that monetary
policy a¤ects bank lending also through bank capital. This transmission mechanism relies
on the assumption that bank loans are slower to adjust than non equity liabilities so that
an increase in interest rates reduces banksprots. And assuming that equity cannot be
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issued costlessly, banks will reduce lending to rebuild their capital following a monetary
tightening.
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Gambacorta (2005) use a sample of Italian banks
to show that bank capital has a crucial role in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. First the authors show that better capitalised banks are less sensitive to tighter
monetary policy as they are able to issue non-deposit liabilities at a lower cost than lower
capitalised banks. Second, they nd evidence that small banks are more a¤ected by
monetary policy shocks due to their elevated assets and liabilities maturity mismatch.
Gambacorta and Ibanez (2010) also argue that capital plays an important role in
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy because poorly capitalised banks are
more exposed to adverse selection problems and nd that it is more costly to issue non-
deposit liabilities following monetary tightening. Paravisini (2006) use a policy change in
Argentina as an instrument to disentangle credit demand and supply and show that small
and lower capitalised banks react more to a change in liquidity, in line with the studies
above.
Jimenez et al. (2010) use Spanish rm and bank level data to test for the existence of
the bank lending channel and to analyse the role of capital in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. The use of bank and rm level data allows the authors to better
disentangle the role of demand and supply on bank lending as they can observe at the
same time the balance sheet of the lender and the balance sheet of the borrower for a given
loan. Jimenez et al. nd that changes in interest rates a¤ect bank lending supporting
the bank lending view. The e¤ect on bank lending is somewhat larger than other papers
(e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000)) which the authors relate to the fact that other papers
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are not able to completely control for demand factors.1 Moreover, the authors nd that
the e¤ect of tighter monetary policy is stronger for poorly capitalised banks suggesting
an important role for capital in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
These ndings are in line with earlier studies using US banking data (e.g. Kishan
and Opiela (2006)) which show that capital plays an important role in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy so that lower capitalised banks will be the most a¤ected
following tighter monetary policy.
2.2.3. E¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on the broader economy
There is now a large and growing literature that attempts to measure the macroeconomic
impact of unconventional monetary policy. These policies a¤ect a variety of economic
variables and the functioning of the nancial system; for example, QE in the UK a¤ect
nominal demand by boosting asset prices (nancial market channel) and by increasing
the monetary base and therefore bank lending (bank lending channel).2
Despite a broad based e¤ect of QE on the nancial system, large part of the literature
has focused so far on the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on nancial markets
and the broader economy. For example, Joyce et al. (2011) study the e¤ects of gilts
purchases by the Bank of England, the so called Quantitative Easing (QE), by using
event studies and econometric analysis to show that asset purchases may have lowered
gilt yields substantially. The authors also show that the e¤ects on riskier assets may
have come through mainly via the portfolio rebalancing e¤ect, whereby sellers of gilts use
1This is because Jiminez et al. are able to account for observed and unobserved time-varying rm loan
demand by including rm-quarter xed e¤ects.
2Section 3.3 will analyse in depth the transmission mechanism of QE.
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money proceeds to bid up risky assets. Using US data, Gagnon et al. (2010) investigate
the e¤ect of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) by the Federal Reserve on nancial
markets and nd that the LSAP has an economically strong and long lasting e¤ect on
long term interest rates on a variety of nancial assets. Gagnon et al. also nd that the
reduction in long term interest rates reects lower risk premia rather than lower expected
policy rates.
Few papers analyse the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on the broader econ-
omy. Chung et al. (2010) analyse the impact of Federal Reserves asset purchases when
short term interest rates are constrained by the zero-lower bound by using a set of econo-
metric models. The authors nd that asset purchases lowered the level of unemployment
and probably prevented the US economy from falling into deation. Similarly to Chung et
al., Kapetanios et al.(2012) use a set of VAR models to estimate the e¤ect of Quantitative
Easing on ination and economic growth in the UK. To construct the counterfactual the
authors assume that QE lowers gilt yields as estimated in Joyce et al. (2011) and that QE
a¤ects the real economy only through lower gilt yields. In line with US empirical evidence,
Kapetanios et al. nd a sizeable positive impact of unconventional policy measures on
economic growth and ination. Bridges and Thomas (2012) use a simple money demand
and supply framework to estimate the impact of QE on the UK economy and nd that
QE lowered gilt yields while increasing ination, results that are broadly consistent with
other evidence found on UK QE.
To our knowledge, little literature is available on the e¤ects of unconventional mone-
tary policy on bank lending and very few papers use panel data. Giannone et al. (2010)
nd that unconventional monetary policy measures in the Euro Area were successful in
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insulating the monetary transmission mechanism from the nancial crisis. The authors
use a Bayesian VAR to construct a counterfactual scenario that is then compared to the
actual readings of economic variables and nd that short term bank loans and M1 be-
haved during the crisis in line with pre-crisis regularities suggesting a positive e¤ect of
non-standard monetary policy on bank lending.
Carpenter et al. (2012) analyse the e¤ects of non-standard monetary policies adopted
by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank on bank lending. The authors
rst nd that there exists a negative relationship between proxies for banks funding
costs and bank lending. They then use estimates from related research on the e¤ects of
unconventional monetary on banksfunding conditions along with their ndings (e.g. Wu
(2008)) to estimate the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on bank lending in the
US and the Euro Area.
Bowman et al. (2011) investigate the e¤ects of Bank of Japans quantitative easing
programme in the early 2000s using a panel dataset of Japanese banks. They nd that
there is a statistically signicant positive relationship between banksliquidity position
and bank lending so that quantitative easing, given its enhancing e¤ect on banksliquidity
position, may have led to increased bank lending. However, the authors also nd that the
magnitude of the e¤ect is not economically signicant and that liquidity injections were
e¤ective only during the initial years of the programme when the nancial system was
impaired.
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2.3. Current evidence on the e¤ects of macroprudential policy
The role of capital on bank lending is well documented in the empirical literature.
The main nding is that better capitalised banks lend more than poorly capitalised banks
and that more capital helps banks isolating their lending schedule from adverse economic
e¤ects. The key problem in identifying the e¤ect of capital on bank lending is disentangling
supply and demand e¤ects. If, for example, we observe that capital is declining along
with lending this may be due to either a supply problem where the bank does not have
enough capital to lend (a so called capital crunch) or a demand problem where bad
macroeconomic conditions a¤ect borrowerscreditworthiness and therefore bankscapital
position and bank lending. Much of the empirical literature focuses on addressing this
question using di¤erent identication strategies.
While the literature on the e¤ects of capital on bank lending is well established, few
papers have investigated the e¤ect of regulatory capital requirements on bank lending.
This relative lack of empirical research may be due to the fact that there have been few
changes in capital requirements, which makes the relationship between capital require-
ments and bank lending di¢ cult to identify. For example, the Basel I accord in 1988
established common minimum capital requirements of 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets
initially adopted by major advanced countries and then implemented by other several
countries worldwide. For studies exploiting the time-series variation around the imple-
mentation of Basel II it will be challenging to completely disentangle the e¤ect of changes
in capital requirements, demand factors and changes in the supervisory environment, e.g.
examination standards (Jackson et al. (1999)), even though studies using US and Euro-
pean banks suggest that the introduction of Basel II may not have a signicant impact
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on bank lending behaviour (Fabi et al. (2005), Liebig et al. (2007), Lang et al. (2008)).
And cross-section analysis, e.g. across countries, will be a¤ected by di¤erent institutional
factors and di¤ering bank variables denitions that are di¢ cult to account for in the
empirical analysis. Even though capital requirements were originally introduced as an
instrument to enhance the resilience of the nancial system rather than a time varying
tool for macroprudential regulators, the recent development of macroprudential policy
has attracted the attention of empirical economists trying to estimate the e¤ectiveness of
capital requirements as a macroprudential tool, for example in curbing excessive credit
creation.
A branch of the literature in the UK investigate the e¤ects of changes in time varying
capital requirements on bank lending. The UK provides a unique natural experiment
because capital requirements were set by the Bank of England and the FSA on a bank
by bank basis, the so called trigger capital requirements (capital requirements from
now on), for more than two decades. These additional requirements were set by UK
regulators starting in 1989 as the regulators felt that the Basel I Accord did not take into
account a wide range of risks (e.g. interest rate risks, reputational and operational risks)
that may a¤ect rmsprobability of default (Richardson and Stephenson, 2000). Capital
requirements are usually set above the minimum regulatory capital and are mainly based
on general market conditions, risk management practice and strength of individual banks
controls (FSA (2001), Francis and Osborne (2009)). If a bank breaches this triggerlevel,
regulatory action is taken. The capital requirements are set by the FSA on a bank by
bank basis and vary over time (they are usually reviewed every 18-36 months) which allow
the researchers to use it as a proxy for a macroprudential instrument.
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However, these requirements were set for microprudential reasons so that the esti-
mated e¤ect may be di¤erent when set by the macroprudential regulator. This is because
the microprudential regulator changes the capital requirements based only on individual
banksriskiness while the macroprudential regulator aims to reduce systemic risk. For ex-
ample, the microprudential regulator may not have increased capital requirements before
the nancial crises if all the nancial institutions were individually sound but a macro-
prudential regulator may have increased capital requirements if it deemed the nancial
system over leveraged and therefore posing systemic risks.
This is not an exhaustive literature review but we will pick out the main papers that
are closely related to our research, starting from the relationship between capital and
lending and then turning to the e¤ects of time-varying capital requirements on capital
and bank lending in the UK.
2.3.1. Relationship between capital and lending
Bernanke and Lown (1991) use US state and individual bank level data to investigate the
role of the capital crunch in the early 1990s recession. This paper tries to disentangle
demand from supply factors by using bank level data from individual states so that the
economic conditions facing local banks were similar across banks. In this case di¤erent
responses in lending should be due primarily to shocks to capital rather than changes in
demand. The authors nd that the capital ratio has a positive, but economically small,
e¤ect on bank lending and that this result is mainly driven by small banks. Hancock
and Wilcox (1998) use an instrumental variable approach on US banking data to correct
for possible simultaneity bias and also nd that shocks to capital a¤ect bank lending.
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Similarly to Bernanke and Lown, declines in capital a¤ect small banks more than large
banks.
Peek and Rosengren (1995) nd that banks balance sheets may have contracted
sharply in the early 1990s not only because of capital losses but because of higher binding
capital requirements around the implementation of the Basle I accord. As in Bernanke
and Lown, they address the demand-supply nexus by restricting the sample to a single
US state so that all the banks are facing the same macroeconomic conditions.
Peek and Rosengren (1997) was the rst study using a natural experiment to inves-
tigate the e¤ect of capital on bank lending. The authors exploit a sharp deterioration
in Japanese bankscapital positions in the early 1990s, due to an unprecedented decline
in Japanese equity prices, to show that lending of US branches of these banks declined
more than other US banks. Given that lending by US banks was strong at the time, the
authors conclude that the decline in lending by Japanese branches was due to the sharp
deterioration in the capital position of Japanese parent banks, therefore establishing the
existence of a strong supply e¤ect. Their ndings also suggest that the decline in lending
by Japanese branches was exacerbated by the introduction of binding capital requirements
(Basel I accord) and Japanese parent banksattempt to insulate domestic borrowers from
a credit crunch.
Jimenez et al. (2010, 2012b) use a unique dataset with rm and bank level data in
Spain to better control for individual rm loan demand. The authors nd that capital and
liquidity positions of both banks and rms matter for the probability of granting a loan
and that during a recession or when monetary policy is tight, banks with more capital
and liquidity grant more loans than undercapitalised banks. This rm-bank level dataset
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helps addressing the identication issues that a¤ect the majority of the empirical banking
literature because it controls for both lenders and borrowersbalance sheets. The authors
also nd that the inclusion of rm specic e¤ects increases strongly the e¤ects of capital
on lending so that previous studies are likely to underestimate the role of banks in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.3
2.3.2. E¤ect of capital requirements on capital decisions
The studies reviewed in the previous subsection consider the e¤ects of shocks to total
capital ratios on bank lending. Given that changes in capital ratios reect losses in the
banks loan or trading book which are often highly correlated with declines in economic
activity, this may complicate the identication problem.
The focus of our research is on the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending.
A regulatory change in capital requirements also constitutes a shock to capital as banks
will be able to use up less capital therefore decreasing their ability to extend new loans.
However, banks may react di¤erently to a change in capital requirements as regulatory
actions convey information on the regulatorsview on the riskiness of the bank. Following
regulatory action, the bank may decide to change its behaviour by for example accumu-
lating more capital to accommodate the new (heightened) capital requirement which in
turn may have an e¤ect on bank lending.
For this channel to exist, capital requirements need to a¤ect total capital, i.e. capital
requirements are binding. The link between capital requirements and capital is therefore
a necessary condition for the transmission mechanism between capital requirements and
3This is because there is a higher degree of correlation between the amount of bankscapital and the type
of borrower.
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lending to exist. Below we briey review research trying to investigate the e¤ect of
capital requirements on bank capital. Because of the availability of bank by bank capital
requirements in the UK (as opposed to one o¤ changes in capital requirements), this
literature uses mainly data on UK banks.
Ediz et al. (1998) use a panel dataset of UK banks to investigate the e¤ects of changes
in individual bankscapital requirements on bank capital and lending decisions. Ediz et
al. nd that when regulators increase capital requirements banks increase their capital
ratio. The authors also use their results to infer that banks reach their new desired capital
ratio by issuing new capital rather than reduce the riskiness of their exposures.
Alfon et al. (2005) use a panel of UK banks to investigate the pass through of changes
in capital requirements on banks and building societiescapital ratios. Similarly to Ediz
et al., they nd that banks and building societies adjust their capital ratios in response
to changes in capital requirements. However, the authors also nd that their reaction is
asymmetric depending on whether nancial institutions experience an increase or decrease
in capital requirements.
Francis and Osborne (2009) estimate a dynamic panel model and data on UK banks
for the 1998-2006 period and also nd that changes in capital requirements a¤ect banks
capital ratio. The authors also interact changes in capital requirement with the busi-
ness cycle and nd that the relationship between capital requirements and bank capital
becomes stronger in an economic upturn than in a downturn. Moreover, Osborne et al.
(2012) show within an error correction model framework that capital requirements a¤ect
bankstarget capital and conclude that capital requirements are therefore binding.
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In the US, the analysis on the e¤ects of bank by bank capital requirements on bank
capital is more limited. However, early literature (Peltzman (1970), Mingo (1975) and
Dietrich and James (1983)) estimated the e¤ects of regulatory target capital on a bank
by bank basis (the so called ABC ratio) on bankscapital decisions and nd inconclusive
results. While Peltzman nd that changes in ABC ratios do not have an e¤ect bank
capital ratios, Mingo use bank level data to show a positive e¤ect of ABC ratios on bank
capital. Dietrich and James analyse a di¤erent time period and conclude that Mingo
results may have been driven by other regulatory factors rather than capital regulation.
More recently, Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) investigate the e¤ect of Prompt Correc-
tive Action (early regulatory intervention on problem banks) on bankscapital decision
using a partial adjustment framework and found that PCA increased bankscapital ratio.
Even though PCA does not involve changes in bank by bank capital requirements (as in
the UK case), it represents, similarly to changes in UK trigger capital requirements, an
increase in regulatory pressure on bank capital.
2.3.3. Capital requirements and bank lending
A new branch of banking literature is now emerging in the UK exploiting the fact that
UK regulators have been setting time varying bank by bank capital requirements above
minimum capital requirements. Di¤erently from other studies this regulatory experiment
can be used as a proxy for macroprudential policy instruments (even though the intent of
the regulator was primarily microprudential), such as the countercyclical capital bu¤er,
as it allows to capture the e¤ect of changes in capital requirements on capital decisions
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and bank lending. Our empirical research sits within this new branch of the banking
literature.
Francis and Osborne (2010) use a partial adjustment model and panel data on UK
banks to determine whether individual capital requirements set on a bank by bank basis
by the regulator have an e¤ect on target (i.e. desired) capital ratios. Di¤erently from
other partial adjustment models with target capital ratios (e.g. Hancock and Wilcox
(1994)), Francis and Osborne include capital requirements as a determinant of the desired
capital ratio, therefore isolating the e¤ect of regulatory changes on banksdesired capital.
The authors then use the gap from the estimated target capital ratio as a regressor in a
lending equation to determine the e¤ect of changes in capital requirements on lending.
As in previous studies using UK data, Francis and Osborne nd that capital requirements
a¤ect the desired level of capital, i.e. capital requirements are binding4. The authors
also nd that the gap between the target capital ratio and the actual capital ratio has a
positive e¤ect on lending so that when the actual capital is below the target capital banks
shrink their balance sheet to rebuild their capital. The paper then uses the estimates
on the e¤ects of capital requirements on lending to simulate the e¤ect of countercyclical
capital bu¤ers during the credit boom in the UK and nd a negative and signicant e¤ect
on the stock of bank lending and a positive impact on bank capitalisation levels after
four years. Francis and Osborne then conclude that the use of countercyclical capital
requirements may lead to a more resilient nancial system.
4The term bindingcapital requirements in the banking literature refer to capital requirements that a¤ect
the level of capital held by banks. This should not be confused with other terms used in the economics
literature, e.g. binding constraints.
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Ayiar et al. (2012) use a large panel dataset on UK banks to answer two main
questions. First, the authors estimate the impact of changes in capital requirements on
bank lending using a simple panel econometric model. Second, they estimate the impact
of capital requirements on lending of UK resident foreign branches to study to what extent
the e¤ectiveness of capital requirements may be a¤ected by other non-regulated nancial
institutions. The authors nd that changes in capital requirements a¤ect bank lending
growth, results that conrm the role of capital requirements found in Francis and Osborne
(2010). Moreover, Ayiar et al. also nd that unregulated banks increase their lending
in response to tighter capital requirements, so that the e¤ect of capital requirements on
total lending (i.e. lending by regulated and unregulated nancial institutions) may not be
as strong as estimated when taking into account only the regulated sector. The authors
argue therefore in favour of an internationally agreed macroprudential policy framework
that would reduce the potential for regulatory leakage.
Studies on the relationship between capital requirements and bank lending are not
limited to the UK. Jimenez et al. (2012a) analyse the impact of countercyclical capital
requirements (so called dynamic provisioning in Spain) using a Spanish bank-rm level
dataset which allows to better disentangle demand and supply factors. The authors rst
nd that the introduction of dynamic provisioning led to a contraction in credit in 2000,
while banks increased lending following a loosening of provisioning requirements in 2005.
During the nancial crisis in 2008, banks with higher bu¤ers built in good times were able
to reduce lending less than banks with lower bu¤ers. This suggests that countercyclical
capital bu¤ers may smooth credit supply cycles. Watanabe (2007) shows the importance
of tighter regulation in generating a credit crunch in Japan in the late 1990s. The author
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also shows that public capital injections led to an increase in lending which was not
su¢ cient to o¤set the previous regulatory induced decline.
Di¤erently from the other studies reviewed above, Osborne et al. (2012) analyse the
e¤ect of capital requirements on bank lending rates, rather than bank lending volumes,
using an Error Correction Model (ECM). The model is estimated on individual banks to
fully capture heterogeneity and allows to disentangle short and long term e¤ects of capital
requirements. The authors nd a positive long-term relationship between the bank target
capital, which is a function of capital requirements, and lending rates. Osborne et al.
interpret this results as evidence of the existence of a cost of capital e¤ect, i.e. higher target
capital ratios lead to higher funding costs and therefore higher lending spreads. However,
Osborne et al. also nd that this relationship weakens signicantly after 2007 because
capital requirements are not binding when marketcapital requirements dominate. This
e¤ect prevails because in times of nancial crisis rising risk aversion increases the amount
of bank capital required by market participants, which is often above the regulatory capital
requirements. Finally, the authors nd that short term deviations of capital from target
capital does not a¤ect lending rates and use this nding as evidence that banks with
capital decits do not use higher lending spreads to rebuild their capital bu¤ers. From a
policy perspective, these ndings suggest that macroprudential policy may be e¤ective in
dampening a credit boom, while it may be less e¤ective in boosting lending growth during
periods of nancial instability, i.e. the e¤ects of capital requirements may be asymmetric
through the credit cycle.
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CHAPTER 3
Setting the scene
3.1. Introduction
One of the key problems of the current nancial crisis in the UK is weak bank lending
growth. For this reason, the Bank of England and the UK Government announced in July
2012 the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) to lower bank funding costs and support
lending to the real economy (Bank of England (2012)). Supply factors (e.g. low bank
capital and low liquidity bu¤ers) and weak demand for bank lending have been identied as
possible contributors to bank lending weakness (Bell and Young (2010)). These problems
are the result of the fragility of the nancial system that led to the crisis (for example
excessive credit creation funded by an increase in leverage) and the unprecedented impact
of the nancial crisis on economic growth and bank lending demand. Macroprudential
policy and unconventional monetary policy have a role in reducing excessive swings in
credit growth that may generate nancial and monetary instability.
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to monitor and reduce systemic risk
which is the risk of developments that threaten the stability of the nancial system as
a whole and consequently the broader economy(Bernanke (2009)). The establishment
of macroprudential regulators was necessary as microprudential regulation is on its own
necessary but not su¢ cient to reduce systemic risk (De Nicoloet al. (2012)). For example,
UK banks were individually robust before the nancial crisis and there were rare failures
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of nancial institutions, however their high leverage and interconnectedness meant that
for a given macroeconomic shock the loss to the nancial system was signicant (Bank of
England (2009)).
The close link between excessive credit creation and systemic risk1 provides macro-
prudential policy with the role of reducing swings in bank lending that may a¤ect the
stability of the nancial system (Bank of England (2009)). Systemic risk can have a time
series dimension, i.e. the build up of asset bubble and excessive credit creation and a
cross sectional dimension, i.e. the risk that a failure of a major nancial institution a¤ect
the stability of the nancial system. In this section we will refer only to the time series
dimension of systemic risk.
Changes in capital requirements are considered as one of the main tools available
to macroprudential regulators. For example, the introduction of countercyclical capital
bu¤ers in Basel III Accord are based on capital add-ons that increase with the gap of
credit/GDP ratio from its historical average (BIS (2010a,b)). Raising capital requirements
during a lending boom forces banks to reduce their leverage either by cutting lending,
issue fresh equity or a combination of the two (this e¤ect is stronger if capital requirements
are binding). All these actions are consistent with the objective of macroprudential policy
of reducing systemic risk.
However, the task of estimating the impact of changes in macroprudential policy on
bank lending and the broader economy is a challenging one. First, there is limited history
on the use of macroprudential instruments as these tools were mainly adopted in Emerging
Market economies since the early 1990s (Lim et al. (2011)). Second, a macroprudential
1For example when credit/GDP ratio increases compared to its historical averages, see BIS (2010a)
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policy framework comprises a wide set of tools, for example changes in countercyclical cap-
ital bu¤ers, leverage ratios and sectoral capital requirements (Bank of England (2012a)).
Lim et al. provide a preliminary investigation on the role of macroprudential tools and
show that these instruments may be e¤ective in mitigating systemic risk. Moreover, Os-
borne at al. (2012) suggest that changes in capital requirements have an e¤ect on bank
lending.
Macroprudential policy is still at an early stage of development as only few central
banks and regulators have started to put in place a policy framework similar to that
developed for monetary stability. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the UK, the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU and the Financial System Oversight
Council (FSOC) in the US are early examples of macroprudential policy frameworks.
Turning to unconventional monetary policy, the objective of QE is to support demand
in order to maintain monetary stability after reaching the zero lower bound. QE may
therefore a¤ect bank lending indirectly through demand for lending, but it may also
a¤ect supply directly if it also has an impact on bank balance sheet and protability, for
example by lowering bank funding costs.
It is di¢ cult to clearly identify the ne line between conventional and unconventional
monetary policies. In broad terms, monetary policy becomes unconventional when the
instruments adopted by the central bank to achieve its goals di¤er from the instruments
that are used in normal times. For example, before the nancial crisis the Bank of England
(BoE) implemented its monetary policy decisions by setting the interest rate at which it
remunerated banksreserves in a corridor system where banks periodically set their own
reserves targets, the so called Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) (Clews et al. (2010)).
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However, the BoE departed from the SMF in March 2009 after the beginning of the
QE programme and now implements monetary policy decisions by purchasing UK gilts
nanced by central bank money.
The key question is whether unconventional monetary policy was successful in boost-
ing economic growth and restore the correct functioning of the transmission mechanism
in order to support bank lending. Some empirical papers investigate the e¤ect of uncon-
ventional monetary policies on nancial markets (e.g. Joyce et al. (2011), Gagnon et al.
(2010)), on the broader economy and bank lending (Kapetanios et al. (2012), Giannone et
al. (2011) and Chung et al. (2011)) and generally conclude that these programmes were
successful in easing market stress, boosting demand and enhance bank lending. Along
with the Bank of England, other major central banks started unconventional monetary
policy programmes, for example the European Central Bank with (among others) Long
Term Renancing Operations (LTRO) and the Federal Reserve with Large Scale Asset
Purchases (LSAP) programme.
To set the scene for the theoretical and empirical papers, we rst briey outline the
possible causes of the current crisis and e¤ects of the crisis on the UK nancial system.
We then look at unconventional monetary policy and macroprudential policy and how
they are transmitted to the nancial system and we then briey review initial ndings on
their e¤ectiveness.
3.2. A brief review of causes and e¤ects of the nancial crisis
The causes of the current crisis have been well documented in the literature and
generally include a combination of rising global imbalances, loose monetary policy and
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Figure 3.1. Sectoral bank lending in the UK
inadequate banking supervision (Merrouche and Nier (2010)). We will not investigate the
root causes of the current crisis, but we will briey review some of the imbalances in the
nancial system that led to the current crisis and the subsequent sharp decline in bank
lending. Given that the rest of the thesis focuses on the UK banking system we will only
consider developments in the UK nancial system.
Financial system leverage is an indicator of nancial fragility because the higher the
leverage the stronger the impact of a loss on bankssolvency position. In the run up to
the crisis, UK banks expanded their balance sheet three-fold to around £ 7tn driven by
increases in secured lending to households and lending to private non nancial corpora-
tions. The increase in lending growth was particularly strong before 2007 but declined
sharply after the nancial crisis (Figure 3.1) .
The expansion in banksbalance sheet may be accompanied by increases in equity
so that overall systemic fragility does not increase. However, Figure 3.2 shows that the
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Figure 3.2. Leverage ratio for major UK banks
expansion in banksbalance sheet was mainly fueled by an increase in debt. Major UK
banks leverage increased sharply until 2008 to unprecedented levels in recent history.
Bank leverage declined sharply following the nancial crisis and has now reached levels
more consistent with long run averages.
An increase in credit in itself is not necessarily detrimental to nancial stability be-
cause it may be linked to a stronger economy and therefore stronger demand for lending.
However, absent structural changes in the economy, credit growth should not be stronger
than its norm based on economic fundamentals for a prolonged period of time. This is
because excessive credit growth has been often associated with an increased probability
of nancial crises. For example, the gap between total credit and its long term trend
is widely used by policymakers as a leading indicator for nancial instability (Borio and
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Lowe (2002)).2 Figure 3.3 shows that the expansion in UK banksbalance sheet translated
into excessive credit growth. The credit gap increased to around 15 per cent of UK GDP
in 2007, while the most recent readings suggest that credit is well below its historical
norm and comparable to the previous credit bust in the early 1990s.
Periods of credit exuberance are often followed by sharp credit contractions which
may lead to monetary and nancial instability. The contraction in credit in the UK
following the nancial crisis was particularly severe, even when compared with other
recent systemic banking crisis in developed countries (Figure 3.4). Credit growth in the
UK has been negative for around three years and only the latest data suggest a return
towards nil growth.
While these charts do not tell us much about the drivers of the increase and subsequent
fall in credit - they can be caused by both supply and demand factors - they suggest
that policymakers had to take steps to address the sharp fall in credit demand and to
prevent excessive credit growth. This is because falls in credit are important drivers of
economic growth and they can a¤ect nancial stability as loss rates on loans increase and
capital bu¤ers decline. In the following sections we review the transmission mechanism of
quantitative easing and macroprudential policy and we examine how these policies may
a¤ect bank lending.
2Long term trends for total credit are often estimated by using long term averages or Hodrick-Prescott
lters.
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Figure 3.3. Credit gap to GDP ratio in the UK
3.3. The role of unconventional monetary policy during the crisis
In the previous section we suggest that excessive credit creation has an important
role in increasing fragilities within the nancial system and that credit has contracted
sharply following the nancial crisis. Contraction in credit has important implications for
both monetary and nancial stability. First, a reduction in credit a¤ects the capacity of
rms and households to fund investments and purchases of goods which in turn lowers
economic activity. This means that for a given supply, the following decline in demand
lowers inationary pressures. Second, higher rms and householdsinsolvencies increase
loanswrite o¤s and therefore reduce bank capital bu¤ers. Lower economic activity and a
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Figure 3.4. Credit growth after sytemic banking crises
more fragile (i.e. less capitalised) nancial system a¤ect demand and supply for lending
and credit contracts even more.
Unconventional monetary policy in the UK can increase bank lending indirectly by
supporting economic activity, and therefore demand for lending, and directly by changing
the composition of banksbalance sheet (Figure 3.5). QE may therefore increase bank
lending through three main economic channels: 1) e¤ect on asset prices and portfolio
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Figure 3.5. Transmission mechanism of QE
rebalancing; 2) bank lending and quantity e¤ects; and 3) changes in expectations (Benford
et al. (2009)). We now review these three channels in turn.
First, as the BoE purchases gilts nanced by central bank money from non-bank
nancial institutions the balance sheet composition of these institutions change as non-
bank nancial institutionsdeposits held at their banks increases as a share of total assets.
After the gilts sale the non bank nancial institution may want to rebalance its portfolio
if the new deposits are not a perfect substitute of the gilts they sold the central bank,
the so called portfolio rebalancinge¤ect. As nancial institutions buy other assets (e.g.
corporate bonds), the price of these and other instruments increases until the portfolio
of the nancial institutions is rebalanced, i.e. share of money in the portfolio reaches the
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desired level. This increase in asset prices lowers funding costs for corporates and increases
household consumption through wealth e¤ects which in turn boosts economic activity and
ination. Finally, higher spending and income boost demand for bank lending.
Second, quantitative easing may a¤ect the supply of lending directly by increasing the
liquidity of banksbalance sheet, the so called bank lendinge¤ect. When the BoE pur-
chases assets from non-bank nancial institutions nanced by central bank money, bank
deposits and reserves at the central bank increase as the non-bank nancial institutions
deposit cash from the sale of gilts. Purchasing assets from non-bank nancial institutions
is a distinctive feature of BoE QE (as opposed to QE in Japan for example) and the main
aim is to increase broad money as well as narrow money (Benford et al. (2009)). Figure
3.6 shows the direct channel of QE on bank lending from a balance sheet perspective,
i.e. tracing the exchange of money across the nancial system when assets are purchased
from banks (e.g. QE in Japan) and when assets are purchased from non-bank nancial
institutions as in the UK. A higher level of reserves as a proportion of bank assets may
increase bankswillingness to extend new loans as their precautionary motive for holding
liquid bu¤ers decreases (i.e. hold a bu¤er to avoid sudden liquidity problems) and banks
may be willing to increase illiquid assets (e.g. loans) on their balance sheet.
Third, unconventional monetary policy in the UK may also a¤ect bank lending indi-
rectly via the expectations channel. The announcement of asset purchases should have
a positive e¤ect on ination expectations as QE has the e¤ect of reducing the probabil-
ity of a deationary scenario. In this case real interest rates will remain low enough to
support investments and household spending. Moreover, the willingness of the central
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Figure 3.6. Impact of QE on banksbalance sheet
bank to shore up the economy and maintain stable ination may increase condence and
therefore economic growth.
There is a growing literature on the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on
nancial markets and the broader economy (e.g. Joyce et al. (2011), Kapetanios et al.
(2012), Chung et al. (2010)) but the literature on the e¤ects of unconventional monetary
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policy on bank lending is more limited (especially using panel data) and to our knowledge
there is no research that examines this e¤ect in the UK.
However, the empirical evidence so far seems to suggest that unconventional monetary
policies in major economies may be e¤ective in supporting bank lending growth. Bowman
et al. (2012) examine the e¤ect of Quantitative Easing policies on bank lending in Japan
in the early 2000s using a panel data of Japanese banks and nd that there is a positive
but economically small e¤ect on bank lending. Using aggregated data, Giannone et al.
(2012) show that unconventional monetary measures taken by the ECB had a positive
e¤ect on bank lending and Carpenter et al. (2012b) reaches similar conclusions by using
aggregated data on US and Euro Area banks.
3.4. Macroprudential policy: reducing the magnitude of nancial crises
Sharp increases in credit like the ones experienced before the current nancial crisis
often lead to nancial instability. While it is possible for the central bank to ease the sharp
fall in demand by cutting interest rate and by using unconventional monetary policy, it is
now widely accepted that central banks and regulators should avoid these excessive build
ups in credit in the rst place.
The objective of the macroprudential regulator is to monitor and reduce systemic
risk and therefore it has a role in leaning against the windwhen credit growth is too
strong. Given that the analysis of macroprudential policy is still at the early stages, there
is no consensus on how changes in macroprudential policy may a¤ect bank lending. In
Figure 3.7 we present a possible transmission mechanism of capital requirements which
is one of the instruments that may be used by the Financial Policy Committee in the
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Figure 3.7. The transmission mechanism of changes in capital requirements
UK. Moreover, the literature on the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending is the
most developed and our empirical analysis will focus on this particular macroprudential
instrument.
In a credit boom, the macroprudential regulator may want to reduce bank lending
growth through an increase in capital requirements and lower them during a credit bust
to support lending growth. An increase in capital requirements can be binding, i.e. it
a¤ects bankscapital ratios or non binding, i.e. banks do not change their capital structure
following a change in capital requirements.
If the capital structure remains unaltered following a change in capital requirements,
there should be no e¤ect on bank lending as banks are comfortablewith a reduction in the
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capital bu¤er (i.e. capital above the capital requirement). However, the banking literature
suggests that this is unlikely as banks try to hold a bu¤er above capital requirements to
insure against the risk of breaching the regulatory minimum and being liquidated (Chami
and Cosimano (2001)). Therefore we may expect that, for a given increase in capital
requirements, banks will increase their capital ratio. This increase can be achieved in
three ways: a) by raising fresh capital, b) by reducing lending growth and c) by de-risking
the asset side of the balance sheet.
But given various frictions in the market for equity (e.g. adverse selection problem,
Myers and Majluf (1984) and debt overhang problem, Myers (1977)) banks are likely
to reduce lending rather than raise fresh capital (see also Hyun and Rhee (2011) for a
theoretical model). Alternatively, banks can change the composition of their loan book
without necessarily reducing total lending stock. Even in the event the bank decides to
issue fresh capital, this may lead to an increase in bank funding cost given that equity is
more expensive than debt and interest paid on debt are tax deductible. We would there-
fore expect that bank lending declines following an increase in capital requirements and
empirical evidence on the e¤ects of changes in capital requirements on lending supports
the theoretical ndings (VanHoose (2008)).
However, it is particularly di¢ cult to identify an e¤ect of changes in capital require-
ments (for example the introduction of Basel I or Basel II accords) on capital and lending
because changes in capital requirements are rare events. For example, Jacques and Nigro
(1997) investigate the e¤ects of the Basel I accord on US banks in the year following its
introduction in 1990. However, given that the US experienced a recession in 1991, their
results may have captured both regulatory changes and demand factors. An interesting
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development in this literature is the use of bank-by-bank time-varying capital require-
ments set above the minimum capital requirements by UK regulators since late 1980s, the
so called trigger ratios. Before 2001 the Bank of England set the trigger ratios based on
bank specic factors such as the quality of risk management, the quality of internal control
and accounting systems, its size and outlook of markets where the bank was positioned.
The power of setting trigger ratioswas passed over the FSA in 2001 and were set as a
part of the Pillar 2 process.
To our knowledge, there is no other available information on other regulators setting
capital requirements in this way so that the UK experience can be considered a macropru-
dential policy natural experiment. Aiyar et al. (2012) suggest that discretionary setting
of capital requirements in the UK played a greater role than in other major countries.
Of course, these capital requirements are set according to microprudential rules but they
can still be considered proxies for macroprudential tools.
Francis and Osborne (2010) and Osborne et al. (2012) suggest that changes in capital
requirements are binding (i.e. a¤ect bankscapital decisions) and that capital require-
ments have an e¤ect on bank lending. Even though a macroprudential policy framework
still needs to be implemented in major economies, these ndings generally indicate that
changes in capital requirements may have the desired e¤ect in reducing bank lending.
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CHAPTER 4
A Simple Theoretical Framework: Two Adverse Selection
Models
4.1. Introduction
In this section we develop two stylised models to derive priors on the e¤ects of Quan-
titative Easing (QE) and changes in capital requirements on bank lending. The key
contribution of this chapter is the development of a consistent theoretical framework to
examine the e¤ects of QE and changes in capital requirements on bank lending. We will
then test the predictions of the models in the following empirical chapters by using a
newly constructed and non-publicly available panel dataset of UK banks.
The two models are based on Kashyap and Stein (1994) adverse selection model which
is a simple partial equilibrium model with a stylised bank balance sheet and shocks to
deposits that are driven by changes in monetary policy stance (e.g. a change in interest
rates). Following these shocks the bank may decide to issue non-deposit liabilities if the
stock of liquid assets is not enough to absorb the reduction in deposits. Loans cannot be
liquidated so only securities can be drawn down following shocks to deposits.
The model is a simplistic description of how monetary policy a¤ects bank lending.
For example, the basic assumption is that changes in interest rates a¤ect reserves and
therefore the amount of deposits in the banking system. But this may not necessarily
happen when changes in reserve requirements are not used as a monetary policy tool.
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In the UK, during normal times, monetary policy is implemented by providing enough
reserves to the banking system so that the short term interbank rate is close to the Bank
rate and the amount of deposits in the system is determined by the banking system
endogenously.1 However, we will not need the link between changes in reserves and bank
deposits to hold in our framework given that QE changes exogenously the level of total
deposits in the banking system as gilts are (mainly) purchased from non-bank nancial
institutions.2
The key feature of this model is that, because of adverse selection, issuing non-deposit
liabilities is costly so that a shock to deposits will lead to a change in bank lending, the
so called bank lending channel. Moreover, the standard Kashyap and Stein model also
predicts that there is a di¤erent reaction of large and small banks as their costs of issuing
non-deposit liabilities vary.
After examining the e¤ects of QE on bank lending using this stylised model, we develop
a simple new model where we include a shock to capital and derive a bank lending supply
equation. Given that banks have to maintain a minimum level of capital (i.e. minimum
capital requirements) we can then analyse the e¤ects of changes in capital requirements
on bankslending. To identify the key predictions more easily we analyse the two models
separately, as we will do with the empirical analysis in the following chapters. Of course,
in reality there are interactions between QE and capital requirements but we leave this
aspect of the analysis to future research.
1The Bank of England normal times framework is the so called Sterling Monetary Frameworkestablished
in 2006 and operational until 2009 when the QE programme started.
2See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the transmission mechanism of QE on bank lending.
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These simple models give us two testable predictions on the e¤ects of QE and capital
requirements on bank lending supply. First, the model predicts that an increase in deposits
which follows QE (at least in the UK) leads to an increase in lending. Moreover, the
e¤ect of changes in deposits is stronger for small banks than for large banks because small
banks nd issuing non-deposit liabilities more costly. These results follow directly from
the Kashyap and Stein model.
Second, changes in capital requirements will have a negative e¤ect on bank lending.
Therefore, increases in macroprudential capital bu¤ers may be a useful tool in containing
excessive credit creation. On the other hand, the model also suggests that these e¤ects
are heterogenous across banks. Large banks react less to changes in capital requirements
than small banks because large banks face a lower cost of issuing capital.
We rst review the existing theoretical literature on QE and bank lending in general
equilibrium models and we then review the literature on capital requirements and bank
lending from a partial equilibrium perspective. Finally, we present two simple (partial
equilibrium) adverse selection models to analyse the impact of QE and capital require-
ments on bank lending.
4.2. The e¤ects of QE and capital requirements on bank behaviour in
general equilibrium models
The role of banks in modern macroeconomic models have been overlooked until re-
cently (Goodhart (2009)). In standard micro-founded general equilibrium models money
is generally introduced because of frictions (e.g. cash in advance requirements), but banks
and money play a little role in model dynamics. Even in simple textbook IS-LM models,
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bank loans are grouped together with other assets in a bond market so that banks have
only a passive role (i.e. banks hold money as a liability) (see Bernanke and Blinder
(1988)).
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) do not include banks explicitly in their model but they
develop a richer framework to analyse the relationship between asset prices and balance
sheets, the so called nancial accelerator channel (in line with Bernanke and Gertler
(1989)), that will be later applied to models with nancial intermediaries. They introduce
a macroeconomic model with endogenous credit constraints for borrowers where assets are
used as collateral for loans and show that the e¤ects of temporary shocks are magnied
through a reinforcing e¤ect on asset prices and borrowersnet worth.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) extend the basic IS-LM model by including bank loans
(in addition to money and bonds) which allows for an independent e¤ect of bank loans
on the real economy. However, the theoretical literature on the e¤ects of unconventional
monetary policies, including Quantitative Easing (QE), on bank behaviour has developed
only recently, partly due to the challenges of introducing nancial institutions in Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. For example, Gertler and Kyotaki (2010)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011) analyse the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy
actions with a DSGE model with nancial frictions (based on Bernanke et al. (1999))
by adding endogenously determined balance sheet constraints for nancial intermediaries
and by introducing central bank intermediation as a monetary policy tool (e.g. the central
bank can buy corporate debt in the secondary markets). In this framework, central bank
balance sheet can expand during a nancial crisis by issuing risk-free liabilities (in e¤ect
government debt) and it can increase its intermediation role while private sector balance
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sheets are shrinking. The authors nd that the net welfare benets of unconventional
monetary policy may be large if e¢ ciency losses are limited (they assume that central
bank intermediation is less e¢ cient than private intermediation) and these benets may
be even larger at the zero lower bound. These welfare benets derive from the fact that
central bank intervention is e¤ective in reducing the wedge between lending and deposit
rates, which in turn reduces the decline in investments. On the other hand, to our
knowledge, there are currently no partial equilibrium theoretical models that study the
e¤ects of QE on bank behaviour.
More recently, also capital requirements have featured in DSGE models to study the
e¤ects of regulatory changes on bank behaviour and the real economy. Kiley and Sim
(2012) develop a macroeconomic model where nancial intermediaries optimally choose
their funding structure showing nancial acceleratorfeatures. They then use the model
to evaluate the e¤ects of a countercyclical macroprudential policy - a tax on nancial
intermediariesleverage which increases with indicators of potential nancial imbalances
(e.g. credit to output ratio). Simulations using the model show that while macropruden-
tial policy tools may be e¤ective in smoothing the cycle in response to nancial shocks,
macroprudential policy may be less desirable following non-nancial shocks (e.g. produc-
tivity shocks). This is because bank lending is constrained when more credit is needed to
acquire new capital which reduces investments and therefore economic activity.
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) develop a DSGE model with nancial intermediaries
in line with Gertler and Kyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). However, they
depart from these papers by assuming that nancial intermediaries have to hold equity
in proportion to the riskiness of their assets (i.e. as in Basel II where capital ratios are
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calculated as a proportion of risk-weighted assets), which gives the model a procyclical
behaviour as suggested by empirical ndings (see Adrian et al. ( 2011)). Adrian and
Boyarchenko nd that tighter capital requirements reduce banksrisk taking and therefore
systemic risk in the future, but increases the price of risk today.
Goodhart et al. (2012) use a general equilibrium model with banks and non-bank
nancial institutions, to incorporate re sales externalities that the relationship between
banks and non-banks can generate, to estimate the impact of various regulatory measures
on economic activity. They nd that if the regulator raises capital requirements, the bank
can either reduce mortgage lending or increase securitisation, which could potentially lead
to credit leakagesfrom the banking to the non-bank nancial sector.
4.3. E¤ect of capital requirements on bank lending in partial equilibrium
models
The microeconomic theoretical literature to study the relationship between capital
requirements and bank lending is more substantial than that on the impact of QE on
bank lending. Myers and Majluf (1984) provides a theoretical rationale for the existence
of an e¤ect of capital requirements on bank lending. Because of asymmetric information,
raising capital can be costly, and therefore a¤ect banksprotability and therefore banks
capital. If the capital requirement is binding, i.e. the bank increases its capital ratio
following an increase in capital requirements, then this adjustment is more likely to come
through cutting loans rather than issuing new costly equity. This may suggest that an
increase in capital requirements is linked to a decline in lending.
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Thakor (1996) uses a game theory model with asymmetric information to show that an
increase in capital requirements raises the probability of a borrower being denied credit,
therefore lowering the total banks loan supply. This is because an increase in capital
requirements increases bank funding costs (capital is more costly than deposits as in Myers
and Majluf (1984)) which in turn reduces banksprotability and makes investing in loans
marginally less attractive. Following the increase in capital requirements banks therefore
reduce the screening probability which in turn leads to credit rationing in equilibrium.
Zhu (2008) develops a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model to assess the im-
pact of the transition from at capital requirements to risk-based capital requirements
as in Basel II. His analysis concludes that the transition to risk-weighted capital require-
ments does not necessarily lead to an increase in lending procyclicality. However, the
introduction of risk-weighted capital requirements is likely to increase minimum capital
requirements sharply for small banks (which in their model are riskier) leading to a large
contraction in small banks lending. However, Zhu does not directly study the e¤ects
of increases in capital requirements above Basel II requirements as in a macroprudential
policy setting.
De Nicolo et al. (2012) addresses this question more directly and builds on Zhu
to study the impact of capital and liquidity regulation and taxation on bank lending,
e¢ ciency and welfare. They nd that a low level of capital requirements (e.g. 4%) is
consistent with an increase in lending compared to a case with no capital requirements.
At the same time, a tightening of capital requirements (e.g. to 12%) has a signicant
negative impact on bank loans and reduces bank e¢ ciency and social value. This is
because it becomes too costly to issue equity to satisfy the increased capital requriements.
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Therefore the relationship of capital requirements, lending and welfare has an inverse U-
shaped relationship, reaching the maximum at the optimal level of capital requirements.
Hyun and Rhee (2011) suggest another possible transmission mechanism of capital
requirements to bank lending. In their model the choice of reducing loan supply does not
come because of the presence of asymmetric information but because an increase in equity
capital, following an increase in capital requirements, will dilute existing shareholders
which will nd optimal replenishing the capital ratio by cutting loan supply instead. In
this way Hyun and Rhee establish a negative relationship between capital requirements
and bank lending.
4.4. A simple model on the e¤ect of QE on bank lending supply
The Kashyap and Stein (1994) model is a two period model which allow us to generate
a bu¤er stock motive for holding securities in the rst period. On the asset side of the bank
there are illiquid loans (L) and securities (S), e.g. UK gilts. On the liability side banks
have equity (E), non-deposit liabilities (ND) and deposits (D). Equity is not included in
the Kashyap and Stein model, but the main conclusions remain broadly unaltered.
Loans yield a return of r, and cannot be liquidated at time 2 capturing the illiquid
nature of bank loans. Banks can invest S at time 1 yielding a normalised return of zero
(r for the loan is therefore a spread) and the security can be costlessly liquidated at time
2. The spread r is a measure of the bank lending channel, i.e. how changes in monetary
policy a¤ect banksreturns.
In this model the level of deposits is determined entirely by the monetary authority so
that when interest rates increase reserves decline and leading to a reduction in deposits,
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i.e. the monetary authority is able to a¤ect banksbalance sheets through changes in
reserves. This is of course an oversimplication of how monetary policy works in practice.
However, we will not need the transmission mechanism from interest rates to changes
in deposits to work in order to examine the e¤ects of QE on bank lending as QE in
the UK creates bank deposits directly because gilts are bought from non-bank nancial
institutions rather than banks.3
In this framework, when the amount of deposits at time 1 is realised, the distribution
of deposits at time 2 follows a uniform distribution:
(4.1) D2 is uniform on [D1 + (1  )D   =2; D1 + (1  )D + =2]
where the mean of D2 is D1 + (1  )D and  is a measure of the persistence of the
shock, while  measures the variance of deposit shocks. D is the marginal e¤ect of the
monetary policy shock on the initial stock of deposits in the system, D1: At time 2, the
total quantity of deposits in the system is therefore D2:
Following a shock to deposits (i.e. D2 is realised) the bank can fund itself by issu-
ing non-deposit liabilities (ND) and at time 2 the amount of non-deposit liabilities is
ND1(issued before the shock to deposits) +ND2 (issued after the shock to deposits):
The key assumption in this model is that there are increasing marginal costs of nance
for non-deposit liabilities (ND) and that their costs are 1ND
2
1
2
at time 1 and 2ND
2
2
2
at
time 2. This is because this type of liability is not covered by deposit insurance and
large issuance of non-deposit liabilities may signal a bad state of the bank, the so called
3We will describe this mechanism more extensively in the following empirical paper on QE.
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adverse selectionproblem. These costs are likely to be higher for small than for large
banks (i.e. 1; 2 are larger for smaller banks) because large banks have better access to
capital markets. Kashyap and Stein show empirically that this is true for a panel of US
banks.
We also know that QE in the UK creates deposits so that increases in gilt purchases
will be captured by shocks to D. When at time 2 the value of deposits is realized there
are two possible cases:
1) ND1 +D2 +E1 > L; then there is no need to issue external nance (ND) at time
2 and the bank can draw down the liquid asset bu¤er (S).
2) ND1 + D2 + E1 < L; then the bank is short of funds and issues external nance
(ND) at time 2 to absorb the shortage of funds.
The amount of non-deposit liabilities issued following the deposit shock will therefore
be:
(4.2) ND2 = max(0; L ND1  D2)
In order to write down the prot function we estimate the expected cost of issuing
non-deposit liabilities at time 2 for the case of a deposit shock. In this case the expected
issuance cost at time 2 from the perspective of the bank at time 1 is:
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(4.3) E(2ND22=2) = 2(L ND1   D1   (1  )D   E1 +

2
)2=6
For the derivation of equation 4.3 see the Annex.
In the banks prot equation, income is generated from loans and costs arise from non-
deposit liabilities issued at time 1 and the expected costs of non-deposit liability issuance
in the case of shock to deposits at time 2. Therefore, the banks prot function will be
the following:
(4.4)  = rL  1ND
2
1
2
  2(L ND1   D1   (1  )D   E1 + 
2
)2=6
Note that the expected cost at time 2 (equation 4.3) is the last term of equation 4.4.
By di¤erentiating 4.4 with respect to L and then ND1 we can nd the expression for bank
lending supply and non-deposit liabilities, which is the same maximisation problem as in
Kashyap and Stein with the only addition of the equity term E1.4 The lending supply
equation can therefore be written as follows:
(4.5) L =
3
2
r +
r
1
+ D1 + (1  )D + E1   
2
Equation 4.5 suggests that an increase in deposits leads to an increase in lending so
that an increase in bank deposits due to QE has a positive e¤ect on lending. Also a higher
4We will not show the derivation of equation (4) as it is identical to Kashyap and Stein (1994).
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level of equity (E) is related to higher bank lending.5 This is in line with the bank capital
channelliterature, e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991), where shocks to capital a¤ect bank
lending.
As discussed before, we would expect large and small banks to react di¤erently to a
change in deposits given their di¤erent capacity to access capital markets. To analyse the
e¤ects of QE on large and small banks we di¤erentiate 4.5 with respect to D1. The rst
derivative can then be written as:
(4.6)
@L
@D1
=

1
1
+
3
2

@r
@D1
+ 
Kashyap and Stein then assume a simple linear loan demand function to close the
model of the form:
(4.7) LD = Y   kr
Equation 4.7 says that demand for loans is a positive function of economic growth and
a negative function of the loan return r. Suppose there are n banks (our theory implicitly
assumes banks are identical). Then the equilibrium condition is:
(4.8) LD = nL
5These results are e¤ectively equal to the Kashyap and Steins results with the exception that the loan
supply equation is a function of E1 too.
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Let b  1
1
+ 3
2
. Solving the equilibrium condition, we get:
(4.9) r =
1
nb+ k

Y   n

D1 + (1  )D + E1   
2

It then follows that:
(4.10)
@r
@D1
=
1
nb+ k

@Y
@D1
  n

If @Y
@D1
is not too large (i.e. changes in deposits do not have a large impact on economic
activity) then @r
@D1
< 0, which means that there exists a bank lending channel. In this
case an increase in deposits reduces r, which is equivalent to an increase in the volume
of lending. From equation 4.6 and 4.10 we can infer that, for a given change in deposits,
banks that nd more costly to issue non-deposit liabilities (e.g. small banks with high 1
and 2) will react more to a change in deposits. Conversely, large banks will react less to
a shock in deposits.
Summing up, equations 4.5 and 4.6 give us two testable hypothesis. First, bank
lending supply is positively related to deposits so that we should expect QE to increase
bank lending. Second, small banks will react to QE more strongly than large banks. This
is an intuitive result because small banks with limited access to capital markets are more
likely to be credit constrained than large banks.
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4.5. A simple model on the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending
supply
In the previous section we described the Kashyap and Stein model and analysed its
implications for the e¤ects of QE on bank lending. However, to our knowledge there is no
consistent theoretical framework outlining the transmission mechanism of QE and capital
requirements.
In this section we will use a modied version of the adverse selection model seen above
to investigate the e¤ects of changes in capital requirements on bank lending. In contrast
to the previous model, banks face shocks to capital which has to remain above a binding
capital requirement. These shocks may materialise because of losses in the loan book or
mark to market losses in the trading book. We can then dene the distribution of the
shocks to equity (E), which will follow a uniform distribution:
(4.11) E2 is uniform on [E1 + (1  )E   =2; E1 + (1  )E + =2]
The mean of the shock is E1 + (1   )E and  is a measure of the variance of the
capital shocks.
Banks respond to an equity shock by issuing non-deposit liabilities (ND) at time 1
and 2. The bank is not able to issue core equity because of the so called debt overhang
problem(Myers (1977)). This is because following a shock to capital investors will be
unwilling to be the rst in line to face losses. Therefore the bank can only issue Tier 2
capital (which is part of ND) which counts as total capital according to Basel II capital
denition.
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Banks are subject to minimum capital requirements and therefore have to maintain a
constant equity/asset ratio  = (E +ND)=A (i.e. minimum capital requirements), where
the numerator is the total bank capital and the numerator is total bank assets.6
If the bank breaches the regulatory minimum  (say at 8%) the regulatory authority
takes the bank into resolution by liquidating the company and/or by transferring a part
of its assets to another bank. Given that A = (S+L) the equality above can be re-written
as  = (E +ND)=(S + L): At time 2 we observe the shock to capital and the bank may
face two scenarios:
1) E2+ND1
L+S
> , i.e. the bank is above the minimum capital requirement, then there is
no need for new equity as the bank is solvent.
2) E2+ND1
L+S
< ; i.e. the bank breaches the minimum capital requirements, then the
bank is insolvent and needs to issue new capital (ND).
In this case the amount of non-deposit liabilities (ND) issued by the bank at time 2
will be:
(4.12) ND2 = max(0; (S + L)  (E2 +ND1))
6The denition of capital ratio is a simplied version of the Basel II denition, where the numerator is
risk-weighted assets.
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The expected cost of issuing non-deposit liabilities at time 2 can then be written as
follows:
(4.13) E(2ND22=2) = 2((S + L)  E1   (1  )E  ND1 +

2
)2=6
We have now all the main terms of the banks prot equation. The prot of the bank
increases with the interest charged on loans and the volume of loans while decreases non
linearly with non-deposit liability issuance at time 1 and time 2. The main di¤erence from
the previous model is the expected cost of non-deposit liability issuance which is now a
function of regulatory minimum () too. Using 4.13, the banks prot equation will have
the following form:
(4.14)  = rL  1ND
2
1
2
  2((S + L)  E1   (1  )E  ND1 + 
2
)2=6
By di¤erentiating the prot function 4.14 with respect to L and then with respect to
ND1 we obtain the banks loan supply function for a representative bank (see Annex for
proof):
(4.15) L =
3


1[E1 + (1  )E] + (31 + 2)

r   1
2

  S
Where  is equal to 1
2(31+2 1) :
Given that L is a positive number the term of equation 4.15 in brackets has to be
positive. This means that for an increase in capital requirements ; lending stock (L) will
decline. This result is in line with the theoretical literature on the relationship between
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capital requirements and bank lending (e.g. Hyun and Rhee (2010), Van Hoose (2007))
and will be used to test our empirical model.
Changes in capital requirement  a¤ect lending through two channels. First, an in-
crease in capital requirement leads banks to delever as they try to reduce the issuance of
costly non-deposit liabilities. Second, a higher  also decreases lending by reducing the
sensitivity of changes in lending to changes in lending returns (see the  term inside the
brackets). So if returns r increase because of better macroeconomic conditions, banks
lending will adjust less to this increase. This can be explained by the fact that higher
minimum capital requirements reduce bank risk taking as the probability of falling below
the minimum increases.
Kashyap and Stein show (also empirically) that in an adverse selection setting large
and small banks react di¤erently to a monetary policy shock. Similarly, large and small
banks may expect to have a di¤erent impact on lending following a change in capital
requirements. This is because large and small banks may face di¤erent costs of issuing
capital following a capital shock.
If we assume for simplicity that 1 = 2, i.e. the cost of issuing non-deposit liabilities
is the same at time 1 and time 2 then  is positive for  > 1
4
, i.e. the cost issuing non-
deposit liabilities is non-negligible. In this case for an increase in capital requirements
lending declines because issuing non-deposit liabilities is costly and banks will restore the
capital ratio by cutting lending. This is similar to the mechanism at work during the
current crisis where shocks to capital were followed by declines in lending because of high
cost of issuing new capital.
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The story is slightly di¤erent when 0 <  < 1
4
and  is negative, i.e. capital is cheap.
In this case an increase in the capital requirement has a smaller impact on lending than
in the previous case (proof in the Appendix). This means that for banks with a lower
cost of capital the e¤ect on lending is still negative but likely to be limited. These results
are intuitive as lower cost of capital means that banks can issue non-deposit liabilities
following an increase in the capital requirement rather than cut lending and/or dispose
of its assets.
Using equation 4.15 we can, with some more algebra, derive an expression for ND1to
analyse the e¤ect of changes in capital requirements on the issuance of non-deposit liabil-
ities. ND1 can be then written in the following way:
(4.16) ND1 = 2

(1  2) [E1 + (1  )E]  (1  2)
2
+
3

r

When  is positive (i.e.  > 1
4
; raising capital is costly), an increase in the minimum
capital requirements leads to a decline in the issuance of non-deposit liabilities. This is
because capital is costly and an increase in capital requirements is met by a shrinkage
of the bank balance sheet. On the other hand, when  is negative (0 <  < 1
4
; raising
capital is cheap), an increase in minimum capital requirements leads to an increase in
non-deposit liabilities. This is because part of the increase in capital requirements is met
by issuing new Tier 2 capital.
4.6. Conclusions
We consider two simple, partial equilibrium adverse selection models to form our
priors on the e¤ects of changes in deposits and changes in minimum capital requirements
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on bank lending supply. We use an adverse selection model developed by Kashyap and
Stein (1994) and we incorporate shocks to capital and a binding capital requirement.
We nd that changes in deposits (e.g. following QE) have a positive e¤ect on bank
lending supply, and for a given change in deposits small banks are likely to react more
than large banks. We also nd that an increase in minimum capital requirements reduces
bank lending and that a given change in capital requirements will a¤ect small banks more
strongly than large banks. This is because small banks nd issuing equity more expensive
than large banks. Additionally, if the cost of equity rises for all the banks a change in
capital requirements may have a sharp e¤ect on bank lending.
These results are consistent with large part of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the bank lending channel and the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending. We
will then test these four predictions in the next chapters using a newly constructed panel
dataset of UK banks.
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Appendix
4.A. Appendix
Derivation of equation 4.3
E(2ND
2
2=2) = 2(L ND1   D1 + (1  )D   =2  E1 + 2 )2=6
We know that the rst moment of a uniform distribution is E(X) = 1
2
(a+ b)
And the second raw moment of the uniform E(X2) = a
2+b2+ab
3
E(2ND
2
2=2) =
2
2
E(ND22) =
2
2
E(max(0; L ND1  D2  E1))2 (the RHS quantity
is uniformly distributed between 0 and the bigger positive quantity with =2; we then use
the denition of second raw moment)
= 2
2
(L ND1 D1+(1 )D E1+ 2 )2
3
= 2(L ND1 D1+(1 )D E1+ 2 )2=6
Derivation of equation 4.13
E(2ND22=2) = 2((S + L)  E1   (1  )E  ND1 + 2 )2=6
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E(2ND22=2) =
2
2
E(ND22) =
2
2
E(max(0; (S + L)   E2   ND1))2(use the same
principle as above)
= 2
2
((S+L) E1 (1 )E ND1+ 2 )2
3
Derivation of equation 4.15
@
@L
= 0! 3r   22L = (2S   E1   (1  )E  ND1 + 2 )
! L =  S + 1
2
[E1 + (1  )E] + 12ND1   12

2
+ 3
2
2 r ()
@
@ND1
= 0! 31ND1 + 2ND1 =

2

(S + L)  E1   (1  )E + 2
	
! ND1 = 231+2S + 231+2L  231+2 [E1 + (1  )E] + 231+2

2
()
Now we can plug in our expression for ND1 (**) into L (*) we have derived above.
L =  S + 1
2
[E1 + (1   )E] + 131+2S + 131+2L   1(31+2) [E1 + (1  )E] +
1
(31+2)

2
  1
2

2
+ 3
2
2 r
!

1  1
31+2

L =  

1  1
31+2

S+
h
1
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  1
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2)
i
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h
  1
2
+ 1
(3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2)
i

2
+
3
2
2 r
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2 1)
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h
31
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+
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1
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Proof of relationship between cost of capital and e¤ect of capital require-
ments on lending
We are now in the case of 0 <  < 1=4: If we rewrite the lending supply equation in
the following way:
L = 3

n
1[E1 + (1  )E] + (31+2) r   1 2
o
  S
Then we can see that if 3

< 0 , also the part of the equation within parenthesis
will have to be negative for the equation to hold (remember that L has to be a positive
quantity). For an increase in  , this component will increase. On the other hand when
the other  within the parenthesis increases the quantity within parenthesis will become
even more negative.
To determine which of the two e¤ects dominates we have to see for what values 3 >
(31 + 2): This is true for  < 1; so for every  within 0 <  < 1=4:7 Therefore, given
that the left-hand side always dominates, an increase in minimum capital requirements
reduces lending, but less than in the  > 1=4 case.
Derivation of equation 4.16
To derive equation 4.16 we plug in the early expression for L, as in (*), in (**), which
are the two rst derivatives of the prot function with respect to L and ND respectively.
ND1 =

2
31+2

S + L  [E1 + (1  )E] + 2
	
7Recall that we assume that 1 = 2:
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! ND1 =

2
31+2
n
1
2
[E1 + (1  )E] + 12ND1   12

2
+ 3
2
r   [E1 + (1  )E] + 2
o
!

31+2 1
31+2

ND1 =

1
31+2

[E1 + (1  )E] 

1
31+2


2
+

3
(31+2)

r+
 

2
31+2

[E1 + (1  )E] +

2
31+2


2
! ND1 = 2

(1  2) [E1 + (1  )E]  (1  2)2 + 3 r
	
Proof of relationship between cost of capital and e¤ect of capital require-
ment on non-deposit liability (ND) issuance
It is quite straightforward to see that when  is positive an increase in capital require-
ments leads to a decline in non-deposit liabilities. However, when  is negative and the
minimum capital requirement increases, non-deposit liabilities increase too.
ND1 = 2

(1  2) [E1 + (1  )E]  (1  2)2 + 3 r
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CHAPTER 5
Quantitative Easing and Bank Lending: A Panel Data Approach
A signicant programme of asset purchases was likely to be necessary in order to
make up this shortfall in nominal spending. The current strains in the nancial system,
and in particular the pressures on banks to reduce the size of their balance sheets, meant
banks were less likely to increase their lending substantially following an increase in their
reserves...The Committee noted that ...asset purchases were likely to be most e¤ective if
they were purchased from the domestic non-bank nancial sector rather than from banks.
MPC Minutes, 4 and 5 March 2009
5.1. Introduction
After the global nancial crisis worsened at the end of 2008, the major central banks
cut their policy rates sharply and, after hitting the zero lower bound, began looking
for other unconventional measures to loosen monetary conditions further. In the United
Kingdom and United States, a key element of these unconventional measures has been the
policy of large-scale asset purchases nanced by central bank money, sometimes referred
to as quantitative easing (QE).
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of Englands Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
announced a policy of asset purchases nanced by central bank money in March 2009, at
the same time as it reduced Bank Rate to 0.5%, its e¤ective lower bound. In announcing
the new policy, the Committee noted that without further measures there was a serious
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risk ination would undershoot the 2% ination target in the medium-term. By the end
of the rst round of purchases that ended in January 2010 the Bank of England had
purchased £ 200 billion of assets, consisting almost exclusively of government bonds - an
amount equivalent to 14% of annual nominal GDP (see Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011)).
In October 2011, the Bank resumed its QE purchases and at the time of writing (March
2013) has purchased a total of £ 375 billion of assets.
There is now a large and growing literature that attempts to measure the impact
of central bank asset purchases during the nancial crisis in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere. Most of this literature focuses on the impact of asset purchases on nancial
markets (for the UK, see for example, Joyce et al (2011) and for the US, Gagnon et al
(2010)) and to a lesser extent the wider economy e¤ects (for the UK, see Kapetanios et al
(2012) and Bridges and Thomas (2012) and for the US Chung et al (2011)), but there has
been very little analysis of the e¤ects of asset purchases on banks (a study by Bowman
et al (2011) of the e¤ects of QE in Japan is an isolated example but their analysis relates
to the 2001-2006 period rather than the recent crisis). This relative neglect reects the
general consensus that the main e¤ects of QE have come through increasing asset prices,
through signalling and portfolio balance e¤ects (see e.g. Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011)).
As the quote above from the MPCs March 2009 Minutes indicates, the MPC speci-
cally downplayed the possibility of QE working through a bank lending channel because
of the pressures on banks to deleverage in the crisis. This was reected in the design of the
purchase programme itself, which was targeted towards the non-bank nancial sector by
skewing purchases towards medium and long-term maturity gilts, rather than the shorter-
maturity gilts typically held by banks for their liquidity needs. But, even if all the Banks
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QE asset purchases came from non-banks (directly or indirectly), the banking sector will
still have gained additional reserves as a result, as well as a corresponding increase in its
deposits. These additional reserves mean that banksholdings of liquid assets will have
increased, making them less reliant on seeking wholesale funding to manage their liquidity
needs. Put another way, the extra deposits that banks consequently held will have helped
relieve any funding constraints they may have faced. Since these constraints are more
likely to bind in times of nancial stress, it seems possible that this might have led to
additional lending.1 While any e¤ects on lending might have been expected to be weak
during a period when the banks were also trying to delever, it seems unlikely that there
will have been no e¤ect at all. In other words, relative to the counterfactual of no QE,
bank lending seems likely to have been larger.
The contribution of this chapter is to test for the existence of this bank lending channel
and to quantify the size of the e¤ects of the Bank of Englands QE policy during 2009-10
on bank lending using a new non-publicly available quarterly panel dataset on UK banks.
The use of this unique dataset allows us to model the relationship between bank lending
growth and its determinants over a twenty-year period pre-dating the nancial crisis and
to explore whether the relationship between deposits and bank lending changed during
the crisis. We are also able to explore heterogeneities between large and small banks and
to control for the balance sheet e¤ects, by including information on bank capital ratios at
the level of individual banks. Given that (by construction) QE a¤ects the amount of bank
deposits, we rst estimate the historical relationships between bank lending growth and
deposit growth, macroeconomic indicators and individual controls. In order to simulate
1This potential channel has been highlighted by David Miles in various speeches, see Asset prices, saving
and the wider e¤ects of monetary policy, 1 March 2012.
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the potential e¤ects of QE on bank lending, we rst estimate the impact of QE on the
amount of bank deposits and then use the econometric estimates to gauge the impact on
bank lending.
We nd that QE may have led to small but statistically signicant increases in bank
lending. The e¤ect on bank lending is heterogeneous, as small banks have increased
lending more than large banks, consistent with economic theory. However, we also nd
evidence that the e¤ect of QE on bank lending may have been smaller than initially
estimated because of lower levels of capital during the crisis.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the MPCs
asset purchase programme during 2009 to 2010 and how these purchases may have a¤ected
bank balance sheets and bank lending. Section 3 describes the non-publicly available panel
dataset on UK banks that we have used to examine the e¤ects of QE on UK banks during
the crisis. Section 4 turns to the econometric strategy we adopt, while Section 5 discusses
the econometric results and some simulations of the likely e¤ects of the rst round of the
Bank of Englands QE purchases on bank lending. The nal section concludes.
5.2. Quantitative easing and its impact on banks
The Bank of Englands MPC announced the beginning of its rst round of QE as-
set purchases in March 2009. The initial decision was to purchase £ 75 billion of assets
over a three-month period, but further extensions to the programme were subsequently
announced at the May, August and November 2009 MPC meetings and by the time the
programme was paused in early 2010 the Bank had bought £ 200 billion of assets. Though
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the Bank purchased some private assets, the overwhelming majority of the purchases con-
sisted of UK government bonds (so-called gilts). Initially the Bank bought gilts with a
residual maturity of between 5 and 25 years, although this was later extended to gilts with
maturities of 3 years or over. Part of the motivation for purchasing medium to long-term
bonds was to skew purchases towards the non-bank nancial sector (insurance companies
and pension funds) rather than buying from banks (see Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011)).
From a balance sheet perspective, central bank asset purchases from banks constitute
an exchange of Gilts for reserves on the banks asset side as the central bank credits
the banks reserve account with central bank money in exchange of the asset purchased.
Because reserves are higher, narrow money increases (i.e. monetary base or currency in
circulation plus reserves held at the Bank of England) but broad money (i.e. currency in
circulation plus deposits) remains unchanged. At the same time the central bank expands
its balance sheet by the amount of the assets purchased (Figure 5.1). The Bank of England
has purchased gilts mainly from non-bank nancial institutions (e.g. pension funds and
insurance companies) with the intention of increasing not only narrow money but also
broad money via an increase in deposits (Benford et al. (2009)).
When the Bank of England purchases assets from non-bank nancial institutions (e.g.
a pension fund) it credits the bank of the pension fund with central bank reserves, while
the pension fund gains a deposit at its bank. Di¤erently from the case where assets are
purchased directly from banks, this asset purchase has increased the banks balance sheet
(Figure 5.1).2 The bank nds itself with a more liquid balance sheet on the asset side (a
2We present a simplied version of the asset purchases scheme. In practice, asset purchases are completed
via an o¤-balance sheet vehicle rather than the Bank of England directly. However, this does not a¤ect
our econometric strategy.
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Figure 5.1. E¤ects of QE on banksbalance sheets
higher reserves ratio) and more deposits on the liability side. Given that the bank now
has a higher level of liquid assets, and possibly above the one required to meet payment
demands from customers, it may be less costly for the bank to increase lending to the real
economy (e.g. lending to households or non-nancial corporations).
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Initially the newdeposits will be from non-bank nancial institutions. However, if
non-bank nancial institutions use the cash to buy higher yielding assets (e.g. corporate
bonds), the deposit moves to the private non nancial corporate sector. If the bank then
lends to an household to purchase a at, it also creates new household deposits. This
means that it is likely that the banks deposit mix will change over time, but in reality it
is di¢ cult (if not impossible) to track these changes through the banking system. In this
paper we will therefore use total rather than disaggregated measures of deposits.
Asset purchases by the central bank may also have indirect (ow) e¤ects on banks
balance sheet. For example, if these purchases a¤ect long rates and the slope of the yield
curve this can have an e¤ect on banksnet interest margins (NIM). This in turn may a¤ect
the ability of banks to accumulate capital and extend new lending to the real economy.
For example, Alessandri and Nelson (2012) show empirically that interest rates and the
slope of the yield curve a¤ect NIM using data on UK banks. In this paper we focus only
on the direct balance sheet e¤ects, i.e. reaction of banks lending following changes in
the stock of deposits. In order to do this, we use a non-publicly available panel dataset
containing balance sheet and income statement information of individual banks. Before
turning to our econometric analysis, the next section describes this dataset.
5.3. Data
The new panel dataset includes non-publicly available quarterly balance sheet and
income statement data of 30 nancial institutions active in the lending market operating
in the UK from Q2 1989 until Q4 2010. The sample includes UK-owned banks, foreign-
owned banks (around 60% of the sample), building societies (around 10% of the sample)
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and non-bank nancial institutions (around 17% of the sample). The panel is unbalanced
as the time series is discontinued after mergers and failures - banks are observed for a
minimum of 9 periods and a maximum of 92 periods.3
We have included nancial entities on a consolidated level, as we assumed that lending
decisions are taken on a group-level basis. Considering a lower level of consolidation (as
for example in Kashyap and Stein (2000)) would instead assume that liquidity could not
be transferred within the group and that subsidiaries act in isolation. Given that this
is an unrealistic assumption, we think that a consolidated approach better reects the
relationship between liquidity and lending in a complex banking group. This is consistent
with Houston, James and Marcus (1997) who found that shocks to one subsidiary in a
holding company are partially transmitted to other subsidiaries in the banking group.
Table 5.1 describes the main variables used in this paper. Total lending is obtained by
adding the stock of lending to households and to private non-nancial corporates (PNFC),
i.e. total non-nancial lending. Total lending growthis calculated as the quarter over
quarter percentage changes of total lending stock, while provision ratio is dened as
provisions over assets ratio. Changes in capital ratiois capital over risk-weighted assets
quarter over quarter change and Changes in deposit ratiois quarter over quarter changes
in total deposits over total assets ratio.
We have summarised these variables for large and small banks, where a large bank
is any bank that has been on the top ve according to assets at any period during the
3An alternative approach adopted in the literature is to construct articial banks that are observed
along the whole time series. Even though this approach is likely to reduce problems deriving from the use
of unbalanced panel data, it may create estimation biases. For example, following a merger, unobservable
characteristics of the bank (e.g. management ability) may change but this structuralchange would not
be picked up in the estimates if we used articialbanks.
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Table 5.1. Description of the main variables (1989-2010)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total
Total lending growth (%) 3336 1.8 8.5 -23.1 34.8
Capital ratio (%) 2777 15.1 5.4 10.2 42.0
Provision ratio (%) 3945 0.3 1.0 -2.5 15.5
Capital bu¤er change (pp) 2361 0.0 1.3 -16.0 17.2
Change in deposit ratio (pp) 3578 -0.2 4.3 -36.9 43.9
Large banks
Total lending growth (%) 473 1.8 3.3 -15.5 28.3
Capital ratio (%) 527 11.9 1.3 10.2 17.1
Provision ratio (%) 725 0.3 0.3 0.0 3.1
Capital bu¤er change (pp) 470 0.0 0.4 -2.8 1.6
Change in deposit ratio (pp) 476 -0.2 2.5 -8.5 11.8
Small banks
Total lending growth (%) 2863 1.8 9.0 -23.1 34.8
Capital ratio (%) 2250 15.8 5.7 10.2 42.0
Provision ratio (%) 3220 0.3 1.1 -2.5 15.5
Capital bu¤er change (pp) 1891 0.0 1.4 -16.0 17.2
Change in deposit ratio (pp) 3102 -0.2 4.6 -36.9 43.9
Figure 5.2. Deposit over asset ratio and total lending growth
81
sample.4 Large and small banks have similar averages for total lending growth, provision
ratio and changes in deposit ratio, but small banksvariables exhibit a higher dispersion.
This is because large banks have more homogenous characteristics, while small banks
range from medium sized to very small institutions.
Figure 5.2 (left-hand side panel) shows the deposit over asset (DA) ratio for large and
small banks in our sample. The DA ratio has declined steadily since early 1990s consistent
with the fact that banks have increasingly nanced their assets with non-deposit liabilities.
Since the late 1990s large and small banks DA ratio started to diverge and became
structurally lower for large banks. Better access to capital markets by large banks and
the evolution of more complex funding instruments (e.g. securitisation) probably explains
the di¤erent behaviour of large and small banks.
The DA ratio ticked up around the second half of 2009 (particularly for small banks)
which may be seen as evidence that QE had an e¤ect on the banks included in our sample.
However, we should not over interpret the evidence from this chart, as this increase is
comparable to previous increases in the series and more data is needed to judge whether
this is noiseor a structural increase in DA ratio due to QE.
Figure 5.2 (right-hand side panel) shows that both large and small banks lending
growth declined during the crisis compared to pre-crisis averages. But small bankslending
growth turned negative shortly after the QE programme started while large bankslending
growth remained in positive territory. Small bankslending growth then increased strongly
since 2010 Q1. Our dataset therefore suggests that there might be di¤erences in the way
large and small banks reacted to QE.
4Throughout the sample the same eight banks are classied as large.
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5.4. Econometric strategy
The bank lending channel literature (e.g. Kashyap and Stein (1993)) suggests that
deposit growth is positively related to lending growth. This literature builds on the
imperfect substitutability of bank deposits with non-deposit liabilities to show that a
monetary shock (e.g. increase in interest rate) has an impact on bank lending. The
argument goes that a monetary tightening reduces bank deposits as bank reserves are
drained from the banking system. If banks want to maintain a stable ratio of reserves over
deposits, a reduction in the numerator has to imply a reduction in the denominator too.5
Banks will have then to increase their share of non deposit liabilities to maintain the size
of the balance sheet unchanged. However, banks may not have access to capital markets
or non-deposit liabilities may be more costly (e.g. because of adverse selection and/or
lack of deposit insurance), and they may shrink their balance sheet by cutting lending
to accommodate the decline in deposits. Kashyap and Stein (2000) provide empirical
evidence that the so called bank lending channelexists using a large panel of US banks.
As discussed in Section 5.2, Quantitative Easing (QE) may a¤ect lending through
changes in deposits. This channel is similar to the bank lending channel, with the ex-
ception that in this case the central bank a¤ects directly the amount of bank deposits in
the nancial system via asset purchases. Our strategy is therefore to use the QE-induced
change in deposits to estimate the e¤ect of QE on bank lending.
However, following QE not only the level of deposits increases, but also deposits over
total assets (DA) ratio increases. We will focus on DA ratio as it ensures that we are not
5In practice modern central banks do not change monetary policy by changing reserve requirements.
However, we do not need this link between interest rates and deposits for our econometric strategy to
work, as QE changes directly the stock of deposits in the banking system.
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capturing increases in deposits that are in line with growth of other non-deposit liabilities.
By looking at the ratio we will capture only those large changes in deposits that drivethe
increase in assets and are therefore closer to a QE-induced expansion of banksdeposits.
At the same time, we are interested in what happens to the level of lending following
an increase in the DA ratio. After the asset purchase the bank has an additional amount
of reserves on its balance sheet and the bank can then decide whether to lend some of
these reserves out (e.g. to households). The focus in this paper will be on lending growth
because we would like to capture changes in the level of lending following changes in DA
ratio.6
Using lending growth as dependent variable is quite common in the literature. For
example, Kashyap and Stein (2000) investigate the existence of the bank lending channel
mechanism by regressing bank lending growth on individual bank variables and macro-
economic factors. Bernanke and Lown (1991) study the e¤ect of changes (and level) in
the capital ratio (i.e. capital over assets) on lending growth.
Assuming that QE a¤ects banks mainly through changes in deposits, we can then
investigate the e¤ect of changes in the DA ratio on lending growth. Using equation 5.1
we can estimate the importance of the bank lending transmission mechanism of QE in
the following way:
(5.1) lit =  + (L)lit + (L)Dit + (L)Cit + 0Iit + 
0At + uit
6Other possible left hand side variables, e.g. lending over asset ratio, are not useful for our purpose because
this ratio may remain unchanged even though banks decide to increase lending to the real economy.
84
where lit is quarterly lending growth for bank i in period t, Dit is changes in the
deposits over assets ratio, Cit is changes in the published regulatory capital (capital
over risk weighted assets), Iit is a vector of micro controls and At is a vector of macro
controls. uit is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance 2; uit 
N(0; 2):7 L is a lag operator where (L) =
4P
s=1
s(L
s), (L) =
3P
s=2
s(L
s) and (L) =
2P
s=1
s(L
s): We use lagged dependent variables to reduce the simultaneity bias problem in
our estimates.
This dynamic (Auto Regressive Distributed Lag) model allows us to estimate both
short and long-run e¤ects of changes in the deposit ratio on lending growth. The short-
run e¤ects are identied by the coe¢ cients of the individual time lags, while the long-run
e¤ect is identied by the sum of the lagged coe¢ cients divided by one minus the sum of
lagged lending coe¢ cients.8 In the following section we will present both long run and
short run estimates.
According to 5.1 lending growth is a function of individual bank characteristics (cap-
turing lending supply factors) and macroeconomic variables (capturing lending demand
factors). Among bank characteristics we have included the size of the bank, changes in
the ratio of provisions over assets and changes in regulatory capital ratio (regulatory cap-
ital over risk weighted assets). The size of the bank is likely to be linked to the banks
business model and therefore to lending growth, while the provisions ratio is an indicator
7Moreover, we assume that the error terms are independent both in time and cross-section dimensions,
i.e. E(uit; ujs) = 0 for i 6= j; s 6= t:
8Using this specication we are able to estimate the long run e¤ects of changes in deposit ratio on bank
lending growth. This e¤ect is dened as the cumulative e¤ect of a change in deposit ratio on lending
growth as time goes to innity. However this e¤ect should not be confused with the e¤ect on the long-run
lending growth, which we constrain to be zero. This is because the model is estimated in growth rates
and there is no long-run levels relation.
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of asset quality which a¤ects the banks capacity to lend. Changes in the capital ratio
a¤ect lending because capital is a costly source of funding. A low level of capital ratio
(i.e. close to the regulatory minimum) also provides a limit to lending growth. We have
also included a control variable to account for di¤erences in sectoral demand that may
drive lending growth as in Aiyar (2011).9
The macroeconomic controls include GDP growth, unemployment rate, FTSE 100
growth and Bank Rate. All these variables are likely to drive lending demand. For
example, stronger GDP growth will increase household income and therefore demand for
secured lending.
If QE had an e¤ect on bank lending we would expect (L) to be positive and statis-
tically signicant so that an increase in DA ratio leads to higher lending growth. Similar
literature on this issue is limited at the moment, and therefore it is di¢ cult to have strong
priors on the sign and magnitude of the e¤ect, even though the bank lending channel lit-
erature points towards a positive relationship between deposit growth and bank lending.
However, according to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the
e¤ect of an increase in bank reserves on bank lending may have been muted during the
banking crisis given the incentives of banks to deleverage.10 One of the advantages of this
9Total lending is calculated by adding lending to households (secured and unsecured) and lending to
private non-nancial corporations (PNFC). If a bank is particularly exposed to lending to PNFCs and
there is a specic demand shock to this sector we would observe total lending for this particlar bank to
decline sharply. To reduce the impact of secoral demand shocks on our estimates we have included a
variable calculated as follows as in Ayiar (2011):
Si;t = l(s)t  ( l(s)i;ttotlendingi;t ) + l(ut)  (
l(u)i;t
totlendingi;t
) + l(pt)  ( l(p)i;ttotlendingi;t )
where the changes in sectoral lending are computed by excluding changes in sectoral lending by the bank
we are considering.
10See minutes of the monetary policy committee meeting on 4 and 5 March 2009 available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf, p. 9 paragraphs
31 and 34.
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study is that our panel dataset allows us to control directly for this factor by including
changes in bank-by-bank capital ratios in our baseline regression.
Throughout the paper we are going to treat this panel dataset as a time-series panel
dataset, as we would expect that our results will be largely determined by the time-series
dimension within individual banks. Indeed for changes in total lending and changes in
DA ratio (our key variables), within (individual bank) variance explains almost all total
variance. This indicates that the cross-section dimension is not likely to contribute much
to our estimates.
The relevance of the time-series dimension in the panel dataset may add two potential
problems to the estimation process. First, the variables we have included in the specica-
tion may not be stationary, and this may cause our estimated relationship to be spurious.
However, we consider changes for most of the variables, so that even if they were originally
integrated of order one, taking changes would make them stationary.
Second, including the lags of the dependent variable generates biased estimates, the
so-called lagged dependent variablebias.11 In this case estimates are consistent as long as
there is no autocorrelation of the error terms. The inclusion of lagged dependent variable
and lagged explanatory variables has the e¤ect of reducing the autocorrelation problem.
In our regressions we have included lagged dependent and lagged exogenous variables, so
autocorrelation should not a¤ect the consistency of our estimates.
11Some studies (e.g. Alessandri and Nelson (2012)) deal with this problem by using GMM estimator.
However, the asymptotic properties of GMM estimators are derived for large N and small T datasets and
may not be applicable to our case (see Attanasio et al. (2000)). Also consistency of the Fixed E¤ect
estimator is not an issue because of the large T. We have therefore used Fixed E¤ects throughout the
paper.
As a robustness check we will include GMM estimates in the Annex.
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Another way of determining whether the time-series or the cross-section dimension
drives our estimates is to test for Fixed E¤ects in the main regressions. If they are signif-
icant, it would indicate that our ndings are mainly driven by the time-series dimension
of the panel because individual bank trends are statistically di¤erent across banks. In the
following section we will test for the presence of Fixed E¤ects.
5.5. Results
Table 5.2 shows the estimates of regression 5.1 using Fixed E¤ects (FE) with data until
Q2 2007.12 We initially excluded the nancial crisis period from the sample as the rela-
tionship between the DA ratio and bank lending may have changed during this period.13
We will investigate this issue later in the section.
The estimated lags of the DA ratio all have a positive sign and are statistically signi-
cant.14 This may suggest that a bank lending channel exists and that QE may potentially
have had an e¤ect on bank lending growth. The long-run coe¢ cient suggests that the
e¤ect of an increase in the DA ratio has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on
12DA ratio estimates are similar in magnitude with POLS (not presented here) and FE, but xed e¤ects
are signicant and highly correlated with the regressors so POLS estimates are not consistent. Therefore,
we will present only FE estimates.
13Also the sample used in the regressions is not the full sample of banks because cases with missing
observations on any variable are excluded. If the missing cases are systematically related to observed
characteristics then there might be sample selection bias, e.g. survivorship bias if only rms that survive
are included in the sample and they are systematically di¤erent from the excluded failed rms. While
sample selection bias is fairly easy to deal with in cross-section, it is more di¢ cult to deal with in dynamic
panels of the type used here, so allowing for this is a topic for future research (e.g. using the procedure
proposed recently in Semykina and Wooldridge (2013)).
14In our preferred specication we use the second and third lags of the DA ratio. To arrive at the
preferred specication we rst estimated a more general specication (i.e. 4 lags for each variables) and
then excluded the highly insignicant variables sequentially to arrive at a more parsimonius specication.
However, the main results hold also with specications with a higher number of lags. The appendix
contains a fuller explanation of the selection procedure.
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Table 5.2. Deposit asset ratio and total lending
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FE FE - Small FE - Large
Lending growth (-1) -0.114*** -0.120*** -0.0935
(0.0290) (0.0324) (0.0667)
Lending growth (-2) -0.0176 -0.0224 -0.00506
(0.0281) (0.0310) (0.0780)
Lending growth (-3) 0.0383 0.0346 0.0625
(0.0285) (0.0315) (0.0774)
Lending growth (-4) -0.0350 -0.0417 0.146*
(0.0291) (0.0322) (0.0768)
Cap. ratio (-1) -0.677*** -0.696*** -0.629
(0.209) (0.235) (0.429)
Cap. ratio (-2) -0.275 -0.346 0.695
(0.204) (0.228) (0.481)
DA ratio (-2) 0.138** 0.161* 0.0655
(0.0685) (0.0826) (0.0843)
DA ratio (-3) 0.132* 0.144* 0.131
(0.0689) (0.0825) (0.0879)
Sectoral demand 2.810 5.969** -0.137
(1.844) (2.879) (1.311)
Provision ratio (-2) -1.567** -1.485* -2.238*
(0.720) (0.822) (1.348)
Bank size 1.339** 1.599** 0.150
(0.541) (0.640) (0.728)
Macro controls1 Yes Yes Yes
Constant -11.20* -13.29* 2.296
(6.038) (6.827) (9.523)
Observations 1,394 1,128 266
R-squared 0.049 0.057 0.093
Number of banks 50 39 11
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) GDP growth, Equity returns, Unemployment, Bank rate
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lending growth (Table 5.3)15. For a 1pp increase in the DA ratio change, quarter over
quarter lending growth increases by around 0.24pp in the long-run. In other words, the
sum of all the percentage point increases (as time goes to innity) in bank lending growth
is around 0.24pp.
Table 5.3. Long-run coe¢ cients for the total lending regression
Coef. S.e. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DA ratio 0.24 0.10 2.43 0.02 0.05 0.43
Capital ratio -0.84 0.23 -3.66 0.00 -1.30 -0.39
GDP 1.04 0.73 1.42 0.16 -0.40 2.47
Bank Rate 0.04 0.13 0.31 0.76 -0.21 0.30
Equity returns 0.03 0.02 1.75 0.08 -0.004 0.07
Small banks
DA ratio 0.27 0.11 2.33 0.02 0.04 0.49
Capital ratio -0.91 0.25 -3.59 0.00 -1.40 -0.41
GDP 1.59 0.87 1.82 0.07 -0.12 3.30
Bank rate 0.04 0.15 0.29 0.77 -0.26 0.35
Equity returns 0.04 0.02 1.56 0.12 -0.009 0.081
Large banks
DA ratio 0.22 0.17 1.28 0.20 -0.12 0.56
Capital ratio 0.07 0.65 0.11 0.91 -1.20 1.35
GDP -1.27 1.14 -1.12 0.27 -3.52 0.97
Bank Rate -0.18 0.20 -0.90 0.37 -0.58 0.22
Equity returns 0.005 0.029 0.17 0.86 -0.05 0.06
Changes in capital have a strong and negative e¤ect on lending growth in the rst lag
and in the long run. This is because an increase in capital is costly for the bank (Myers
and Majluf (1984)), which has to adjust lending following the negative prot shock. As
expected, the provision ratio is negative and statistically signicant, as banks reduce their
lending when future losses are likely to be higher to build up the capital bu¤er and absorb
15As discussed earlier the long-run coe¢ cient is the sum of the estimates of deposit asset ratio coe¢ cients
divided by one minus the sum of the coe¢ cients on lagged lending growth.
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eventual losses. Size has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on lending growth,
so that ceteris paribus larger banks have a higher lending growth than smaller banks. The
sectoral demand variable is not statistically signicant, meaning that sectoral di¤erences
in lending demand do not explain away our results.
Turning to the macro control variables, real GDP growth and the Bank Rate level
are statistically signicant for some lags, but they are not statistically signicant in the
long-run. This is in line with previous research using data on UK banks (e.g. Francis
and Osborne (2009), Aiyar et al. (2012)). On the other hand, changes in equity prices
(as measured by the FTSE100) have an expected positive and statistically signicant
coe¢ cient. This suggests that stronger equity prices are associated with stronger lending
growth as rmsmarket leverage decline and is less costly for banks to lend.
5.5.1. E¤ect of changes in deposit asset ratio on large and small banks
In the previous section we have assumed homogeneity of the DA ratio coe¢ cient, i.e. in
equation 5.1 we have assumed that i(L) = j(L) with i 6= j: In this section we will relax
this assumption by letting the coe¢ cient vary for small and large banks. Understanding
heterogeneity in lending responses is very important for public policy purposes as major
banks have a very large share of total lending in the UK banking system.
We have therefore estimated 5.1 for small and large banks using FE (see second and
third column of Table 5.2). Large banksDA ratio coe¢ cients remain positive, but they
are not statistically signicant anymore. Also the long-run e¤ect remains positive but
still not signicant (Table 5.3). On the other hand, the DA ratio has a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect on small banks, even in the long-run.
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However, given that the e¤ects for large and small banks are positive and similar in
magnitude it may be that the coe¢ cients are not statistically signicant because of lack of
observations. We have therefore estimated a regression where every explanatory variable
is interacted with a dummy for large banks so that we can test whether the coe¢ cients
of large and small bank regressions are statistically di¤erent by using an F-test.
The test does not reject equality of coe¢ cients, suggesting that large and small banks
may both increase lending growth after an increase in the DA ratio. However, the e¤ect on
large banks is somewhat smaller. This could be explained by the fact that large banks can
issue non-deposit liabilities more cheaply (because of a better access to capital markets),
and changes in deposits can be accommodated by alternative sources of funding. Finding
heterogeneity of coe¢ cients for large and small banks is common in the literature and is
often used as evidence for the existence of the bank lending channel e.g. Kashyap and
Stein (1994, 2000). This is because small banks have limited access to capital markets to
raise non-deposit liabilities and a given shock to deposits is therefore met with a sharper
reduction in lending than large banks.
5.5.2. Has the relationship changed during the crisis?
One possible criticism for using these estimates to simulate the e¤ects of QE is that the
positive relationship we have found held only in periods of relative nancial stability.
Indeed, other factors during the current nancial crisis may have reduced the ability of
banks to increase lending as their balance sheet became more liquid. For example, large
losses during the nancial crisis have reduced bank capital bu¤ers (i.e. the amount of
capital above the minimum capital requirements) constraining new lending even when
92
deposits (and cash) are increasing due to QE. However, one of the advantages of using
panel data is that we can control for changes in capital ratios on a bank-by-bank basis,
so that our estimates are less likely to be a¤ected by the e¤ects of the banking crisis.
Moreover, our dataset includes events of nancial instability in the early 1990s which
a¤ects our estimates.
A simple way to investigate whether the relationship changed during the crisis is
to run a FE regression over the full sample and check if the positive relationship still
holds. More formally, we can include a crisisdummy taking value one from 2007 Q3
which marks the beginning of the nancial crisis in the UK when Northern Rock received
liquidity support from the Bank of England. We can then test whether the DA ratio had a
di¤erent e¤ect during the crisis by including interaction variables between the deposit ratio
and the crisis dummy. Table 5.4 (rst three columns) compares our pre-crisis estimates
with estimates for the whole sample and those using the additional crisisdummy and
interaction variables.
DA ratio coe¢ cients and their signicance are little changed when we consider the
full sample. But then this does not tell us anything specic about the e¤ects of QE
during the nancial crisis. If the e¤ect of QE changed during the nancial crisis we would
expect the interaction coe¢ cients to be jointly statistically signicant (column 3). The
interaction terms are negative, which may indicate smaller DA coe¢ cients, but the test
for joint signicance does not reject a zero e¤ect indicating that the relationship may have
remained stable even during the nancial crisis.
Above we have tested that the deposit ratio coe¢ cients were not statistically di¤erent
during the crisis. We can also test for a structural break during the nancial crisis (i.e.
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Table 5.4. Lending and deposit asset ratio during the crisis period
VARIABLES Until Q2 2007 Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample
DA ratio (-2) 0.138** 0.123** 0.157** -0.120
(0.0685) (0.0617) (0.0667) (0.0790)
DA ratio (-3) 0.132* 0.127** 0.145** -0.137*
(0.0689) (0.0625) (0.0671) (0.0785)
Crisis -0.280
(0.729)
Crisis*DA ratio (-2) -0.254
(0.176)
Crisis*DA ratio (-3) -0.179
(0.177)
High capital -0.360
(0.595)
High cap.*DA ratio (-2) 0.595***
(0.128)
High cap.*DA ratio (-3) 0.676***
(0.129)
all the coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent) using a Chow test. The test does not reject
the null of no structural break. However, a variance ratio test excludes that variances
are the same in the two sub-periods and therefore the Chow test is not applicable (this is
because the Chow test assumes equality of variances). This means that we cannot exclude
with certainty a structural break, even though the deposit ratio estimates did not change
during the crisis period. On the other hand, the interaction variables are negative and
their insignicance may also be driven by the lack of crisisdata.
An alternative approach would be to investigate the relationship between the DA ratio
and capital levels during the whole sample and infer from this relationship what might
have happened during the crisis given the large capital losses experienced by UK banks
during the nancial crisis. If the e¤ect of the DA ratio on lending changes with capital we
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would expect the interaction terms to be statistically signicant, meaning that the e¤ect
of DA ratio may have changed during the crisis. The capital channelliterature suggests
that banks with a higher capital ratio may react more to a given monetary policy shock
(Van den Heuvel (2002)).
We have therefore run our baseline regression adding a dummy taking value one for
banks with a capital ratio higher than the sample average (around 15%) (Table 5.4, last
column). The interaction terms are positive and highly statistically signicant, suggesting
that our overall estimates are driven by institutions with above average capital ratios.
This is because banks with a higher capital ratio can increase lending more than lower
capitalised banks following an increase in deposits in line with the existence of a bank
capital channel. This is because lower capitalised banks may not be able to increase
lending as they may breach minimum capital requirements if they do so.
Even though this nding does not give a denitive answer on the e¤ect of the DA
ratio during the crisis (because the relationship between capital and DA ratio may have
changed during the crisis) these results may suggest that the e¤ect of QE during the
banking crisis might have been somewhat lower given capital losses experienced by few
major banks.
However, a stronger e¤ect from better capitalised may have o¤set lower lending from
lower capitalised banks during the crisis. We can therefore use these results only as an
indication on what may have happened to the magnitude of the e¤ect and we will be able
to reach a denitive answer on whether the relationship between lending and deposits
remained unaltered during the crisis period only with more observations during the crisis
period.
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5.5.3. Endogeneity of the deposit asset ratio
Until now we have assumed exogeneity of the DA ratio, i.e. it is not correlated with the
error term in equation 5.1. In this case a change in DA ratio can be interpreted to have a
causal e¤ect on lending growth. However, banks may collect deposits only after they have
identied lending opportunities, which we call the investment opportunitieshypothesis.
In this case deposits will be positively correlated with lending, even though more deposits
are not causing the increase in lending. In other words, we may be facing an endogeneity
problem and our estimated e¤ect of QE on lending will be biased and inconsistent.
However, if we assume that economic growth is a good proxy for investment opportu-
nities (i.e. stronger economic growth is related to more investment opportunities) we can
then test the hypothesis above by running a regression of DA ratio changes on a set of
bank specic and macroeconomic variables in line with specication 5.1.
This can be justied by the fact that the DA ratio is both related to bank specic
factors (e.g. certain banks will have a structurally higher DA ratio) and to macroeconomic
factors (e.g. during a boomDA ratio declines as banks use alternative forms of nancing to
expand their balance sheet). If better investment opportunities lead banks to seek deposits
to nance them, we would expect economic growth to a¤ect changes in DA ratio. Table
5.5 shows the coe¢ cients for the deposit growth regression. Macroeconomic variables
proxying investment opportunities (e.g. GDP growth, changes in stock market prices and
Bank of England Base Rate) are all statistically insignicant.16 This would suggest that
16F-tests for joint signicance shows that these variables can be removed altogether from the main
specication without much loss of explanatory power.
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Table 5.5. DA ratio and investment opportunities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DA ratio DA ratio DA ratio DA ratio
DA ratio (-1) -0.282*** -0.285*** -0.281*** -0.280***
DA ratio (-2) -0.0482* -0.0446* -0.0413 -0.0410
DA ratio (-3) -0.0858*** -0.0874*** -0.0862*** -0.0853***
DA ratio (-4) 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123***
Cap. ratio (-1) 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.379*** 0.374***
Cap. ratio (-2) 0.209** 0.207** 0.203** 0.208**
Cap. ratio (-3) -0.0473 -0.0466 -0.0445 -0.0465
Cap. ratio (-4) 0.216** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.223***
Crisis 0.905** 0.958*** 0.970*** 1.033***
Provision ratio (-2) 0.183 0.182 0.234 0.244
Bank size -0.0683 -0.0349 -0.261 -0.275
Equity returns (-1) -0.0173*
Equity returns (-2) 0.0116
Equity returns (-3) -0.000581
Equity returns (-4) 0.0118
Unemployment -0.152* -0.148* -0.134* -0.139*
GDP growth (-1) -0.114 -0.0981 -0.126
GDP growth (-2) -0.0215 -0.00904 -0.0711
GDP growth (-3) 0.0161 0.155 0.195
GDP growth (-4) -0.0371 -0.108 -0.0585
BoE rate (-1) 0.0829 0.0788
BoE rate (-2) 0.129 0.199
BoE rate (-3) -0.177 -0.273
BoE rate (-4) 0.0958 0.137
Constant 0.652 0.192 3.029 3.150
Observations 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729
R-squared 0.127 0.124 0.120 0.120
Number of banks 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
investment opportunities do not drive deposit growth and therefore endogeneity issues
are likely to be limited.
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5.6. Estimating the impact of QE on bank lending
Now that we have estimated the e¤ects of changes in the deposit ratio on lending
growth, we can estimate the impact of QE on bank lending in the UK.17 To do so we rst
need to identify the likely change of deposits in the UK nancial system following QE. A
possible approach would be to assume that this increase is equal to the £ 200bn of gilts
purchased during the QE programme. However, Bridges and Thomas (2012) consider a
three factors that may o¤set the increase in deposits due to QE.
First, the Bank of England may have purchased gilts from the non-UK nancial sector
or UK banking sector. In this case the increase in deposits may be lower than total assets
purchased because the increase in deposits will materialise in the country of residence of
the selling nancial institution (e.g. seller is non-UK nancial company) or there is a
change in the composition of banks balance sheet without an increase in deposits (e.g.
seller is a UK bank). Observing patterns of gilts held by UK banks during the period of
QE, the authors conclude that this o¤setting channel may not be signicant.
Second, QE-induced lower yields and asset prices may have led to an increase in UK
banksequity and/or long-term debt issuance. The authors argue that UK banksdeposits
will decline by the amount of the increase in equity or long-term debt if this issuance is
purchased by non-banks. They then make a number of assumptions to estimate a £ 60bn
o¤setting e¤ect of this channel. One potential problem with this approach is that issuance
of bank equity and/or long term bank debt may not necessarily lead to a reduction of
deposits. This is indeed a function of how the purchases of these instruments are funded.
For example, if non-bank nancial institutions buy bank equity funded by a bank loan,
17For ease of tractability we will not consider the relationship between capital and DA ratio in this section
and we will use estimates using pre-crisis data.
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both bank and non-bank balance sheet will expand and deposits will remain unchanged.
Of course, this factor is very di¢ cult to quantify but adds another degree of uncertainty
to Bridges and Thomas (2012) estimates.
Table 5.6. Asset purchases and e¤ect on deposit over asset ratio
Date Purchases (£ bn) Deposits (£ bn) Assets (£ bn) Ratio (per cent) Change (pp)
Q4 2008 0.0 3300.9 5455.3 60.5
Q1 2009 15.5 3316.3 5470.8 60.6 0.1
Q2 2009 84.4 3400.7 5555.2 61.2 0.6
Q3 2009 56.1 3456.8 5611.3 61.6 0.4
Q4 2009 32.1 3488.9 5643.4 61.8 0.2
Q1 2010 9.6 3498.5 5653.0 61.9 0.1
Third, some of the additional deposits created may have been absorbed because PNFCs
have used proceeds from the issuance of equity or debt to repay bank loans during the
crisis in order to deleverage or disintermediate. The authors then point to the decline in
bank lending to PNFC, the increase in the issuance of corporate equity and debt and the
increase in net loan repayments as an indication of corporates substituting away from bank
nance. Assuming that all the extra PNFC issuance compared with the 1990s recession
was attributable to QE and that all the proceeds were used to repay bank loans, the
authors suggest an o¤setting e¤ect of £ 16bn. However, the assumption that all of this
amount has been used to repay bank loans is quite restrictive. According to Dealogic
data, UK corporates have used around 25% of the proceeds of their corporate bond and
equity issuance to repay corporate bonds and bank loans. This suggests that Bridges and
Thomas (2012) may have overestimated the true o¤setting e¤ect through this channel.
Given the di¢ culties in estimating accurately the e¤ect of QE on broad money we have
therefore estimated the impulse response functions based on the simplifying assumption
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Figure 5.3. Bank lending following a £ 200bn increase in deposits
that £ 200bn of QE increased deposits by the same amount (i.e. there is a one for one rela-
tionship between asset purchased and new deposits created). Our estimates are therefore
an upper bound of the likely e¤ect on bank lending as some of the new deposits created
will have been absorbedby the channels described above.
We have based these simulations on the actual purchases of gilts in 2009 and 2010
by the Bank of England and estimated the impact on the DA ratio for the average bank
using our dataset (Table 5.6). We have also assumed that total assets increase in line
with the increase in deposits. For example, after the rst £ 15bn asset purchase, £ 15bn
of new deposits are created in the banking system and total assets change by the same
amount. This means that the DA ratio increased by around 0.1pp.
We then use these estimated changes in the DA ratio as a shock in our simulation,
with the rst asset purchase materialising in period 5. Figure 5.3 shows the simulation for
total lending. The e¤ect of QE peaks around four quarters (median e¤ect around 0.1pp
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Figure 5.4. Bank lending for large and small banks following a £ 200bn
increase in deposits
on q/q lending or 0.4pp q/q annualised) after the rst purchases and the e¤ect fades away
around seven quarters after the rst asset purchase.
The impact on lending growth is statistically di¤erent from zero. In the long-run, the
cumulative e¤ect on lending growth for our estimated change in deposits (approximately
the area under the red line) is around 0.3pp for q/q lending growth or 1.2pp for q/q
annualised lending growth.18
As discussed in Section 5, the signicance of DA ratio on bank lending di¤ers for large
and small banks. Figure 5.4 shows the simulations for large and small banks using the
same estimates as in Table 5.2. Despite being positive, the large bankschange in lending
is not statistically di¤erent from zero (the zero line is within the condence intervals). On
the other hand, small bankslending impulse response is similar in shape to the pooled
regression in Figure 5.3, even though the peak impact of changes in the DA ratio is
18This is derived by using the long-term coe¢ cients in Table 2. For a 1pp increase in the DA ratio
increases total lending growth by around 0.24pp in the long run. If we then multiply this amount for the
cumulated impact of QE on DA ratio (i.e. 1.4) we obtain 0.3pp.
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approximately three times stronger (the peak e¤ect for small banks reaches around 0.3pp
q/q after four quarters against 0.1pp q/q in the pooled case). However, given that we
cannot reject equality of coe¢ cients for large and small banks we can assume that the
e¤ect is positive also for large banks even though somewhat smaller.
5.7. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the potential e¤ects of QE on bank lending growth using
a new and non-publicly available panel dataset on UK banks. So far, the vast majority
of research on QE has focussed on the impact on economic growth and nancial markets
using aggregate time-series data, while the e¤ect of QE on bank lending has been largely
neglected. This is because policymakers expected QE to a¤ect demand mainly through
nancial markets (e.g. expectations and portfolio rebalancing e¤ects), while the e¤ect on
bank lending was expected to be small because of banksincentives to delever during the
banking crisis. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper to try to quantify the e¤ect of QE
on bank lending in the UK using a panel dataset. Our approach allows us to control for
bank specic factors (e.g. shocks to capital) and to test for heterogeneity in the e¤ects of
QE on bank lending.
We found that QE may have led to small but statistically signicant increases in
bank lending. The e¤ect on bank lending is heterogeneous, as small banks have increased
lending more than large banks, consistent with economic theory. However, we also found
evidence that the e¤ect of QE on bank lending may have been smaller than initially
estimated because of lower levels of capital during the crisis.
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Appendix
5.A. Appendix
5.A.1. The appropriate number of lags: from general to specic
There is no golden ruleto choose the correct specication and in particular the appro-
priate number of lags (see Verbeek (2012) for a summary of all possible approaches). The
approach we have used is to start with a General Unrestricted Model (GUM) and then
reduce it in size using tests for joint signicance. The intuition here is that we would like
to have a relatively parsimonious model so that our coe¢ cients can be interpreted more
easily.
Table 5.A.1 show all the steps we have taken to reach the nal specication. We have
started by estimating a very general specication including 4 lags of the bank specic
controls and macro variables.
As a rst step, we have dropped the last two lags of the provision ratio using an F-test
for joint signicance. Second we have noticed that the contemporaneous GDP and Bank
rate variables were highly insignicant, so we dropped both. We have left the remaining
four lags for each variable.
Third we have dropped the last two lags of the capital ratio as the probability of them
being jointly equal to zero was around 30 per cent so that dropping them changed very
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little in terms of cumulative e¤ect on lending growth. In the fourth and fth step we have
dropped the rst and last lags of the DA ratio as they were both highly insignicant.
Table 5.A.1. From a general to the nal specication
lag no.
general spec. 1st test 2nd test 3rd test 4th test 5th test
Total lending 4 4 4 4 4 4
Capital ratio 4 4 4 2 2 2
Deposit ratio 4 4 4 4 3 2
Provision ratio 4 2 2 2 2 2
GDP 4 + cont 4 + cont 4 4 4 4
Bank rate 4 + cont 4 + cont 4 4 4 4
Prob>F (joint sign.) 0.6327 0.279
p-value (ind. sign.) 0.743, 0.919 0.785 0.301
5.A.2. Assumption on deposit over asset aggregation to run impulse response
functions
Note that in the impulse responses we use changes in the deposit asset ratio derived at an
aggregate level. These changes are then used in the impulse responses to estimate average
bank changes in lending. But this is not necessarily the same as estimating deposit asset
ratio changes for individual banks and then use the averages of these changes in the
impulse responses. We cannot proceed with the latter approach as we do not know the
distribution of QE-created deposits across banks. We therefore assume that:
(5.1)
P
DitP
Ait
 
P
Dit 1P
Ait 1
=
P
(Dit
Ait
  Dit 1
Ait 1
)
n
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Table 5.A.2. Deposit ratio and lending with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FE FE - small FE - large
Lending growth (-1) -0.117** -0.123** -0.0984
(0.0452) (0.0475) (0.145)
Lending growth (-2) -0.0193 -0.0237 -0.00804
(0.0583) (0.0614) (0.0972)
Lending growth (-3) 0.0431 0.0394 0.0623
(0.0587) (0.0603) (0.0825)
Lending growth (-4) -0.0399 -0.0472 0.148**
(0.0490) (0.0510) (0.0545)
Cap. ratio (-1) -0.753** -0.773** -0.628
(0.291) (0.310) (0.756)
Cap. ratio (-2) -0.259 -0.329 0.697
(0.299) (0.317) (0.882)
DAratio (-2) 0.128 0.142 0.0755**
(0.132) (0.161) (0.0326)
DAratio (-3) 0.144 0.157 0.136**
(0.126) (0.152) (0.0512)
Sectoral demand 2.790 5.952** -0.114
(1.819) (2.630) (0.424)
Provision ratio (-2) -1.703 -1.628 -2.254***
(1.896) (2.124) (0.503)
Bank size 1.280 1.498 0.214
(1.098) (1.259) (0.923)
Macro variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant -10.42 -12.09 1.451
(12.13) (13.25) (12.86)
Observations 1,371 1,110 261
R-squared 0.053 0.060 0.093
Number of banks 50 39 11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
or in other words that the general change of deposit asset ratio is equal to the average
individual bank change of the ratio. With a bit of algebra we can see that this is equal
to:
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(5.2)
P
DitP
Ait
  1
n
(
X Dit
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) =
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Ait 1
  1
n
(
X Dit 1
Ait 1
):
This expression is the restriction that we are applying to individual bank changes in
deposit asset ratio. The interpretation is that the deviation of the aggregate change from
the bank average changes needs to be constant across time.
5.A.3. Comparing FE with GMM estimates
In Table 5.A.3 we have estimated specication 5.1 using Arellano-Bond di¤erence GMM
estimator. The presence of lagged dependent variables may potentially lead to a bias
that may a¤ect our estimates. One possible approach is to address the endogeneity of
lagged dependent variables by using the GMM estimator with lags of the levels of the
dependent variables as instruments. Our results suggest that the di¤erence between FE
and GMM is not large and the log run coe¢ cient remains positive, even though smaller
than FE estimates (Table 5.A.4). Attanasio et al. (2000) show that when the number of
time periods exceeds 30 (i.e. our case), the bias created by the FE estimator is more than
o¤set by its greater precision compared to GMM estimators. And Judson and Owen
run a Montecarlo simulation to show that, if T is greater than 30, FE fares better than
GMM in terms of e¢ ciency, bias and error. For these reasons FE remains our favourite
estimation method.
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Table 5.A.3. Deposit asset ratio and total lending - a comparison between
FE and GMM
(1) (2)
VARIABLES FE GMM
Lending growth (-1) -0.114*** -0.339***
(0.0290) (0.0369)
Lending growth (-2) -0.0176 -0.213***
(0.0281) (0.0385)
Lending growth (-3) 0.0383 -0.0345
(0.0285) (0.0327)
Lending growth (-4) -0.0350 -0.0730**
(0.0291) (0.0304)
Cap. ratio (-1) -0.677*** -0.482**
(0.209) (0.208)
Cap. ratio (-2) -0.275 -0.337*
(0.204) (0.196)
DA ratio (-2) 0.138** 0.0645
(0.0685) (0.0710)
DA ratio (-3) 0.132* 0.154**
(0.0689) (0.0729)
Sectoral demand 2.810 2.931*
(1.844) (1.721)
Provision ratio (-2) -1.567** -3.572***
(0.720) (1.151)
Bank size 1.339** 0.585
(0.541) (1.654)
Macro controls1 Yes Yes
Constant -11.20* n.a.
(6.038)
Observations 1,394 1,312
R-squared 0.049 n.a.
Number of banks 50 50
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) GDP growth, Equity returns, Unemployment, Bank rate
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Table 5.A.4. Comparing FE and GMM long run coe¢ cients
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
DA ratio (FE) 0.24 0.10 2.43 0.05 0.43
DA ratio (GMM) 0.13 0.07 1.77 -0.01 0.27
5.A.4. Deposit ratio and lending with robust standard errors
A modied Wald test (we have used xttest3 command in Stata which is a modied
Wald test as in Greene (2000)) on equation 5.1 rejects the hypothesis that the variances
of the groups are the same, i.e. it suggests that there is group-wise heteroskedasticity.
The formula has been modied to allow for unbalanced panels. In terms of small sample
properties, simulations of the test statistic have shown that its power is very low in
the context of xed e¤ects with "large N, small T" panels. In that circumstance, the
test should be used with caution. A test for serial correlation as in Wooldridge (2000)
rejects the hypothesis of no serial correlation (we have used xtserialcommand in Stata).
However, this test is constructed for large N small T, and therefore may not be applicable
to our dataset. We are not aware of alternative serial correlation tests for large T, small
N case.
However, a visual inspection of bank by bank predicted errors seems to suggest that
there is limited serial correlation within groups. Wooldridge (2000) shows that the robust
variance-covariance matrix is valid with group-wise heteroskedasticity or serial correlation
within individual panels, provided that T is small relative to N. The author adds that
OLS standard errors may be better behaved under assumptions of homoskedasticity if N
is not very large relative to T.
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There is not much literature deriving asymptotic properties of robust variance-covariance
matrix when T is large and N small. Using Montecarlo Simulations, Kezdi (2004) shows
that the robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix does not get biased or signif-
icantly more dispersed as T increases. Hansen (2006) derives the asymptotic properties
of the robust covariance matrix as T goes to innity and N xed, and shows that the
robust estimator is not consistent but it does have a limiting distribution. In this case the
t-statistic is not asymptotically normal but converges in distribution to a random variable
proportional to a t (n-1) distribution. Hansen (2006) suggests to use this distribution to
construct condence intervals and tests when robust covariance matrix is used.
However, these papers do not consider the case of unbalanced panels. Given that our
panel is unbalanced this may raise further problems in using robust variance-covariance
matrix. Again here there is no strong evidence, but Austin Nichols and Mark Scha¤er
suggest in a presentation (http://repec.org/usug2007/crse.pdf) that with a small number
of clusters, or very unbalanced cluster sizes the cure (of using robust standard error)
can be worse than the disease. We have therefore used non robust variance covariance
matrixes in this paper.
5.A.5. Chow tests for structural breaks
Table 5.A.5 presents structural break tests for large/small banks and the crisis period.
The upper panel shows that we cannot reject equality of coe¢ cients for large and small
banks, i.e. large and small banks react to changes in the deposit ratio in a similar way.
The lower panel shows that the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is not rejected, i.e.
there is no structural break during the crisis.
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Table 5.A.5. Test for large and small banks and crisis structural breaks
Test Statistic Prob>F
Large banks coe¢ cients F( 19, 1304) = 0.53 0.9507
same as small banks
No crisis structural break F( 19, 1415) = 1.13 0.3133
5.A.6. F-tests for joint signicance for macroeconomic variables
In table 5.A.6 we report F-tests for joint signicance of macroeconomic variables (that
we use as proxies of investment opportunities) in the auxiliary deposit regression. These
tests show that these variables can be removed from the auxiliary regression as they are
jointly not statistically signicant. This suggests that banks do not change their deposit
ratios ahead of future investment opportunities.
Table 5.A.6. F-test for joint signicance in the DA ratio regression
Test Statistic Prob>F
FTSE F( 4, 1653) = 1.55 0.1849
GDP F( 4, 1661) = 0.30 0.875
Bank rate F( 4, 1657) = 1.54 0.1884
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CHAPTER 6
The Transmission Mechanism of Time-Varying Capital
Requirements
6.1. Introduction
As a policy response to the nancial crisis, the UK government has established the
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the rst example of a macroprudential regulator.
1 The stated objectives of the FPC are to reduce systemic risk through two channels:
increasing the resilience of the nancial system by forcing banking institutions to hold
more capital, and dampening the credit cycle by reducing lending to the real economy
during an expansionary credit phase.2 The complete toolkit available to the FPC is still
uncertain, but time-series changes in capital requirements are likely to be one of the main
policy instruments.3
Economic theory and empirical evidence have generally established that there is a
negative relationship between changes in regulatory capital ratios and credit supply (Van-
Hoose (2008)). However, there are still uncertainties on how changes in capital require-
ments will a¤ect the banking system and the real economy. In particular, how will the
1The interim FPC became operative in June 2011. The record of the second FPC meeting can be found
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/records/fpc/pdf/2011/record1110.pdf
2See for example P. Tucker speech Macroprudential policy: building nancial stability institutionsfor
the remit of the FPC, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech492.pdf
3The interim FPC agreed to advise HM Treasury that the statutory FPC should have powers of
direction over the countercyclical capital bu¤er, sectoral capital requirements and a leverage ratio.
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/nancialstability/Documents/fpc/statement120323.pdf
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transmission mechanism work? What is the e¤ect of a change in capital requirements on
lending growth? And will banks change the composition of their lending as well? This
chapter will try to answer these and related questions from an empirical perspective using
a new and non-publicly available panel dataset of banks operating in the UK.
The existence of the transmission mechanism of capital requirements hinges on the
failure of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem (1958). In the M-M world shocks to
capital will not have any impact on bank lending decisions. But in reality several frictions
make changes in capital non-neutral from the bank perspective, so that changes in capital
requirements are likely to a¤ect bank lending growth. The frictions often cited in the
literature are the tax deductibility of debt, asymmetric information problems (Myers and
Majluf (1984)) and debt-overhang problems (Myers (1977)).
The non-neutrality of capital is also well documented in the empirical literature that
uses panel datasets. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1997) are early
examples of this. And more recent empirical literature conrmed that shocks to capital
(or changes in capital requirements) a¤ect lending growth (e.g. Francis and Osborne
(2010) for the UK and Berrospide and Edge (2010) for the US).
In contrast to the large majority of the research investigating the relationship between
capital (or capital requirements) and lending, our dataset contains regulatory (and non-
publicly available) information on individual capital requirements that vary over time, the
so called triggercapital requirements. These requirements are set above the regulatory
minimum and regulatory action is taken if these requirements are breached.
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The use of these capital requirements provides us with a macroprudential tool proxy
allowing us to estimate the e¤ectiveness of these tools on bank lending growth.4 For
example, Ayiar et al. (2012) have used a UK bank panel dataset containing trigger
capital requirements and showed that increases in capital requirements leads to a decline
in bank lending growth.
The contribution of this paper is to estimate a dynamic model of bank lending growth
to quantify both short and long-run e¤ects of changes in capital requirements on bank
lending growth. We also estimate a capital equation which helps us understand better
how the transmission mechanism of capital requirements works. To do so, we employ a
newly constructed and non-publicly available dataset with observations since 1989 which
allows us to capture two full business cycles.
We nd that an increase in trigger capital requirements reduces bank lending growth.
The e¤ect of the increase in capital requirements is transmitted through increases of actual
holdings of capital. Capital requirements are therefore binding, a necessary conditions for
the transmission mechanism to work. The e¤ect of capital requirements on lending is
quite large and highly statistically signicant. But the e¤ect is not homogenous and large
and small banks react di¤erently to an increase in capital requirements. In particular,
large banks seem insensitive to a change in regulatory policy, while small banks react to
it quite strongly. This could have potentially important implications as few large banks
constitute a conspicuous slice of the lending market. We also nd that banks not only
reduce the volume of lending, but de-risk their balance sheet in the short term in an e¤ort
4It is di¢ cult to determine whether the underlying rationale for changes in capital requirements were
microprudential or macroprudential in nature. Here we assume that changes in time series capital require-
ments before the establishment of the macroprudential regulator is a good proxy of future macroprudential
changes in capital requirements.
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to reduce their risk weighted assets. The macroprudential authority should therefore take
into account that changes in capital requirements are likely to a¤ect bank capital ratios,
the volume and composition of lending.
In Section 6.2 we outline a possible transmission mechanism of capital requirements on
bank capital and bank lending while Section 6.3 describes briey the dataset and present
some summary statistics. In Section 6.4 we look at the relationship between capital
requirements, capital and bank lending. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2. A possible transmission mechanism of capital requirements
In a Modigliani-Miller (M-M) framework the structure of bank capital does not have
an impact on the cost of capital. This means that an increase in capital requirements
will not a¤ect banksfunding costs and therefore lending to the real economy is likely to
remain unchanged.5
However, there may be various frictions so that a change in capital requirements (and
therefore capital ratios) is likely to have a real e¤ect. The most often cited friction is the
deductibility of debt interest payments, which will lead to an increase in banks funding
costs when capital requirements (or trigger capital requirements) are raised (Figure 6.1).
In this case the bank may try to pass on higher funding costs to borrowers by increasing
lending spreads or by reducing the volume of new lending.
In a M-M world, following an increase in capital requirements, we would expect banks
to raise new equity to increase the capital (K) over risk weighted assets (RWA) ratio.
5We assume that there is a relationship between capital and regulatory capital requirements, i.e. capital
requirements are binding. Banks try to maintain a constant bu¤er above the minimum, so that an increase
in reglatory capital leads to an increase in the capital ratio. This is supported by empirical evidence in
the UK, see for example Alfon et al (2005) and Francis and Osborne (2009), Ediz et al (1998)
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Figure 6.1. A stylised bank balance sheet
Alternatively, banks could cut dividends or lower sta¤pay to increase their retained prots
and accumulate more capital. Absent any frictions, cutting RWA would not be rational
as banks are prot maximizing agents and it would reduce their expected protability
(and therefore their value).
The rst option facing the bank - raising fresh equity - would increase the capital ratio
(K/RWA) via the numerator. But the literature has shown that raising equity voluntarily
may signal to the market that the issuer is bad(see Myers and Majluf (1984)), the so
called adverse selectionproblem. This is because equity pays out only in good states
of the world. In this case raising fresh equity may increase further funding costs. The
importance of this friction is likely to be limited in a macroprudential policy regime as
the regulator will ask all banks to raise capital at the same time. In this case raising fresh
capital may not reveal additional information about the health of the bank.
The second option facing the bank  reduce dividend payments  would increase
retained prots and therefore the ability of the bank to accumulate capital. However,
in a world with competing banks, the level of dividends and sta¤ pay may be sticky
(for example because of a collective action problem). Deviating from what the other
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competitors are doing may lead to lower equity prices and sta¤ being hired in higher
paying institutions.
An increase in funding costs (e.g. because of equity issuance) will lead banks to
increase the interest charged to customers. But banks usually borrow short to lend long,
i.e. the loan book has usually a longer average maturity than its liabilities and it will not
be re-priceble at least in the short term. This will lengthen the adjustment process to the
new capital requirements. This is because prots will be a¤ected in the short term and
the capacity of the bank to reach the new capital ratio via retained prots will be reduced
(i.e. the adjustment happens via changes in volume). The more di¢ cult the re-pricing,
the higher the adjustment via lower RWA. Alessandri and Nelson (2012) provide evidence
on the existence of repricing frictions in banking.
Another frequently cited reason for why capital may be costly is the debt overhang
problem (Myers (1977)). In this case banks with weak balance sheets will be reluctant to
invest in new projects as the possible payo¤s will be absorbed by senior creditors. This
is because shareholders are the rst in line to absorb losses. Shareholdersinterest will
therefore be to rebuild the capital ratio by reducing assets rather than increasing capital.
French et al. (2010) argue that debt nancing is a disciplining device to solve the so
called free cash owproblem, and increases in the capital ratio may therefore increase
banksrisk taking incentives. This may lead in turn to an increase in the cost of capital.
However, though appealing on a theoretical basis, it seems that nancial crises are usually
preceded by large increases in leverage. The claim that debt is a disciplining device seems
therefore not supported by empirical evidence.
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On the other spectrum of capital theory, Admati et al (2011) argue that capital is not
costly. Their analysis consists in an examination of all the frictions highlighted above and
reaching the conclusion that increasing bank capital is not socially expensive, as it would
deliver larger social benets. However, the vast majority of theoretical and empirical
evidence seems to suggest that capital is expensive, at least in the short term.
The market imperfections and frictions highlighted above will make more likely that
banks will choose to adjust to an increase in capital requirements by changing their RWA,
therefore a¤ecting lending and the real economy. This adjustment can be made in three
ways (Figure 6.2). First, banks can reduce lending growth by cutting on new lending.
Second, banks can lower the risk prole of the loans without reducing the volume of loans,
i.e. reduce those loans that have a higher risk weight (therefore reducing RWA). Third,
they can dispose of parts of their portfolio and increase their equity capital. This chapter
considers the rst two channels.6
In addition, a change in capital requirements may a¤ect lending via the expectations
channel. In monetary policy, expectations of changes in interest rates a¤ect market in-
terest rates, which in turn a¤ect economic activity. Expectations of changes in capital
requirements operate in a similar way. If banks believe that an increase in capital require-
ments is forthcoming, they may adjust the level of capital (K) or risk-weighted assets
(RWA) to avoid sharper adjustments after the announcement (e.g. because sharp adjust-
ments of capital are costly). However, this channel will become more important after
eventual changes of FPC macroprudential policy stance, e.g. by increasing or lowering
6Ultimately these adjustments will have an e¤ect on the real economy if we believe that lending activity
is special in the sense that corporates are not able to perfectly substitute bank lending with market debt
(see Bernanke and Lown (1991)). We will not analyse this aspect of the transmission mechanism in this
paper.
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Figure 6.2. Transmission mechanism of capital requirements
capital requirements. We will not therefore consider the expectations channel in this
paper and leave this analysis to future research.
6.3. Description of the data
This new and non publicly available panel dataset includes quarterly balance sheet and
income statement data of 30 di¤erent nancial institutions active in the lending market
operating in the UK from 1989 until end 2010. The panel is unbalanced as the time series
is discontinued after mergers and failures - banks are observed for a minimum of 9 periods
and a maximum of 92 periods.
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The sample includes UK-owned banks, foreign-owned banks (around 60% of the sam-
ple), building societies (around 10% of the sample) and non-bank nancial institutions
(around 17% of the sample). We have considered nancial entities on a consolidated level,
as we assume that lending and capital decisions are taken on a group-level basis (Hous-
ton et al. (1997)). Considering a lower level of consolidation would instead assume that
capital cannot be transferred within the group. Given that this is a strong assumption,
we believe this dataset better reects real capital-lending dynamics in a complex banking
group. An unconsolidated level approach is instead followed by other related research,
e.g. Francis and Osborne (2010).
Our dataset includes Bank of England information on banks balance sheet and in-
come statements (e.g. bank lending and prots) and FSA data on regulatory capital
requirements. In particular, the FSA reports regulatory capital held by each bank, and
a time-varying individual minimum capital requirements, the so called trigger capital
requirements (capital requirements from now on). These additional requirements were
set by UK regulators starting in 1989 as the regulators felt that Basel I Accord did not
take into account a wide range of risks (e.g. interest rate risks, reputational and oper-
ational risks) that may a¤ect rmsprobability of default (Richardson and Stephenson,
2000). Capital requirements are usually set above the minimum regulatory capital and
are mainly based on general market conditions, risk management practice and strength of
individual bankscontrols (FSA (2001), Francis and Osborne (2009)). If a bank breaches
this trigger level, regulatory action is taken. The capital requirements are set by the
FSA on a bank by bank basis and vary over time (they are usually reviewed every 18-36
months) which allows us to use it as a proxy for a macroprudential instrument.
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Table 6.1. Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean, GBPmn Std. Dev. Min Max
Total lending 4016 15909.94 37484.34 0 311344.9
Household lending 4019 11221.95 27198.97 0 237846.5
PNFC lending 4045 4654.021 12289.17 0 121783.7
Secured lending to households 3920 9048.897 23040.73 0 218855.8
Unsecured lending to households 3978 2439.304 6188.257 0 42309.52
per cent
Total lending growth 3474 1.693999 8.556637 -23.6508 34.83484
Household lending growth 3275 0.963405 9.663742 -34.6899 43.11927
PNFC lending growth 3389 1.824463 10.10389 -26.2055 40.45848
Secured lending growth 2667 0.217652 5.57018 -22.9219 18.60189
Unsecured lending growth 2967 1.717776 6.267442 -16.0981 31.81272
per cent
Capital requirements 2176 9.670173 1.324076 8 13.58488
Capital bu¤er 2599 7.313729 8.241084 0.780774 39.41779
percentage points
Capital requirements 1445 0.015852 0.269116 -2.65808 3.177661
Capital bu¤er 1795 0.018363 1.280993 -15.9491 11.30077
Table 6.1 describes the main variables that we use in this paper. Total lending is the
stock of lending to households and to private non-nancial corporates (PNFC), i.e. total
non-nancial lending. Secured lending and unsecured lending are lending to households
secured by residential property and unsecured lending to households respectively. Growth
variables are the quarter over quarter percentage changes of stock variables. Among the
growth variables, PNFC lending has the highest variance, while secured lending growth
the lowest.
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6.4. Econometric strategy and results
Our strategy is to investigate the transmission mechanism of capital requirements in
two separate steps, reecting the structure described in Figure 6.2. First, we investigate
the e¤ects of changes in capital requirements on bank capital ratios. As discussed previ-
ously, capital requirements have to have an e¤ect on capital ratios for the transmission
mechanism to work (i.e. capital requirements are binding). Once we have established that
this relationship exists, we aim to investigate the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank
lending. We will also exploit the panel data nature of our dataset and investigate het-
erogeneity of the e¤ects of capital requirements, in particular focusing on the di¤erences
between large and small banks.
Throughout the paper we are going to treat this panel dataset as a time-series panel
dataset, as we would expect that our results will be largely determined by the time-series
dimension within individual banks. Indeed for changes in total lending and changes in
trigger requirement (our key variables), within variance explains around 95% of the total
variance. This indicates that the cross-section dimension is not likely to contribute much
to our estimates.
The relevance of the time-series dimension in the panel dataset may add two potential
problems to the estimation process. First, the variables we have included in the specica-
tion may not be stationary, and this may cause our estimated relationship to be spurious.
However, we consider changes of the main variables, so that even if they were originally
integrated of order one, taking changes would make them stationary.
Second, including the lags of the dependent variable generates biased estimates creates
the so-called lagged dependent variablebias (Bond, 2002). In this case OLS estimates
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are inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term as
both terms include a bank-specic error term. The Fixed E¤ects estimator eliminates this
source of inconsistency by transforming the variables and eliminating the bank specic
error term. But the transformed lagged dependent variable is now correlated with the
error term so that the Fixed E¤ects (FE) estimator is also inconsistent.
Bond (2002) shows that this inconsistency decreases as the number of observations
increases as long as the error terms are not autocorrelated. In our large T dynamic
panel regressions we have lagged dependent variables and lagged exogenous variables and
autocorrelation should not a¤ect the consistency of our estimates.
The Generalised Method of Moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is often used to
tackle these inconsistency problems in large N, small T panels. However, for large T,
the Fixed E¤ects estimator will be close to the GMM estimator and provides a better
alternative given the reported poor small properties of the GMM estimator (Verbeek,
2012). Therefore our preferred approach will be to estimate the regressions by using the
FE estimator.
6.4.1. Are changes in capital requirements a¤ecting bank capital?
For the transmission mechanism to work, changes in capital requirements have to a¤ect
nancial institutionscapital ratios, i.e. capital requirements are binding. This means
that, when the macroprudential regulator changes regulatory capital, banks adjust their
capital ratio e¤ectively, a¤ecting the capacity of banks to lend. This is because a change
in binding capital requirements a¤ects the capital structure.
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Changes in capital ratio are likely to be a¤ected by previous changes in capital ratio,
changes in capital requirements, bank characteristics and macroeconomic factors. For
example, Ediz et al. (1998) regress capital ratios on a set of bank specic variables
(including capital requirements) using a panel of UK banks. This specication however
lacks macroeconomic variables, which are on the other hand included in other seminal
papers on the relationship between capital variables and banksbehaviour, e.g. Bernanke
and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998). Francis and Osborne (2009) suggest
that there is an established empirical relationship between macroeconomic activity and
bankscapital ratios.
Capital requirements may not bind in some states of the world. For example, lowering
capital requirement during a nancial crisis may not a¤ect the desired levels of capital
as market requirementsmay bind (Wall and Peterson, 1995 and Barrios and Blanco,
2003).7 In this case nancial markets may require a capital ratio that is higher than the
regulatory requirement as market participants sell equities of banks that have a capital
ratio lower than the perceived market requirement. On the other hand, increasing capital
requirements in an upturn may bind as banks generally hold smaller bu¤ers with strong
macroeconomic conditions because expected losses in an upturn are limited. For example,
before the current nancial crisis capital ratios of UK banks were exceptionally low and
increased after the beginning of the crisis (see Bank of England, 2012)
In order to incorporate bank specic and macroeconomic factors, we specify the capital
equation as follows:
7The market capital requirement is the level of the capital ratio under which nancial institutions would
incur into liquidity or solvency problems. This is unobservable by the regulator and the nancial markets.
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(6.1) Cit =  + (L)Cit + (L)Tit + 0Iit + 
0At + uit
where Cit is quarterly changes in capital over risk weighted assets ratio for bank
i in period t8, Tit is changes in trigger capital requirement, Iit is a vector of bank
specic (micro) controls (capital requirements, provision ratio and bank size) and At
is a vector of macro controls (Unemployment, Equity returns, GDP growth and Bank of
England base rate). uit is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance
2; uit  N(0; 2):9 L is a lag operator where (L) =
4P
s=1
s(L
s), (L) =
4P
s=0
s(L
s):
For the transmission mechanism to be e¤ective, a change in capital requirements
(T ) should have a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient. Changes in capital
requirements can have short-run and long run e¤ects. The former are identied by the
coe¢ cients of the individual time lags, while the latter are identied by the sum of the
lagged coe¢ cients divided by one minus the sum of lagged lending coe¢ cients.10 Using
data on UK banks, Ediz et al. (1998) and Francis and Osborne (2009) nd evidence
that changes in capital requirements are binding. However, empirical evidence for other
countries is mixed (VanHoose (1997)).
8For example, if in time t=1 the capital ratio is 10 percentage points and in time t=2 the capital ratio is
12 percentage points, the change is 2 percentage points. The same applies to trigger capital changes.
9It is also generally assumed that the error terms are independent both in time and cross-section dimen-
sions, i.e. E(uit; ujs) = 0 for i 6= j; s 6= t:
10Using this specication we are able to estimate the long run e¤ects of changes in deposit ratio on bank
lending growth. This e¤ect is dened as the cumulative e¤ect of a change in deposit ratio on lending
growth as time goes to innity. However this e¤ect should not be confused with the e¤ect on the long-run
lending growth, which we constrain to be zero. This is because the model is estimated in growth rates
and there is no long-run levels relation.
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Bank specic factors like size and provisions are also likely to a¤ect nancial insti-
tutions decisions on capital. Large (and systemic) banks are often reported to hold a
smaller bu¤er of capital and this is also true in our sample. Large banks can benet from
lower funding costs, because of an easier access to capital markets and the presence of an
implicit government guarantee (Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2012), Noss and Sowerbutts
(2012)). Large banks are also more likely to have received capital injections during the
nancial crisis and this is likely to have a positive e¤ect on bank lending (Brei et al.
(2013)). And larger and more diversied banks may be less risky and therefore face lower
funding costs. This will translate into higher prots and therefore a higher level of capital.
A high level of provisions may lead to a higher capital ratio, given that the bank may
expect larger losses in the future.
Macroeconomic activity can a¤ect bankscapital ratios. For example, better macro-
economic variables may lead to lower capital ratios as nancial institutions are less con-
cerned about future losses. On the other hand, better economic conditions mean also
higher prots, higher retained prots and therefore higher capital ratios.
One potential problem with equation 6.1 is that we may have reverse causality, i.e.
changes in capital a¤ect changes in trigger capital. For example, if a bank experiences
large losses (and the capital ratio drops), the regulator may increase trigger capital as the
riskiness of the bank increases. However, as described earlier on, capital requirements are
set every 18 to 36 months and do not necessarily change promptly in response to changes
in banks capital ratio. Therefore, this institutional setting of capital requirements reduces
the extent to which they are endogenous in our regressions.11
11Moreover, Granger causality tests suggest that changes in capital requirements Granger cause changes
in capital ratios and not vice versa.
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Table 6.2 presents the estimates for regression 6.1.12 In specication (a) we have used
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares regression with macro controls to estimate the e¤ects of
changes in capital requirements on the risk weighted capital ratio. Changes in regula-
tory capital lead to an increase in capital ratio.13 In the short run, a 1pp change in
trigger capital leads to a 0.5pp change in capital ratio. The long run coe¢ cient remains
statistically signicant and is around 1.3pp.14 It is di¢ cult to interpret the short term
e¤ects of macro controls as signs vary with lags and both long run coe¢ cients for these
macroeconomic variables are not statistically signicant. Stock market returns do not
seem to a¤ect bank capital ratios which seems in contrast with binding market capital
requirements, i.e. changes in nancial market conditions do not drive changes in capital
resources. Overall, macroeconomic factors do not seem to a¤ect bank capital ratios.
Given that estimates (a) may be biased, in specication (b) we have used Fixed E¤ects
(FE). The xed e¤ects are signicant, suggesting that POLS estimates are not consistent.
The estimates maintain the same sign even though the short run e¤ect of trigger capital
declines somewhat to 0.3pp while in the long run the coe¢ cient drops to 0.9pp.
These results indicate that changes in capital requirements have a positive and sta-
tistically signicant e¤ect on capital ratios, in line with other empirical research on UK
12Also the sample used in the regressions is not the full sample of banks because cases with missing
observations on any variable are excluded. If the missing cases are systematically related to observed
characteristics then there might be sample selection bias, e.g. survivorship bias if only rms that survive
are included in the sample and they are systematically di¤erent from the excluded failed rms. While
sample selection bias is fairly easy to deal with in cross-section, it is more di¢ cult to deal with in dynamic
panels of the type used here, so allowing for this is a topic for future research (e.g. using the procedure
proposed recently in Semykina and Wooldridge (2013)).
13Results are robust to the exclusion of macroeconomic controls.
14Estimates and tests not presented here are in the Annex.
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Table 6.2. Capital ratio and capital requirements regression
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VARIABLES Cap. Cap. Cap. Cap. (l) Cap. (s)
Cap. ratio (-1) 0.793*** 0.715*** 0.715*** 0.764*** 0.714***
Cap. ratio (-2) -0.663*** -0.679*** -0.680*** -0.873*** -0.670***
Cap. ratio (-3) 0.430*** 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.565*** 0.361***
Cap. ratio (-4) -0.198*** -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.264*** -0.220***
Cap. req. 0.507*** 0.346*** 0.392*** -0.290 0.411***
Cap. req.*lar -0.644
Cap. req.(-1) -0.127 -0.0446 -0.0792 0.0752 -0.0959
Cap. req.(-2) 0.335** 0.286* 0.310* 0.213 0.332
Cap. req.(-3) -0.133 -0.116 -0.137 0.0774 -0.152
Cap. req.(-4) 0.246** 0.238* 0.276** -0.0860 0.294**
Cap. req.(-1)*lar 0.240
Cap. req.(-2)*lar -0.0189
Cap. req.(-3)*lar 0.0435
Cap. req.(-4)*lar -0.378
Provisionratio (-4) 0.00703 0.0124 0.00913 -0.00104 -0.000283
Crisis -0.127 -0.130 -0.136 -0.0544 -0.224
Bank size 0.00875 0.0783 0.0813 0.0651 0.0903
Unemployment 0.0202 -0.00790 -0.00761 0.00765 -0.0136
Equity returns -0.00441 -0.00425 -0.00435 0.000997 -0.00635
GDP growth 0.0709 0.0875 0.0814 0.0126 0.0789
GDP growth (-1) 0.0665 0.0437 0.0458 0.0437 0.0281
GDP growth (-2) -0.222** -0.214** -0.215** -0.111 -0.254**
GDP growth (-3) 0.00423 -0.0164 -0.0284 0.00935 -0.000231
GDP growth (-4) 0.117* 0.0852 0.0891 0.00649 0.133
BoE rate -0.158* -0.124 -0.128 0.0537 -0.173
BoE rate (-1) 0.284* 0.237 0.240 -0.192 0.361
BoE rate (-2) -0.366** -0.301* -0.291* -0.0117 -0.400*
BoE rate (-3) 0.371** 0.304** 0.292* 0.227* 0.352*
BoE rate (-4) -0.147* -0.125 -0.120 -0.103 -0.141
Constant -0.132 -0.670 -0.694 -0.663 -0.733
Observations 1,107 1,107 1,107 261 840
R-squared 0.380 0.356 0.357 0.422 0.358
Number of banks 42 42 42 10 31
Standard errors omitted
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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banks (e.g. Ediz et al. (1998), Alfon et al. (2004) and Francis and Osborne (2009)). De-
pending on the estimates, the e¤ect of a 1pp change in trigger capital requirement leads
to a 0.9-1.3pp change in the capital ratio. For the FE regression, the long run coe¢ cient
is not statistically di¤erent from 1, suggesting that nancial institutions try maintain a
constant capital bu¤er above the capital requirement.
In (a) and (b) we assume that the response to a change in capital requirements is
homogeneous across banks. However, large and small banks may react di¤erently to a
change in capital requirements - for example large banks may react less given their better
access to capital markets. In this case large banks may be able to operate with smaller
capital bu¤ers and raise equity when approaching the regulatory threshold. Moreover,
systemic banks may benet from lower funding costs, because of an easier access to
capital markets and the presence of an implicit government guarantee (Ueda and Weder
di Mauro (2012), Noss and Sowerbutts (2012)). This may allow large banks to accumulate
capital more quickly following a capital shock.
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical framework providing priors on the magnitude
of the coe¢ cients for large and small banks even though our simple theoretical framework
suggests that small banks may react more sharply to a change in capital requirements
given their higher cost of accessing capital markets (see Chapter 4).
In (c) we let only the capital requirement coe¢ cient vary for large and small banks,
with all the other coe¢ cients constrained to be equal. A large bank is any bank that
has been on the top ve according to assets at any period during the sample.15 The
15Throughout the sample eight banks are classied as large.
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coe¢ cients of the interaction variables are not statistically signicant, which may suggest
that large and small banks do not react di¤erently to a change in capital requirements.
In (d) and (e) we run two separate regressions for large and small banks respectively,
allowing all the coe¢ cients to di¤er. In this case large and small capital requirements co-
e¢ cient di¤er largely. For small banks, the e¤ect of changes in trigger capital on capital is
positive and statistically signicant and the long run coe¢ cient is not statistically di¤er-
ent from 1 while the coe¢ cients (including the long run coe¢ cient) for large institutions
are not statistically signicant.16
These results suggest that large and small institutions react di¤erently to a change in
capital requirements. In other words, small institutions maintain a constant capital bu¤er
above the trigger capital, while large banks do not change their capital ratios following
changes in trigger capital. The lack of response to a change in capital requirements can
potentially a¤ect the transmission mechanism of capital requirements for large banks.
If large bankscapital requirements are not binding there is no reason why a change in
capital requirements will a¤ect large bankslending (see Figure 6.2). We investigate the
e¤ect of capital requirements on bank lending in the following subsection.
6.4.2. How does a change in capital requirements a¤ect bank lending growth?
Bank lending growth is likely to be a¤ected by bank specic (supply) and macroeconomic
(demand) factors (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Starting from the micro factors, capital
16The statistical insignicance of the capital requirement for large institutions could be due to the fact
that changes in trigger requirements vary less for large institutions than for small institutions. The two
coe¢ cients may then not be statistically di¤erent because of the large standard errors on large institutions
coe¢ cients. However, the standard errors of the trigger coe¢ cient are similar in magnitude and the long
run coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent.
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variables (i.e. capital requirements) and capital bu¤ers are likely to a¤ect lending growth
(Francis and Osborne (2010)).17 An increase in capital requirements should lead to a
decline in lending growth as it acts as a shock to capital, e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991)
and Peek and Rosengren (1997) nd that a shock to capital reduces lending supply. We
now look at the various controls in more detail and describe our priors on the sign of the
various estimates.
As discussed earlier, a change in capital requirements acts as a shock to capital. In our
case, a change in capital requirements reduces the capital bu¤er, and banks will have to
make up the di¤erence either by issuing fresh equity or by cutting lending. Alternatively,
banks could reduce the riskiness of their assets by switching from high risk weighted assets
to low risk weighted assets.
A higher level in capital bu¤er should be related to higher lending growth as banks are
better placed to withstand adverse economic shocks (e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991)).
Also a lower capital bu¤er should a¤ect lending growth negatively as banks try to stay
above the regulatory capital threshold by cutting lending. But an increase in capital
bu¤er may be costly, e.g. because of an adverse selection problem ( Myers and Majluf
(1984)). As funding costs rises, banks may cut lending in response.18 Also, if the capital
ratio is replenished by cutting lending, the bu¤er-lending relationship may be negative,
i.e. we may have a reverse causality problem.19
17Capital bu¤er is dened as the di¤erence between total capital and trigger requirement.
18In this analysis we restrict the e¤ect of capital bu¤ers on long run lending growth to be zero and
therefore we will include only changes of capital bu¤ers in the lending regression. In other words, we
assume that the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in the long run and that the e¤ect of changes in the
capital structure does not have an e¤ect on long run lending growth.
19We test for reverse causality problem in subsection 6.4.3.
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Total provisions a¤ect lending growth because higher provisions give an indication of
banksexpected losses and riskiness of banksasset side. As the bank expects larger losses,
it may decide to reduce lending to preserve its capital bu¤er in the future. Bankssize
could also a¤ect bankscapacity to lend. Large (and systemic) banks can benet from
lower funding costs, because of an easier access to capital markets and the presence of an
implicit government guarantee (Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2012), Noss and Sowerbutts
(2012)). And larger and more diversied banks may be less risky and therefore face
lower funding costs. This will translate into higher prots and therefore a higher level
of capital and lending. Being a foreign-owned bank or a non-bank nancial institution
may a¤ect lending growth. In particular, a foreign subsidiary may react di¤erently to a
shock to capital as its lending decisions may be also a function of economic and regulatory
conditions of the home market (Peek and Rosengren (1997), de Haas and van Lelyveld (
2011), Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013)).
We have also included a set of standard macro variables such as GDP growth, un-
employment rate, Bank of England base rate and changes in stock market prices which
aim to control for demand for bank lending.20 To capture structural changes in lending
patterns, we have also included a crisisdummy variable that takes value one from the
rst quarter of 2008 until the end of the sample.
More formally, the relationship between lending and balance sheet and macroeconomic
variables can be expressed by an Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model :
20These variables do not control for sectoral demand shocks. For example, if there is a specic shock
to real estate companies, banks that lend to real estate will be strongly a¤ected and their lending may
decline sharply. In this case macroeconomic variables may not pick up this e¤ect.
131
(6.2) lit =  + (L)lit + (L)Tit + (L)Bit + 0Iit + 
0At + uit
where lit is quarterly lending growth for bank i in period t, Tit is changes in trigger
capital requirement, Bit is changes in capital bu¤er, Iit is a vector of micro controls
and At is a vector of macro controls. uit is a normally distributed error term with mean
zero and variance 2; uit  N(0; 2):21 L is a lag operator where (L) =
4P
s=1
s(L
s),
(L) =
4P
s=0
s(L
s) and (L) =
4P
s=0
s(L
s):
We start by estimating equation 6.2 using OLS and we then test for xed e¤ects. We
then also test the restriction that the individual bank error term is uncorrelated with the
regressors (random e¤ects).
The key parameters of interest are the e¤ect of a change in capital requirements  and
capital bu¤ers  on bank lending growth. Table 6.3 presents the estimates of equation
6.2 for various specications. In (a) we estimate 6.2 using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares
(POLS) with bank controls only.
As expected, a change in capital requirements has a negative and statistically signif-
icant e¤ect (1% condence level) on lending growth. In the short term, a 1pp increase
in capital requirements leads to a 4.7pp reduction in lending growth. Its long-term e¤ect
remains negative, around 6pp, and statistically signicant. An increase in capital bu¤er
has a mildly negative e¤ect on lending growth (it is signicant at a 1% level) - a 1ppt
21We assume that the error terms are independent both in time and cross-section dimensions, i.e.
E(uit; ujs) = 0 for i 6= j; s 6= t:
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increase in the bu¤er is related to a 1.1pp decline in lending. Di¤erently from capital
requirements, this e¤ect is no longer statistically signicant in the long term.
The e¤ect of a change in capital bu¤ers is likely to work in the opposite direction of
a change in trigger requirements. As the macroprudential regulator decides to increase
capital requirements, the bu¤er will decline (bu¤er equals total capital ratio minus capital
requirements), o¤setting some of the lending growth decline generated by the increase in
capital requirements. Taking into account the combined e¤ects, a 1pp increase in trigger
requirement will lower lending growth by 3.6pp in the short term.22 For example, if banks
are lending at 10% growth rate, an increase in capital requirements will bring lending
growth to 6.4% in the short run.
Bank size is associated to lower lending growth (signicant at a 10% level), while
the crisis dummy is not statistically signicant. Dummy variables for non-bank nancial
institution and foreign subsidiary are also not statistically signicant. This could be due
to the small number of observations for these types of nancial institutions.
Specication (b) presents OLS estimates with macroeconomic variables. We have
included variables to capture general economic activity (e.g. changes in GDP and unem-
ployment rate) and variables that are likely to a¤ect bank lending growth (e.g. Bank of
England base rate and changes in UK stock prices)23. Parameters are little changed and
capital requirements and capital bu¤er still have a negative sign and are highly signi-
cant. Changes in equity returns a¤ect lending growth and the coe¢ cient has the positive
expected sign, i.e. with stronger equity markets, lending growth is higher. This may
22This is derived by subtracting -4.7 and -1.1 which are the trigger requirement and capital bu¤er coef-
cient estimates presented in Table 2.
23Here we have included FTSE100 returns.
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be because when equity prices increase the cost of bank equity declines, which in turn
leads to lower funding costs and higher bank lending. Surprisingly real GDP changes and
Bank of England base rate levels do not a¤ect lending growth which is in line with recent
empirical work, e.g. Ayiar et al. (2012).
We have then estimated the same regression with bank-specic and macroeconomic
controls using the Fixed E¤ects estimator, FE (c).24 The Fixed E¤ects are signicant,
therefore POLS estimates are not consistent. However the bias is probably not large as
the trigger requirement coe¢ cient is similar to POLS estimates and it is still signicant
at a 1% level. The capital bu¤er coe¢ cient declines somewhat (around 0.2pp) and loses
some signicance.
In (d) we have estimated the model using two-way FE and for this reason we have
excluded macro variables to avoid double counting. The R2 increases by around 6pp and
trigger requirement and capital bu¤er remain statistically signicant. The coe¢ cients are
broadly in line with one-way FE estimates even though several criteria suggest that the
FE specication should be preferred.25
6.4.3. Capital bu¤ers and endogeneity issues
As discussed previously, the negative coe¢ cient on changes in capital bu¤er may be related
to the fact that raising capital is costly which leads to higher funding costs and therefore
24We do not present Random E¤ects (RE) estimates because a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test
suggests that we cannot reject that the variance of the individual e¤ects is zero. Therefore RE does not
capture well the nature of the data generating process.
25In order to select the best specication between (c) and (d) we have performed a likelihood ratio test.
The test does not reject the null that the time e¤ects are zero. Moreover, both the Akaike Information
Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion conrms that the one-way FE model better ts the
data than the two-way FE model.
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Table 6.3. Total lending regressions
(a) (b) (c) (d)
VARIABLES Lend. g. Lend. g. Lend. g. Lend. g.
Lending growth (-1) 0.00484 0.00637 -0.0362 -0.0318
Lending growth (-2) 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.0953*** 0.111***
Lending growth (-3) 0.0754** 0.0755** -0.00466 0.00850
Lending growth (-4) 0.0530 0.0537 0.0171 0.0168
Cap. req. -4.665*** -4.992*** -4.728*** -4.675***
Cap. req. (-1) 1.263 2.033 1.429 0.813
Cap. req. (-2) 1.451 1.112 1.019 1.154
Cap. req. (-3) -2.853** -2.850* -2.816* -2.582
Cap. req. (-4) 0.711 0.744 0.365 0.908
Cap. buf. -1.131*** -1.121*** -0.870** -0.809**
Cap. buf. (-1) 0.309 0.295 0.00577 0.0157
Cap. buf. (-2) -0.186 -0.0951 0.0414 0.0802
Cap. buf. (-3) -0.0467 -0.0623 -0.312 -0.314
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.382** 0.370** 0.677*** 0.707***
Provision ratio (-4) -0.982 -0.872 -2.794*** -3.620***
Crisis 0.864 1.687 0.699 1.571
Bank size -0.236* -0.273* 0.560 -0.0187
Foreign sub. 0.498 0.483
Non-bank 0.764 0.754
Unemployment -0.121 -0.0729
Equity returns 0.0616** 0.0744**
GDP growth 0.856 0.922
GDP growth (-1) -0.936 -0.877
GDP growth (-2) 0.984 0.967
GDP growth (-3) -0.677 -1.026
GDP growth (-4) 0.551 0.586
BoE rate -1.104 -1.094
BoE rate (-1) 1.233 1.184
BoE rate (-2) 0.911 0.996
BoE rate (-3) -1.560 -1.809
BoE rate (-4) 0.468 0.628
Constant 4.080*** 4.863** -2.625 4.202
Observations 919 919 927 919
R-squared 0.088 0.103 0.088 0.154
Number of banks 40 39
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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lower lending. An alternative interpretation could be that the capital bu¤er variable may
have a negative correlation with lending by construction, i.e. increases in capital bu¤er
are achieved by cutting lending rather than issuing capital. This could be potentially an
endogeneity issue, where capital bu¤ers and lending decisions are taken simultaneously.
We have therefore estimated a panel VAR for changes in lending growth and changes
in capital bu¤er, with lending and capital bu¤er the only endogenous variables.26 The
system of equations looks as follows:
(6.3) Yit =  + (L)Yit + (L)Tit + (L)Bit + Iit + At + uit
where Yit = [lit;Cit]0;  = [1;2]
0;  = [1; 2]
0;  = [1;2]0;  = [01;
0
2];  =
[01;
0
2]: Variables with subscript 1 refer to the lending regression, while variables with
subscript 2 refer to the capital bu¤er regression. Variables and lag operators are dened
as in 6.2.
If increases in capital bu¤ers are driven (in Granger causality terms) by a reduction
in lending we would expect the lagged lending coe¢ cients in the capital bu¤er equation,
21 (i.e. the coe¢ cient of the lending variable in the second equation), to be negative
and jointly statistically signicant. However, a joint test of signicance of the lagged
lending variables rejects this hypothesis so that we can tentatively infer that the negative
coe¢ cient is linked to the cost of capital story rather than endogeneity issues.27
26In other word this is a panel VAR with exogenous variables. In each regression we have included
four lags of total lending growth and four lags of changes in capital bu¤er and we have excluded the
contemporaneous endogenous variables.
27However, this evidence is far from being conclusive and further analysis should be devoted to this issue.
Indeed a Breusch-Pagan test rejects the independence of the two equations as the correlation coe¢ cient
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6.4.4. Are large and small banks reacting di¤erently to an increase in capital
requirements?
Specication 6.2 assumes that the capital coe¢ cients are homogeneous across types of
institutions, so that for a bank of type i 6= j; i = j and i = j: However, it may be
the case that capital coe¢ cients change with bank characteristics, i.e. for bank of type
i 6= j; i 6= j and i 6= j: From a policy perspective this distinction is particularly
relevant. If, for example, a change in capital requirements a¤ect only small banks, the
total e¤ect on overall lending could be smaller than if the change a¤ected all banks in the
same way.28
One way to examine this issue would be to include interaction variables for capital
variables in equation 6.2, where trigger requirement and capital bu¤er are interacted with
dummies that take value one for large banks. If capital coe¢ cients vary for these types of
banks we would expect the interactions to be statistically signicant. For a given increase
in trigger capital, large banks may nd it easier to access capital markets than smaller
banks allowing large banks to operate with smaller capital bu¤ers. This may mean that
smaller banks may react more sharply to a regulatory change.
This hypothesis is consistent with the literature on transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy, where empirical evidence suggests that an increase in interest rates a¤ects
small banks more than large banks (Kashyap and Stein, 1994) and also with our simple
theoretical model on the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending.
between the errors is around -0.10. This may indicate that there is a certain degree of correlation between
lending and capital bu¤ers.
28In our sample, 60% of total lending was from large banks in Q4 2010.
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Table 6.4, specication (a), presents FE estimates with interaction variables for the
capital coe¢ cients for small and large banks, with all the other coe¢ cients constrained
to be the same.29 Interaction variables are not statistically signicant for any capital
variable, which may indicate that small and large capital coe¢ cients are similar.
However, this specication assumes that only capital parameters can vary. In (b)
and (c) we run separate FE regressions for large and small banks respectively. While
the large banksregression (b) indicates that the capital coe¢ cients are small and not
statistically signicant (but they maintain the expected negative sign), the small banks
coe¢ cients (c) are large and statistically signicant. For small banks, a 1pp increase in
capital requirements leads to a 5pp decline in lending in the short run30, which compares
with a 3.7pp change in the pooled regression.
These results suggest that small and large banks react di¤erently to a change in trigger
capital requirements and are consistent with our earlier ndings that capital requirements
are not binding for large banks.31 Therefore, the capital coe¢ cients that we observe in
the total lending regression are mainly driven by small banks. As discussed previously,
this heterogeneity may be due to large banks better access to capital markets so that,
following a regulatory shock, they are able to operate with smaller capital bu¤ers instead
of reducing bank lending.32
29The relevant variables are Cap. req. * larwith its lags and Cap. buf. * larwith its lags.
30We have considered the joint e¤ect of trigger requirement and capital bu¤er.
31The variability of changes in trigger requirements for large banks is lower than that for small banks.
In this case standard errors of the large coe¢ cient may be so large that the distribution of the large
coe¢ cient may include the distribution of the small coe¢ cient. If true, large and small coe¢ cients may
not be statistically di¤erent after all. However, this hypothesis is rejected, as standard errors of small
and large banks coe¢ cients are similar and their distributions barely overlap.
32We also performed a Chow test on the POLS regression to check whether all the coe¢ cients were
statistically di¤erent. The test suggests that the large and small specications are not statistically
di¤erent. However, the Chow test assumes that the error terms of both groups (in our case large and
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Table 6.4. Lending regression for large and small banks
(a) (b) (c)
VARIABLES Lend.g. Lend.g. (large) Lend.g. (small)
Lending growth (-1) -0.0350 0.0872 -0.0427
Lending growth (-2) 0.0958*** -0.00323 0.101**
Lending growth (-3) -0.00848 0.0338 -0.0155
Lending growth (-4) 0.0172 0.0567 0.0161
Cap. req. -5.200*** -0.455 -5.928***
Cap. req. * lar 4.190
Cap. req. (-1) 1.060 0.814 1.789
Cap. req. (-2) 1.664 -0.580 1.339
Cap. req. (-3) -3.655** -0.336 -3.713*
Cap. req. (-4) 0.814 0.135 0.959
Cap. req. * lar (-1) 0.814
Cap. req. * lar (-2) -2.332
Cap. req. * lar (-3) 2.953
Cap. req. * lar (-4) -1.686
Cap. buf. -0.936** -0.239 -0.960**
Cap. buf. * lar 0.479
Cap. buf. (-1) -0.0217 0.210 -0.0598
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.0417 -0.346 0.150
Cap. buf. (-3) -0.279 0.0845 -0.295
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.699*** -0.0730 0.712***
Cap. buf. * lar (-1) 0.291
Cap. buf. * lar (-2) -0.413
Cap. buf. * lar (-3) 0.290
Cap. buf. * lar (-4) -0.955
Bank controls yes yes yes
Macro controls yes yes yes
Constant -2.666 8.584 -3.510
Observations 919 330 589
R-squared 0.092 0.101 0.110
Number of banks 39 10 29
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In dynamic models, biases may arise if homogeneity of the coe¢ cients is inappropri-
ately imposed (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). This is because coe¢ cientsheterogeneity may
introduce autocorrelation of the error terms which in conjunction with the lagged depen-
dent variable will make the estimates inconsistent. To relax the homogeneity assumption
in the FE estimator we have estimated equation 6.2 using the Mean Group estimator for
large and small banks (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), where the number of the observations
allowed.33
In this case our estimate of the e¤ect of the capital variables on lending will be the
following:
MGE =
1
N
X
^i(6.4)
V (MGE) = 1=N(N   1)
X
(^i   MGE)(^i   MGE)0(6.5)
where MGE is the Mean Group estimator and ^i is the estimated coe¢ cients for
bank i. We have estimated MGE and V(MGE) using the same approach.
Unfortunately, the results are inconclusive as all the capital coe¢ cients are not sta-
tistically signicant due to large estimated variance of the mean group estimator. This
is probably due to the limited number of observations for some banks and the highly
unbalanced nature of our dataset.
small banks) are normally distributed with equal variance 2: The hypothesis that the estimated variance
of the residuals is the same is rejected, casting some doubts on Chow test results.
33We have used 5 large banks and 4 small banks to estimate coe¢ cients for large and small banks. Main
results are included in the Annex.
140
6.4.5. E¤ect of a change in capital requirements on sectoral lending
In the previous section we regressed total lending growth on a set of macroeconomic and
bank balance sheet variables and we found that capital requirements a¤ect bank lending
growth. But total lending growth is constructed by summing up lending to households
(both secured and unsecured) and lending to PNFCs. In this case, the richness of the
dataset allows us to test whether the e¤ect of changes in capital requirements vary for
di¤erent lending sectors. This can have important policy implications as the macropru-
dential regulator may want to act on booms (or busts) of particular lending sectors (Bank
of England, 2012a).
Table 6.5 presents various estimates for household secured, unsecured lending and
lending to PNFCs. For simplicity we present only FE estimates. The results di¤er from
what we have seen in the total lending regressions. For the secured lending regression (a)
the capital coe¢ cients lose signicance, even though they maintain the expected signs.
In the unsecured lending regression the capital requirement coe¢ cient becomes highly
signicant, while the capital bu¤er coe¢ cient loses signicance. For a 1pp increase in
capital requirements banks reduce unsecured lending by around 5pp in the short term.
The long run coe¢ cient is also statistically signicant. Unsecured lending is usually riskier
than secured lending, so this could indicate that given an increase in trigger requirement
nancial institutions decide to reduce unsecured lending and curb risk-weighted assets.
The coe¢ cient of trigger requirement on lending to PNFC has an unexpected sign
on the second lag, i.e. for an increase in trigger requirement we observe an increase in
lending to this type of lending but the long run coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant.
However, these estimates maybe driven by di¤erences in the sample used for each lending
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regression. For example, it may be possible that banks operating only in the unsecured
market may be structurally more sensitive to a change in capital requirements. In this
case our estimate will be biased upwards.
Banks may react to a change in regulatory policy with a reduction in lending growth.
However, banks may decide to switch from one type of lending to another without neces-
sarily reducing lending growth. In this case RWA will decline and the bank will be able to
comply with regulatory changes. Unfortunately the theoretical literature does not seem
to agree on the e¤ects of capital regulation on asset risk; depending on the assumptions
made in the model, an increase in capital requirements could increase or decrease banks
risk taking (VanHoose, 2007).
In practice, given that riskier lending (e.g. unsecured and PNFC ) attracts higher
capital surcharges, we would expect banks to switch from riskier to safer lending to reduce
their risk-weighted assets in order to boost their capital ratio. To assess whether banks
change the composition of their lending book we have estimated a multivariate panel
regression with exogenous variables (VARX) as follows:
(6.6) ljit = 
j
i +
3X
j=1
j(L)ljit + 
j(L)Tit + 
j(L)Bit + 
j0Iit + 
j0At + uit
For i = 1; 2 and 3, where j = 1 for secured lending to households, j = 2 for unsecured
lending to households and j = 3 for lending to PNFCs. Lag operators and explanatory
variables are dened as in equation 6.2.
Table 6.6 presents the estimates for the system of equations 6.6. In the short term,
nancial institutions change the composition of their lending following an increase in
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Table 6.5. Regressions for secured, unsecured and lending to PNFCs
(a) (b) (c)
VARIABLES Sec. lend. g. Unsec. lend. g. Pnfc lend. g.
Cap. req. -0.0214 -4.660*** -1.338
Cap. req. (-1) 1.388 -2.110 6.015***
Cap. req. (-2) -0.210 0.578 -0.500
Cap. req. (-3) -0.562 -0.104 -2.771
Cap. req. (-4) -0.421 -0.158 3.552*
Cap. buf. -0.148 -0.643 0.0662
Cap. buf. (-1) 0.533* 0.841 -0.200
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.130 -0.741 0.421
Cap. buf. (-3) 0.167 0.536 -0.241
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.332 -0.160 -0.375
Provision ratio (-4) -0.602 -3.562*** -3.152**
Crisis 1.739* 1.187 1.741
Bank size -1.467** -2.100* 2.994**
Unemployment -0.428** 0.211 -0.119
Equity returns 0.00812 -0.0436 0.0984**
GDP growth -0.109 0.147 1.369
GDP growth (-1) -0.00440 1.330 -1.269
GDP growth (-2) 0.571 -0.160 0.916
GDP growth (-3) -0.342 -1.692* -0.217
GDP growth (-4) -0.431 0.858 0.991
BoE rate 0.101 -0.275 -1.558*
BoE rate (-1) -0.266 -0.313 2.199
BoE rate (-2) 0.274 1.098 1.960
BoE rate (-3) -0.298 -1.425 -2.463
BoE rate (-4) 0.229 0.703 0.620
Constant 18.92** 24.02* -32.80**
Lagged lending growth yes yes yes
Observations 750 920 837
R-squared 0.099 0.057 0.101
Number of banks 33 39 38
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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capital requirements. In particular, it appears that banks substitute away from PNFC
lending. The capital requirement coe¢ cient is lower than in the general specication and
this can be due to two reasons. First, we are looking at a di¤erent specication, as we
include lags of all the other types of lending as explanatory variables. Second, the number
of observations is almost halved. Several institutions are dropped out of the sample as
they do not operate in all the three types of lending sectors.
We have run two separate multivariate regressions for large and small banks using
equation 6.6 to test whether changes in asset composition a¤ect small and large banks
in the same way. The estimates are presented in Table 6.7. The coe¢ cients suggest
that the adjustment in the asset composition is mainly driven by small banks. This is
consistent with our earlier results, i.e. large banks are insensitive to changes in capital
requirements.34
6.5. Conclusions
We nd that changes in individual capital requirements a¤ect lending growth. This
is because capital requirements are binding and nancial institutions try to maintain a
constant bu¤er of capital above the capital requirement. A 1pp change in the capital
requirements leads to a 4.7pp change in bank lending growth in the short-term. Changes
in capital bu¤ers have a negative (albeit smaller) impact on lending. A 1pp increase
in the bu¤er leads to a decline of around 0.9pp decline in lending. When considering
the combined e¤ect of trigger requirement and capital bu¤er, a 1pp change in capital
requirements leads to a 3.8pp change in bank lending growth in the short term. This
34The number of observations for these regressions decline dramatically compared to total lending esti-
mates, and therefore these estimates should be interpreted with some care.
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Table 6.6. VARX regression for secured, unsecured and lending to PNFCs
(a) (b) (c) (d)
VARIABLES Lend. g. Sec. lend. g. Unsec. lend. g. Pnfc lend. g.
Cap. req. -2.738** -0.261 -0.106 -2.739**
Cap. req. (-1) 2.968* 1.492 -1.995 2.964
Cap. req. (-2) 0.116 -2.122 2.674* 0.393
Cap. req. (-3) -1.131 -0.884 1.203 -1.453
Cap. req. (-4) 0.673 -0.102 0.653 1.606
Cap. buf. -0.647* 0.409 -0.557 -1.689***
Cap. buf. (-1) -0.175 0.393 -0.311 0.392
Cap. buf. (-2) -0.491 0.393 -0.462 -0.680
Cap. buf. (-3) 0.970** -0.385 -0.0735 0.691
Cap. buf. (-4) -0.169 0.157 -0.144 -0.743*
Provision ratio (-4) -1.222* -1.025* -0.584 -1.998**
Crisis 2.466** 0.580 -0.474 0.909
Bank size -0.353** 0.0570 0.0808 -0.407**
Unemployment -0.348** -0.204 -0.315** -0.364*
Equity returns 0.0595** 0.0156 -0.00346 0.0726**
GDP growth 0.478 0.0360 -0.0409 0.402
GDP growth (-1) -0.00678 0.0832 0.335 -0.411
GDP growth (-2) 0.571 0.135 0.359 1.281*
GDP growth (-3) 0.521 -0.300 0.392 -0.326
GDP growth (-4) -0.220 0.153 0.00213 -0.270
BoE rate -0.337 0.0293 0.489 -0.415
BoE rate (-1) 0.250 0.196 -0.692 -0.0656
BoE rate (-2) 0.902 -0.219 0.223 1.349
BoE rate (-3) -1.326 0.368 -0.523 -0.606
BoE rate (-4) 0.740 -0.228 0.620 -0.108
Constant 5.427** 0.897 1.625 7.455***
Lags yes yes yes yes
Observations 579 579 579 579
R-squared 0.180 0.501 0.230 0.337
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.7. VARX regressions for large and small banks
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is because following an increase in trigger requirement, its negative impact on lending is
partially o¤set by the positive e¤ect of a lower capital bu¤er. In the long term, a 1pp
change in capital requirements changes lending growth by 5pp.
Large and small banks tend to react di¤erently to an increase in capital requirements.
Large banks seem insensitive to an increase in capital requirements; for these banks capital
ratio and lending growth is una¤ected. On the other hand, small banks cut lending growth
quite sharply as a response. From a policy perspective, this may a¤ect the extent to which
total lending to the real economy is a¤ected given a change in capital requirements. This
could be due to various factors, but better access to capital markets for large banks may
allow large banks to operate with smaller capital bu¤ers.
We have also examined the extent to which nancial institutions change the composi-
tion of their assets following a change in trigger capital. We found preliminary evidence
that small banks react to changes in capital requirements by cutting lending to PNFCs
and reduce the riskiness of their balance sheet.
Overall, an increase in capital requirements seem to have a dual e¤ect on lending
behaviour; not only it a¤ects the volume of lending, but also the composition and the
riskiness of (small) banksbalance sheet.
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Appendix
6.A. Appendix
6.A.1. Capital and capital requirements for small and large banks
Figure 6.A.1 shows total capital ratios and capital requirements for large and small banks
that are used in our main regressions. There are three main points to make: 1) Small
banks operated on average with higher capital bu¤ers than large banks; 2) Small banks
capital ratios seem more sensitive to changes in capital requirements, e.g. during the
crisis period; 3) Large bankscapital ratios increased sharply during the crisis, which is
consistent with our hypothesis that it is easier for large banks to issue capital when needed
(in this case probably to meet an increase market capital requirements).
6.A.2. Long run coe¢ cients - capital ratio regression
Long run coe¢ cients are dened as the sum of the lagged coe¢ cients divided by one
minus the sum of the lagged lending coe¢ cients and represent the cumulative e¤ect of a
change in capital requirements on changes in capital ratio. Table 6.A.1 shows the long
run coe¢ cients for capital requirements estimates using di¤erent specications - POLS
with only bank specic variables, POLS with bank-specic and macroeconomic variables,
FE and FE for small and large banks.
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Figure 6.A.1. Capital ratio and capital requirements for large and small banks
Table 6.A.1. Capital regression, long run coe¢ cients for capital requirements
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
POLS 1.240043 0.298847 4.15 0.653674 1.826412
POLS and macro 1.297229 0.313622 4.14 0.681853 1.912606
FE 0.86802 0.24637 3.52 0.384582 1.351458
Small 0.969167 0.292496 3.31 0.395001 1.543334
Large -0.01264 0.426482 -0.03 -0.853 0.827734
Table 6.A.2 shows the long run coe¢ cients (using FE) for macroeconomic variables,
GDP growth and Bank of England base rate, included in our preferred capital specica-
tion.
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Table 6.A.2. Capital regression - long run coe¢ cients of macroeconomic
variables
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
GDP growth 0.058092 0.171888 0.34 -0.27918 0.395363
Bank of England rate -0.02715 0.036047 -0.75 -0.09788 0.043577
6.A.3. Granger causality tests - capital ratio regression
We may have reverse causality problems in the capital regression such that changes in
capital a¤ect changes in capital requirements. For example, this may happen if the
regulator increases capital requirements following declines in total capital. To understand
whether there may be reverse causality problems we have estimated a system of equations
with capital and capital requirements as endogenous variables and then tested for joint
signicance of capital and capital requirements regressors in the capital requirements
regression and capital regression respectively. Table 6.A.3 shows that we can reject the
hypothesis (at a 10% condence level) that the capital requirements are jointly zero in
the capital equation while we do not reject the hypothesis that the capital variables are
jointly zero in the capital requirements regression.
Table 6.A.3. Granger causality tests - capital equation
H0 F Prob>F
Capital lags jointly zero in capital requirements equation 1.55 0.1852
Capital requirements jointly zero in capital equation 2.35 0.0529
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6.A.4. Long run coe¢ cients - lending regressions
Table 6.A.4, rst three rows, shows the long run coe¢ cients for capital requirements in
the lending regression using di¤erent estimation methods. The last three rows of table
6.A.4 show the FE estimates of the long run coe¢ cients for the sectoral lending equations.
Table 6.A.4. Lending regression - long run coe¢ cients of capital requirements
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
POLS -5.79034 2.87037 -2.02 -11.4237 -0.15693
POLS and macro -5.56517 2.959253 -1.88 -11.3731 0.242785
FE -5.09619 2.385325 -2.14 -9.77795 -0.41443
Secured 0.277114 2.614225 0.11 -4.8557 5.40993
Unsecured -6.99696 3.040517 -2.3 -12.9647 -1.02918
PNFC 5.017999 3.13006 1.6 -1.12647 11.16246
Table 6.A.5, rst three rows, shows the long run coe¢ cients for the capital bu¤er in
the lending regression using various estimation methods. In the last three rows of Table
6.A.5 we present the estimates of the sectoral lending equations.
Table 6.A.5. Lending regression - long run coe¢ cients of capital bu¤er
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
POLS -0.951 0.811756 -1.17 -2.54415 0.642161
POLS and macro -0.86301 0.815094 -1.06 -2.46274 0.736732
FE -0.493 0.645109 -0.76 -1.75918 0.773173
Secured 1.624404 0.729974 2.23 0.19116 3.057648
Unsecured -0.18059 0.764588 -0.24 -1.68128 1.32011
PNFC -0.33319 0.758499 -0.44 -1.82216 1.155786
6.A.5. E¤ect of capital requirements with low capital bu¤ers
In Column d, Table 6.A.6 we include the results for a regression with an interaction
variable between capital requirements and low capital bu¤ers (i.e. 2.4pp, the bottom
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25th percentile of the distribution). By interacting capital requirements and small capital
bu¤ers, we would like to test whether banks that have a smaller capital bu¤er react more
to a change in capital requirements as they get close to regulatory intervention.
Table 6.A.7 shows that the long run coe¢ cient for the capital requirement remains
broadly unchanged compared to our favourite regression but the interaction with low
capital bu¤er is positive and not statistically signicant. This suggests that banks with a
lower bu¤er may not react more to a change in capital requirements.
6.A.6. Lending regression in levels
In Table 6.A.8 we have re specied the lending regression with capital requirements and
capital bu¤ers in levels to test whether there is a relationship between capital require-
ments, capital bu¤ers and long run lending growth (not to be confused with long run
estimates).
In Table 6.A.9 we have tested whether the coe¢ cients of the lending regression in
levels are equal to minus the following lag. If we cannot reject this hypothesis then our
equation should be specied in changes rather than levels. We present here the test results
for capital requirements and capital bu¤ers. Table 6.A.9 shows that for the majority of
the lags the preferred specication is in changes, i.e. there is no long run relationship
between capital requirements, bu¤ers and bank lending growth.
152
Table 6.A.6. Comparing lending regression estimates with banks with low
capital bu¤ers
(a) (b) (c) (d)
VARIABLES Lend.g. Lend.g. (large) Lend.g. (small) Lend.g.(low buf.)
Lending growth (-1) -0.0350 0.0872 -0.0427 -0.0448
Lending growth (-2) 0.0958*** -0.00323 0.101** 0.0786**
Lending growth (-3) -0.00848 0.0338 -0.0155 0.00680
Lending growth (-4) 0.0172 0.0567 0.0161 -0.000415
Cap. req. -5.200*** -0.455 -5.928*** -4.068**
Cap. req. * lar 4.190
Cap. req. (-1) 1.060 0.814 1.789 0.505
Cap. req. (-2) 1.664 -0.580 1.339 2.030
Cap. req. (-3) -3.655** -0.336 -3.713* -4.873***
Cap. req. (-4) 0.814 0.135 0.959 0.819
Cap. req. * lar (-1) 0.814
Cap. req. * lar (-2) -2.332
Cap. req. * lar (-3) 2.953
Cap. req. * lar (-4) -1.686
Cap. buf. -0.936** -0.239 -0.960**
Cap. buf. * lar 0.479
Cap. buf. (-1) -0.0217 0.210 -0.0598
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.0417 -0.346 0.150
Cap. buf. (-3) -0.279 0.0845 -0.295
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.699*** -0.0730 0.712***
Cap. buf. * lar (-1) 0.291
Cap. buf. * lar (-2) -0.413
Cap. buf. * lar (-3) 0.290
Cap. buf. * lar (-4) -0.955
Cap. req. * lowbuf 0.701
Cap. req. * lowbuf (-1) 2.936
Cap. req. * lowbuf (-2) -0.149
Cap. req. * lowbuf (-3) 4.112
Cap. req. * lowbuf (-4) -2.566
Bank controls yes yes yes yes
Macro controls yes yes yes yes
Constant -2.666 8.584 -3.510 -8.086
Observations 919 330 589 951
R-squared 0.092 0.101 0.110 0.063
Number of banks 39 10 29 39
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.A.7. Low bu¤er regression - long run coe¢ cients for capital requirements
Coef. Std. Err. t [95% Conf. Interval]
Cap. req. -5.821065 2.540115 -2.29 -10.7996 -.8425318
Cap. req.*low bu¤er 5.245531 5.606766 0.94 -5.743528 16.23459
6.A.7. Lagrange multiplier test for RE
Table 6.A.10 shows the output of a Lagrange multiplier test for RE and suggests that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the individual e¤ects is zero. From this test we infer
that RE does not capture well the data generating process.
6.A.8. Chow test for large and small banks
In Table 6.A.11 we present the output of a Chow test for large and small banks regressions
to test whether all the coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent. The test suggests that large
and small estimates are not statistically di¤erent. However, we also reject that the vari-
ances of the residuals are the same (test not presented in the Annex), therefore violating
one of the assumptions of the Chow test.
6.A.9. Testing for RE vs. FE - Hausman test
In Table 6.A.12 we present the output of the Hausman test to determine whether it is
better to estimate the lending regression with RE or FE. The Hausman test rejects the
hypothesis that the RE and FE are the same. The FE estimator is therefore consistent
under the alternative hypothesis of correlation between the regressors and the bank specic
e¤ects.
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Table 6.A.8. Lending regression in levels
Lending growth Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Lending growth (-1) -0.01468 0.034225 -0.43 0.668 -0.08184 0.052492
Lending growth (-2) 0.146582 0.034422 4.26 0 0.079027 0.214137
Lending growth (-3) 0.080989 0.034143 2.37 0.018 0.013981 0.147996
Lending growth (-4) 0.063582 0.034984 1.82 0.069 -0.00508 0.13224
Cap. req. -5.15532 1.280861 -4.02 0 -7.66906 -2.64159
Cap. req (-1) 7.734936 2.533497 3.05 0.002 2.762852 12.70702
Cap. req (-2) -2.00361 2.806381 -0.71 0.475 -7.51124 3.504018
Cap. req (-3) -2.97799 2.43492 -1.22 0.222 -7.75661 1.800629
Cap. req (-4) 2.169799 1.307741 1.66 0.097 -0.39669 4.736291
Cap. buf. -1.37764 0.361523 -3.81 0 -2.08714 -0.66814
Cap. buf. (-1) 1.585172 0.6756 2.35 0.019 0.259282 2.911061
Cap. buf. (-2) -0.62255 0.758801 -0.82 0.412 -2.11173 0.866621
Cap. buf. (-3) 0.452208 0.668047 0.68 0.499 -0.85886 1.763275
Cap. buf. (-4) -0.21884 0.346806 -0.63 0.528 -0.89946 0.461779
Provision ratio (-4) -1.04503 0.670949 -1.56 0.12 -2.36179 0.271738
foreign sub. 0.905159 0.556207 1.63 0.104 -0.18642 1.996737
Non bank 0.728828 1.0269 0.71 0.478 -1.2865 2.744157
Crisis 1.5086 1.203581 1.25 0.21 -0.85347 3.870673
Bank size -0.35671 0.178548 -2 0.046 -0.70712 -0.00631
Unemployment -0.13701 0.186071 -0.74 0.462 -0.50218 0.228163
Equity returns 0.053213 0.02993 1.78 0.076 -0.00553 0.111951
GDP growth 0.76824 0.611808 1.26 0.21 -0.43246 1.968935
GDP growth (-1) -0.67113 0.672803 -1 0.319 -1.99153 0.649275
GDP growth (-2) 0.974283 0.691591 1.41 0.159 -0.38299 2.331556
GDP growth (-3) -0.67609 0.620931 -1.09 0.277 -1.89469 0.542506
GDP growth (-4) 0.36001 0.568011 0.63 0.526 -0.75473 1.474752
BoE rate -1.03964 0.658063 -1.58 0.114 -2.33111 0.251834
BoE rate (-1) 0.949283 1.20023 0.79 0.429 -1.40621 3.304779
BoE rate (-2) 1.111292 1.297616 0.86 0.392 -1.43533 3.657912
BoE rate (-3) -1.65582 1.187231 -1.39 0.163 -3.9858 0.67417
BoE rate (-4) 0.506596 0.641247 0.79 0.43 -0.75188 1.765066
Constant 9.098369 5.237882 1.74 0.083 -1.18117 19.37791
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Table 6.A.9. Tests on level regression
F Prob>F
Trigger L0=-L1 2.33 0.1271
L1=-L2 9.74 0.0019
L2=-L3 6.86 0.009
L3=-L4 0.27 0.6017
Bu¤er L0=-L1 0.24 0.6272
L1=-L2 5.23 0.0224
L2=-L3 0.18 0.6747
L3=-L4 0.32 0.5708
Table 6.A.10. Lagrangian multiplier test for random e¤ects
chi2 (1) Prob>chi2
Var(u)=0 1.71 0.1909
Table 6.A.11. Chow test for large and small banks
SSR No. observations No. vars
Restricted (pooled) 34201.34 919 31
Unrestricted (small and large banks) 33400.02
Chow test 0.663252
6.A.10. One-way vs. two-way FE criteria
Both the AIC and BIC suggest that the one-way FE ts better the data (Table 6.A.13).
Moreover, the likelihood ratio test does not reject the null that time e¤ects are zero.
6.A.11. Panel VARX for lending and capital bu¤er
As discussed in Subsection 6.4.3 we discussed possible endogeneity issues for the capital
bu¤er variable. In Table 6.A.14 we present the estimates of the panel VARX for lending
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Table 6.A.12. Hausman test for FE and RE
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
FE RE Di¤. S.E.
Lending growth (-1) -0.03581 0.006367 -0.04218 0.000821
Lending growth (-2) 0.09505 0.154082 -0.05903 0.002493
Lending growth (-3) -0.00494 0.075495 -0.08044 0.007004
Lending growth (-4) 0.017188 0.053701 -0.03651 0.007501
Cap. req. -4.74102 -4.99201 0.250993 0.289038
Cap. req. (-1) 1.43708 2.032645 -0.59557 .
Cap. req. (-2) 0.98908 1.112056 -0.12298 .
Cap. req. (-3) -2.81129 -2.8502 0.038914 .
Cap. req. (-4) 0.389488 0.744257 -0.35477 .
Cap. buf. -0.87012 -1.12065 0.250534 .
Cap. buf. (-1) 0.009789 0.294885 -0.2851 .
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.027144 -0.09512 0.122268 0.014273
Cap. buf. (-3) -0.30633 -0.06231 -0.24402 .
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.682953 0.370156 0.312797 0.051503
Provision ratio (-4) -2.78612 -0.87169 -1.91443 0.723218
Crisis 0.678878 1.686942 -1.00806 0.571577
Bank size 0.561461 -0.27349 0.834952 0.893048
Unemployment -0.0731 -0.12126 0.048164 0.182474
Equity returns 0.075922 0.061617 0.014305 .
GDP growth 0.892748 0.855719 0.037029 .
GDP growth (-1) -0.88366 -0.93575 0.052092 .
GDP growth (-2) 0.965852 0.984272 -0.01842 .
GDP growth (-3) -1.02769 -0.677 -0.35069 .
GDP growth (-4) 0.623995 0.550994 0.073001 .
BoE rate -1.09933 -1.10363 0.0043 .
BoE rate (-1) 1.207815 1.232753 -0.02494 .
BoE rate (-2) 0.964072 0.911387 0.052685 .
BoE rate (-3) -1.8199 -1.5598 -0.2601 .
BoE rate (-4) 0.651187 0.468362 0.182825 .
chi2 (29) = 298.76 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
and capital bu¤er and Table 6.A.15 shows the correlation matrix of the residuals for the
panel VARX.
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Table 6.A.13. Information criteria for one and two-way FE
Model Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC
FE 919 -2958.18 -2915.79 30 5891.589 6036.287
Two-way FE 919 -2958.18 -2881.09 95 5952.187 6410.4
name command depvar npar title
FE xtreg Lending growth 32
Two-way FE xtreg Lending growth 111
Table 6.A.16 present the results of the Granger causality test which shows that a joint
test of signicance marginally rejects the hypothesis that lending growth Granger causes
changes in capital bu¤er.
6.A.12. Mean Group estimator for large and small banks
In Table 6.A.17 we show the mean group estimator estimates (Pesaran and Smith (1995))
for large and small banks. As discussed in Subsection 6.4.4, the standard errors are large
(not presented here) because of the highly unbalanced nature of the dataset making this
estimation technique not applicable to our data.
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Table 6.A.14. Panel VAR for lending and capital bu¤er (OLS)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Lend. growth Cap. buf.
Lending growth (-1) 0.00650 -0.000120
Lending growth (-2) 0.154*** 0.000298
Lending growth (-3) 0.0725** 0.00264
Lending growth (-4) 0.0436 0.00902***
Cap. buf. (-1) -0.354 0.579***
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.434 -0.473***
Cap. buf. (-3) -0.239 0.158***
Cap. buf. (-4) 0.431** -0.0539***
Cap. req. -4.027*** -0.862***
Cap. req. (-1) 1.269 0.682***
Cap. req. (-2) 1.512 -0.356**
Cap. req. (-3) -3.033** 0.163
Cap. req. (-4) 0.428 0.282**
Provision ratio (-4) -1.018 0.131**
Crisis 1.611 0.0682
Bank size -0.287** 0.0123
Unemployment -0.115 -0.00537
Equity returns 0.0603* 0.00115
GDP growth 0.768 0.0781
GDP growth (-1) -0.997 0.0545
GDP growth (-2) 1.173 -0.168**
GDP growth (-3) -0.727 0.0445
GDP growth (-4) 0.514 0.0330
BoE rate -1.068 -0.0319
BoE rate (-1) 1.182 0.0450
BoE rate (-2) 1.034 -0.109
BoE rate (-3) -1.670 0.0987
BoE rate (-4) 0.483 -0.0133
Foreign sub. 0.536 -0.0472
Non bank 0.868 -0.101
Constant 5.028** -0.147
Observations 919 919
R-squared 0.094 0.362
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.A.15. Correlation matrix of residuals
correlation matrix of residuals
Lending growth Cap. buf.
Lending growth 1
Cap. buf. -0.1026 1
Table 6.A.16. Granger causality test
F Prob>F
Lending lags all zero in bu¤er equation 2.35 0.0528
Bu¤er lags all zero in lending equation 1.86 0.1150
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Table 6.A.17. Mean group estimator
Large banks Small banks
Lending growth (-1) -0.23577 0.024402
Lending growth (-2) -0.17521 -0.08318
Lending growth (-3) -0.1405 -0.14597
Lending growth (-4) -0.05785 0.132386
Cap. req. -4.2294 -3.74219
Cap. req. (-1) -2.77113 -27.4012
Cap. req. (-2) -2.35333 36.73487
Cap. req. (-3) 2.932964 -18.3032
Cap. req. (-4) 1.495341 -7.15772
Cap. buf. 0.741128 -0.19325
Cap. buf. (-1) 1.072797 -2.21783
Cap. buf. (-2) 0.454269 -2.88997
Cap. buf. (-3) 0.883326 -2.7201
Cap. buf. (-4) -0.01803 1.012093
Provision ratio (-4) -2.14078 1.266076
Crisis 1.564807 -0.31208
Bank size 10.04597 9.101392
Unemployment 0.635783 -0.20617
Equity returns 0.040829 0.288589
GDP growth -0.73919 -5.90662
GDP growth (-1) -1.54024 -7.27562
GDP growth (-2) 0.38604 1.499031
GDP growth (-3) -0.92068 0.07
GDP growth (-4) -0.45913 -0.09421
BoE rate 0.455695 -0.73178
BoE rate (-1) 0.668943 3.709168
BoE rate (-2) -0.01136 0.077921
BoE rate (-3) -0.55963 -11.8986
BoE rate (-4) 0.206908 9.326436
Constant -123.484 -73.6181
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
Weak bank lending has plagued the UK economy since the beginning of the nancial
crisis by lowering economic growth and by a¤ecting the stability of the nancial system.
Policymakers in countries hit by the nancial crisis acted swiftly in an attempt to support
bank lending growth.
In the UK, the central bank purchased gilts from non-bank nancial institutions funded
by the creation of central bank money, the so called Quantitative Easing (QE). Moreover,
the government established a macroprudential regulator, the Financial Policy Committee
within the Bank of England, to monitor and reduce systemic risk so that excessive credit
growth will be less likely in the future. This thesis provides an empirical analysis on
the e¤ects of QE and macroprudential policy (focusing on capital requirements) on bank
lending using a non-publicly available panel dataset on UK banks.
We nd that both QE and capital requirements have a positive e¤ect on bank lending
growth even though with di¤erent magnitudes. While changes in capital requirements
seem to have a economically signicant impact on bank lending, QE seems to have a
limited impact on lending growth.
Our results also suggest that, in responding to policy actions, there is a certain degree
of heterogeneity within the banking system with small banks being the most a¤ected.
While this may be a positive development as it may reduce the gap between large and
small banks in the lending market (for example because of the e¤ects of QE on bank
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lending), it provides important challenges to policymakers as large part of lending in the
UK is extended by major banks.
In particular, if QE is ine¤ective in supporting lending growth of large banks, it is
unlikely that lending as whole will increase, if anything. In this case, more measures may
be necessary for a more signicant impact on bank lending. One possible measure would
be to increase the amount of asset purchases so that the overall e¤ect on bank lending may
become economically signicant. An alternative could be to increase the capitalisation
of the banking system which might boost the e¤ectiveness of the QE programme, as
suggested by our results.
From a macroprudential perspective, if increases in capital requirements are ine¤ective
in changing bank lending behaviour of large banks, it may be di¢ cult for macroprudential
regulators to avoid a bank lending boom and the build up of systemic risk. In order
to increase the e¤ectiveness of a regulatory shock on large banks it would be useful to
investigate the structural reasons for this heterogeneous response. A possible reason
may be that large banks, given their systemic importance, incur in low regulatory costs
when approaching or breaching capital requirements. If this is a plausible explanation,
structural reforms to reduce systemic importance of major institutions may increase the
potency of macroprudential tools.
There are several limitations in the analysis on the e¤ects of these policies on the
banking system. When we analyse the e¤ects of QE on bank lending we assume that
QE a¤ects banksbalance sheets only through deposits, but there may be other channels
through which QE a¤ects banksbalance sheets. For example, as long as QE a¤ects yields
at the long end of the gilt curve it may also change the steepness of the curve and therefore
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the capacity of banks to generate prots (recall that banks borrow short and lend long).
Moreover, as QE boosts nominal demand, it may a¤ect the structure of banksbalance
sheets (e.g. by increasing demand for bank lending) that is not captured by changes in
deposits. A more comprehensive empirical analysis of these channels is likely to provide
us with a better answer on how QE a¤ect banksbalance sheets and in particular bank
lending.
From an econometric perspective, there are two main limitations. First, we use histori-
cal information on the relationship between deposits and bank lending before the nancial
crisis to estimate the impact of changes in deposits during the crisis, i.e. we perform a
counterfactual exercise. But the robustness of these estimates rests on the hypothesis
that the relationship between changes in deposits and bank lending did not change struc-
turally, which is di¢ cult to test with few observations during the nancial crisis period.
Performing tests for structural stability with more observations will shed more light on
this issue.
Second, the amount of deposits over asset ratio, which we use as a proxy for the e¤ects
of QE, may be a¤ected by endogeneity problems. If nancial institutions raise deposits
because they expect more lending opportunities in the future, our estimated relationship
between deposits and lending may represent a correlation between these two quantities
rather than a causal relationship. We have tried to exclude this hypothesis by showing
that macroeconomic variables (which we use as a proxy for lending opportunities) do
not a¤ect the deposit over asset ratio. However, nding an instrument that is correlated
with the deposit over asset ratio but uncorrelated with bank lending and estimating the
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deposit-bank lending relationship with instrumental variable estimator may give us less
biased estimates. We leave this work to future research.
The limitations in the analysis on the e¤ects of capital requirements on bank lending
are mainly related to the fact that the UK regulator have set capital requirements from a
microprudential perspective, i.e. capital requirements are set to preserve the solvency of
individual banks rather than the banking system as a whole. Even though it is di¢ cult
to overcome this limitation as the macroprudential regulator has been established only
recently, this limitation may a¤ect the condence with which we can use these estimates
for policy purposes. For example, the macroprudential regulator may increase capital
requirements for all banks to avoid a credit boom and this may have a very di¤erent
e¤ect on bank lending from an increase in capital requirements for an individual bank
due to bank specic (microprudential) problems. Future research may try to tackle this
issue by estimating the impact of changes in capital requirements that were common to
several banks, e.g. because market risk increased for these banks at the same time. But a
better answer will come with more data when the macroprudential regulator will change
capital requirements based on systemic risk considerations.
The nal limitation is related to the possible endogeneity of changes in capital require-
ments. As discussed in Chapter 6, a large shock to capital may induce the regulator to
increase capital requirements as the banks default probability increases generating reverse
causality problems. However, as described earlier on, capital requirements are set every
18 to 36 months and do not necessarily change promptly in response to changes in banks
capital ratios. Therefore, the institutional setting of capital requirements reduces the ex-
tent to which endogeneity problems a¤ect our regressions. Moreover, Granger causality
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tests suggest that changes in capital requirements Granger cause changes in capital ratios
and not vice versa. Finding a suitable instrument for changes in capital requirements
is a di¢ cult task but possible candidates could be regulatory changes that a¤ect capital
requirements but are not related to bank lending. A possible instrument can be found in
the way the UK regulator set capital requirements. For example, the UK regulator may
increase capital requirements for a new subsidiary that is added to the existing group
(FSA (2001)). This shock is unrelated to the lending market of the newly added sub-
sidiary or to its capital position and could therefore be a valid instrument. For several
reasons we opted for the use of bank consolidated data in our analysis so we were not able
to test this hypothesis. We therefore leave this important question to future research.
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